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Liabilityt
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Through 1991 over 4,000 persons contracted AIDS through
transfusion. Statutes in forty-nine states exempt blood banks from
strict liability, and the usual neglignce rule is weak. Analyzing the
medical literature, regulation, and case law, Eckert argues that
blood bankers have superior information for reducing risk and
that stronger liability rules should be reconsidered.
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[T]here are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with




Historians, writing years from now, probably will view the 1980s
and 1990s as the "age of viruses." One of the deadliest agents to
appear so far in the age of viruses is the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) that causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS). AIDS is the failure of the body's immune system and is a
uniformly fatal disease. It caused the public health crisis of our
time.2 Through February 1992 the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) received reports of 213,641 cases, of which 4,770 (2.2%)
were caused by blood transfusion.3 In 1987 the CDC estimated that
1. Quoted in Barbara J. Culliton, Emerging Viruses, Emerging Threat, 247 SCl-
ENCE 279, 279 (1990).
2. The worldwide influenza pandemic in 1918 killed more than 20 million. Barbara
J. Culliton, Influenza Mutants Deadly, 247 SCIENCE 280 (1990).
3. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., Mar. 1992,
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between 1978 and 1984 blood transfusions transmitted HIV infec-
tion to 12,000 adults who were still alive-more than twice the num-
ber of cases reported to CDC through February 1992.: That
estimate does not take into account HIV infections spread by trans-
fusion recipients in turn to others through sex, pregnancy, or both.
AIDS litigation has grown with diagnoses. As of 1987 about
twenty percent of persons who were transfused and developed AIDS
as a result sued the blood bank, hospital, physician, or some group of
them.5 In 1991 it was estimated that three hundred lawsuits were in
process against blood banks, 6 with over twenty consolidated in San
Francisco alone.7
The only successful actions against blood banks have been in neg-
ligence. Blood banking, unique among industries, is immune from
strict liability in all but one state owing to what are called "blood
shield laws." 8 Enacted mainly in the 1960s and 1970s when hepatitis
at 9. Another 1,944 cases occurred among persons with coagulation disorders, who are
transfused with blood or blood products frequently. The CDC counts AIDS cases among
that group separately from cases among persons who were not at risk for AIDS except as
a result of transfusion. Litigation by persons with coagultion disorders is not the subject
of this Article.
HIV-related deaths for the period covered by this Article probably were understated
by an estimated 10-30% owing to the CDC's restrictive surveillance definition of AIDS,
under-diagnosis, and under-reporting of AIDS cases. Centers for Disease Control, First
100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 38 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 561, 561-63 (1989) [hereinafter Centers for Disease Con-
trol, First 100,000 Cases of AIDS].
4. Thomas A. Peterman et al., Estimating the Risks of Transfusion-Associated
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection,
27 TRANSFUSION 371 (1987). Another study predicts that pre-1985 transfusions will
cause 15,000 cases of AIDS. J.D. Kalbfieisch & J.F. Lawless, Estimating the Incubation
Time Distribution and Expected Number of Cases of Transfusion-Associated Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 29 TRANSFUSION 672 (1989); Thomas A. Peterman &
John W. Ward, What's Happening to the Epidemic of Transfusion-Associated AIDS?,
29 TRANSFUSION 659 (1989).
5. Transfusion Associated AIDS Lawsuits May Eventually Number 4000, AMERI-
CAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS BLOOD BANK WEEK, June 12, 1987, at 5 [hereinaf-
ter AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, followed by date of publication].
6. Carol McGraw, Some AIDS Victims Win Blood Cases, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1990, at Al, col. 3; Victoria Slind-Flor, Suing Blood Banks, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 22, 1991,
at 1, 37.
7. CA Court Allows Anonymous Deposition of Implicated Donors, AIDS LITG.
REP. 3835 (1990).
8. The statutory shields of forty-nine states through 1990 are listed in David Ste-
vens, Negligence Liability for Transfusion-Associated AIDS Transmission, 12 J. LEGAL
MED. 221, 225 n.27 (1991). New Jersey lacks a statutory shield, but its case law still
protects blood banks from strict liability. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299,
296 A.2d 668 (1972), rev'd, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974), affd per
curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147
N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105 (1977). The same situation occurs in the District of
was the worst blood-borne disease, they also shield blood banks from
strict liability for AIDS. In negligence actions, usually the courts
have held that industry custom is the standard of due care that blood
banks must meet. Custom often emerges from joint agreements
among blood banks.
In essence, the strategy for regulating blood banks is to displace
the ex post private damage action with ex ante incentive controls
through a combination of industry self-regulation and direct govern-
mental regulation by the United States Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). There remains only a residual negligence liability that
in the context is quite weak. As a result courts have exerted little
influence over blood bank care levels. The level of risk transfusion
recipients bear is determined mainly by the "experts" in the industry
and the politicians in state legislatures and the FDA.
The evidence shows that the experts managed risk poorly and
spread AIDS unnecessarily. Published estimates by blood bankers of
the risk of transfusion AIDS in 1983-1984, which in part were the
basis for the precautions they took at the peak of the danger and
public concern, fell short by two or three orders of magnitude. In
1988 the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Epidemic concluded that "[t]he initial response of the nation's
blood banking industry to the possibility of contamination of the na-
tion's blood by a new infectious agent was unnecessarily slow." It
criticized the FDA for "rel[ying] heavily on that industry for advice
on what standards to set-a relationship that presents a significant
opportunity for conflicts of interest to arise."9
The test for antibody to HIV that blood banks introduced in
March 1985 reduced the risk markedly-to perhaps 1 in 7,100 pa-
tients during 1985-1989. The test has an error rate and, as explained
infra, the risk is still higher than necessary because blood banks do
not do all they can to exclude high-risk donors. In 1988 the CDC's
"worst case" estimate was that up to 460 recipients of properly
tested blood would be infected with HIV each year. Twenty such
cases caused by transfusion and two caused by tissue transplantation
were reported through February 1992.10
What is at stake in risk management by blood bankers, and in
Columbia. Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
9. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 78 (1988).
10. John W. Ward et al., Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
by Blood Transfusion Screened as Negative for HIV Antibody, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED.
473, 477 (1988); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP.,
supra note 3, at 9 n. 2. For the same time period, others using a different model esti-
mated that only 126 infected units per year would have been transfused. J. Sanford
Schwartz et al., Strategies for Screening Blood for Human Immunodeficiency Virus An-
tibody: Use of a Decision Support System, 264 J. A.M.A. 1704, 1709 (1990).
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their advisory relationship with regulators, is not only the spread of
AIDS, but whether the AIDS calamity will reoccur if another lethal
blood-borne virus arrives. Reducing risk requires changes in common
and statutory law, federal and state regulation, and the role of courts
and expert regulatory agencies.
My thesis is that the present system of direct governmental regu-
lation and industry self-regulation is a poor substitute for liability.
Strict liability is absent, and the weak negligence rule based on in-
dustry custom gives blood bankers fewer incentives to compare the
benefits and costs to society of taking extra precautions. The weak
rule is caused in part by the factual complexity of transfusion, a
technical field that is little understood by outsiders. That complexity
helps to explain how the court in the first AIDS case to be decided
made a series of egregious factual errors, which other courts ac-
cepted uncritically. After describing the medical and regulatory
background of transfusion, I argue that blood bankers have better
information than anyone else in the system for reducing risk to pa-
tients. Industry-wide standards of care often emerge from agree-
ments among the three associations of blood banks. They claim
expert status and exercise joint control over transfusion risk. Accord-
ingly, I analyze liability cases in other industries where industry cus-
tom or joint action were issues. I argue.that joint liability for blood
banks should be considered and discuss the probable factual focus if
joint liability is litigated. I conclude that blood banks should be sub-
ject to strict liability in tort, and I discuss the effects on their opera-
tions of repealing the shield laws.
II. BLOOD TRANSFUSION: MEDICAL RISKS AND BACKGROUND
Blood banks and the FDA make several key decisions that deter-
mine risk for patients: (i) how to screen donors; (ii) how extensively
to test blood; and (iii) when to warn physicians of new disease risks.
Understanding the present levels of risks and how, through these
three decisions, the industry controls risk is necessary for under-
standing why present practices and regulations are unsatisfactory
substitutes for liability.
A. The Risks
AIDS occurs when a certain group of white blood cells no longer
protects the body from invading pathogens. Victims succumb to a
series of severe pneumonias or other bacterial, viral, fungal, or proto-
zoal infections caused by germs that normally are harmless, and in
some cases to a rare type of cancer. These "marker" diseases along
with typical white cell abnormalities defined AIDS in the period cov-
ered by this Article."1 HIV infection in otherwise healthy persons is
established by a sequence of blood tests. HIV may incubate for more
than six years before symptoms develop, and it mutates faster than
any known virus.12
The laboratory test for antibody to HIV (anti-HIV) appears to
have reduced the risk of infection by an order of magnitude. In Ta-
ble 1 the estimated per-patient risk when blood banks began testing
in March 1985 was 1 in 487; the CDC's estimate for 1986-1987 was
1 in 7,122. Estimates vary according to the assumptions of statistical
models or the region and period under study. Risk is higher in urban
areas but tends to decline secularly as infectious donors are culled. 13
In Table 1 the lowest estimates appear to arise in studies produced
by affiliates of blood banks.
A second strain of the virus, HIV-2, also causes AIDS and is
spread like HIV-1. Through June 1990 eighteen cases of HIV-2 in-
fection were found in North America, mostly in the Northeast
among heterosexual immigrants from West Africa where HIV-2 is
endemic. Out of over two million donors tested, one American (who
had visited West'Africa) was positive. In 1990 the FDA licensed a
test for anti-HIV-2 but the FDA and the blood banks agreed that
they should not use it. Prevalence of HIV-2 among donors was
"quite low," the FDA said, and the test for anti-HIV-1 reacted to
anti-HIV-2 60-90 % of the time. The extra test would cost $60 mil-
lion per year.14 By September 1991, thirty-two cases of HIV-2 infec-
tion had been reported to the CDC. The FDA licensed a single test
11. In late 1991 the CDC was considering changing the definition of AIDS from
the diagnosis of marker diseases to a laboratory-based measure of the number of T4
lymphocytes, the white blood cells that control the immune system and that HIV de-
stroys. The new definition was expected to increase the number of AIDS cases by
160,000. Glenn Ruffenach, New Definition Almost Doubles U.S. AIDS Cases, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 15, 1991, at B3, col. 6.
12. HIV mutates five times faster than the influenza virus and can mutate several
times within the life of an AIDS patient, which complicates making a vaccine. Boyce
Rensberger, AIDS Virus a Clever Enemy, Study Shows, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1987, at
Al.
13. Annual prevalence rates of anti-HIV in the ANRC Chesapeake Region de-
clined from 5.1 per 10,000 donations in 1985 to 1.8 in 1989. Paul M. Ness et al., Declin-
ing Prevalence of HIV-Seropositive Blood Donors, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 615 (1989).
14. Centers for Disease Control, Surveillance for HIV-2 Infection in Blood Do-
nors-United States, 1987-1989, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 829
(1990); Centers for Disease Control, Update: HIV-2 Infection-United States, 38 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 572 (1989); Centers for Disease Control, AIDS
Due to HIV-2 Infection-New Jersey, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 33
(1988); Robert Steinbrook, Doctors Confirm 1st Case of HIV-2 in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Oct.
208
[VOL. 29: 203. 1992] AIDS Blood-Transfusion Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
to detect antibodies to both HIV-1 and HIV-2 and recommended
that blood banks implement it by June 1, 1992.'5
The greatest transfusion risk is not HIV but hepatitis, an inflam-
mation of the liver that also increases the risk of cirrhosis and can-
cer. Until mid-1990, probably 200,000 or more recipients each year
were infected with hepatitis viruses, which eventually caused an esti-
mated 4,000 cases of cirrhosis-more deaths per year than all cases
from transfusion AIDS through 1990. A new test licensed in 1990
was expected to cut the risk of hepatitis infection by at least half.16
4, 1989, at Al, col.2; Thomas R. O'Brien, Centers for Disease Control, HIV-2 Surveil-
lance in the United States, Presentation to the FDA Blood Products Advisory Commit-
tee, 28th Meeting, Bethesda, MD (March 15, 1990) (transcripts of the Committee's
proceedings may be obtained from the United States Food and Drug Administration,
Freedom of Information Staff, HFI-35, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20857); HIV-
2 Test Approved by FDA, Canada; Blood Organizations Issue Joint Statement, COUN-
CIL OF COMMUNITY BLOOD CENTERS NEWSLETTER, Apr. 27, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter
CCBC NEWSLETTER, followed by date of publication]; AABB, ANRC & CCBC, JOINT
STATEMENT ON SCREENING BLOOD FOR EVIDENCE OF HIV-2 INFECTION (Apr. 30,
1990); Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Use
of Genetic Systems HIV-2 EIA, memorandum from Paul D. Parkman, Director, to all
registered blood establishments (June 21, 1990); HIV-2 Blood Screening Not Urged by
FDA, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1990, at A26, col.1.
15. Four Cases of HIV-2 Identified at Anonymous Testing Sites in Maryland,
CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Aug. 2, 1991, at 2; U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,
FDA Position Statement on Issues Related to Use of Combination Tests for Detection of
Antibodies to HIV-1 and HIV-2, presented to the FDA Blood Products Advisory Com-
mittee, 33d Meeting (Sept. 26-27, 1991); Bruce Ingersoll, Blood Banks Urged to Test
for Rare AIDS, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1991, at B5, col.3.
16. Rosa G. Simonetti et al., Hepatitis C Infection as a Risk Factor for
Hepatocellular Carcinoma in Patients with Cirrhosis: A Case-Control Study, 116 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 97 (1992); Richard D. Aach et al., Hepatitis C Virus Infection in
Post-Transfusion Hepatitis: An Analysis with First- and Second-Generation Assays, 325
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1325 (1991); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-20
(testimony of Ross D. Eckert in Blood Supply Safety) [hereinafter Blood Supply
Safety]; Harvey J. Alter, Infectious Risks of Blood Transfusion, abstract of presentation
in The Nation's Blood Supply: Is Absolute Safety Achievable?, a conference cosponsored
by the Food and Drug Administration and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences (Nov. 1, 1989), at 10-11. See
also Harvey J. Alter & Jay H. Hoofnagle, Non-A, Non-B: Observations on the First
Decade, VIRAL HEPATITIS AND LIVER DISEASE 345, 348-49 (1984); Richard H. Walker,
Special Report: Transfusion Risks, 88 Am. J. CLIN. PATH. 374 (1987); Chiron Unveils
Test to Detect Agent Causing Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK,
supra note 5, Apr. 28, 1989, at 1; Ortho's HCV Test Licensed; Blood Centers to Begin
Screening Blood Donations, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, May 4, 1990, at 1-2.
Apparently, Entertainer Danny Kaye died of transfusion-induced cirrhosis in 1987. Ed-
ward R. Eichner, New Aspects of Tranfusion Medicine, 8 IM: INTERNAL MED. FOR THE
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Cytomegalovirus (CMV) infection is found in perhaps half the
population and is transmitted to 3-9% of blood recipients. CMV
may cause mononucleosis in healthy persons and serious or fatal dis-
ease in premature infants and transplant or chemotherapy patients.17
Most blood banks supply CMV-tested units only on request. Two
long-latency retroviruses, 18 HTLV-I and HTLV-II, are linked to
devastating forms of leukemia. In 1989 HTLV-I was found in blood
donors at a rate similar to that for HIV. No cases of HTLV-I infec-
tion by transfusion were found in this country by 1989, but its la-
tency period of ten to thirty years makes that fact no less troubling.
Blood banks have tested for these viruses since 1988. It was esti-
mated that HTLV-I and HTLV-II were transmitted to approxi-
mately 700 blood recipients per year before routine testing began.19
Blood also can transmit debilitating or fatal parasites20 and
17. CMV is a member of the herpes group of viruses, so it can persist without
symptoms after primary infection. Tranfusion to high-risk persons who do not have CMV
antibody can produce hepatitis, pneumonias, retardation, and life-threatening blood dis-
orders. S. Gerald Sandier & F. Carl Grumet, Posttransfusion Cytomegalovirus Infec-
tions, 69 PEDIATRICS 650 (1982); Julia S. Chan & Girish N. Vyas, What We Can Do to
Prevent Viral Contamination, 27 CONSULTANT 121, 128-29 (1987); John A. Armstrong
et al., Cytomegalovirus Infection in Children Undergoing Open-Heart Surgery, 49 YALE
J. BIOLOGY & MED. 83, 90 (1976); United Blood Services, CMV: WHAT'S IT ALL
ABOUT?. In 1981 Pope John Paul II's recovery from a gunshot was complicated by post-
transfusion CMV infection. Is the Blood Supply Safe?, 52 CONSUMER REP. 596 (Oct.
1987).
18. Retroviruses, of which HIV is one, are insidious and known for their long la-
tencies. They utilize the genetic material of the host cell to replicate. The disease process
advances as pathogens break out of these cells and seek new hosts. Judy Berlfein, Re-
trovirus: AIDS Research May Yield Cure for a Family of Related Diseases, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1989, pt. II, at 3, col. 2.
19. HTLV-I and HTLV-II are human T-cell lymphotropic viruses, types I and II.
S. Gerald Sandier, HTLV-I and -II: New Risks for Recipients of Blood Transfusions?,
256 J. A.M.A. 2245 (1986); Alan E. Williams et al., Seroprevalence and Epidemiologi-
cal Correlates of HTLV-I Infection in U.S. Blood Donors, 240 SCIENCE 643 (1988);
Deborah M. Barnes, HTLV-I: To Test or Not to Test, 242 SCIENCE 372 (1988); John
Pekkanen, How Safe Is Our Blood Supply?, READER'S DIGEST, July 1988, at 37, 41;
Marilyn Chase, Surprising Number of Addicts Infected by HTLV-II Virus, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 28, 1989, at B2, col. 6; Noah D. Cohen et al., Transmission of Retroviruses by
Transfusion of Screened Blood in Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 320 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1172 (1989); Rima F. Khabbaz et al., Seroprevalence and Risk Factors for
HTLV-I/Il Infection Among Female 'Prostitutes in the United States, 263 J. A.M.A. 60
(1990); Centers for Disease Control, Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type I Screening in
Volunteer Blood Donors-United States, 1989, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 915, 922 (1990); Marian T. Sullivan et al., Transmission of Human T-Lympho-
tropic Virus Types I and 11 by Blood Transfusion. A Retrospective Study of Recipients
of Blood Components (1983 through 1988), 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2043 (1991).
20. Lyme disease, a bacterial infection transmitted by tick bites, causes chronic
fever and pain in muscles and joints. Cases were reported in 43 states, 94% of which
were in 6 states, mainly in the Northeast. No transfusion cases were reported through
1989, but blood banks began to ask donors questions to identify those at risk. Six cases of
babesiosis, a malaria-like illness producing kidney failure, were reported in the 1980s.
Chagas' disease, an incurable and usually fatal heart and bowel ailment, is the most
common tropical disease in Latin America. From 1986 to 1989 two transfusion cases
were reported in Los Angeles and New York City and a third in a non-endemic area of
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bacteria.2 1
B. Blood Bank Industry Organization
Blood for transfusion in the United States is collected by three
groups of blood banks. These organizations grew out of rivalries that
began after World War 1122 but ended when the threat of AIDS
litigation drew them together.
About 13.4 million units of blood are collected each year.23 The
American National Red Cross (ANRC), incorporated by Congress
in 1900, collects somewhat over half of the total in fifty-odd regional
Canada. Carriers are asymptomatic and the parasite is difficult to detect. Blood tests for
carriers are not yet available. Louis V. Kirchhoff, Is Trypanosoma cruzi a New Threat
to Our Blood Supply?, 11 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 773 (1989); Irene H. Grant et al.,
Transfusion-Associated Acute Chagas Disease Acquired in the United States, 111 AN-
NALS INTERAL MED. 849 (1989); Peter Nickerson et al., Transfusion-Associated Trypa-
nosoma cruzi Infection in a Non-Endemic Area, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 851
(1989); Lawrence K. Altman, Scientists Fear That a Parasite Will Spread in Transfu-
sions, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1989, at C3, col. 1; Blood-Borne Parasite Blamed in Cha-
gas' Disease Death, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, May 26, 1989, at 2;
AABB Issues Advisory Statements on Blood Donor History Questioning, Babesiosis and
Lyme Disease, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Aug. 18, 1989, at 1, 4; FDA
Committee Hears Donor Deferral Studies, PHS Plans to Study Chagas, CCBC NEWS-
LETTER, supra note 14, Sept. 15, 1989, at 1, 4; Darwin's Disease, ECONOMIIST, May 5,
1990, at 105; Lyme Disease Agent Survives in Stored Blood, but Risk of Transfusion-
Associated Disease Small, CDC Investigators Report, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note
14, Aug. 3, 1990, at 5.
Persian Gulf veterans are prohibited from donating until January 1993 as a precaution
against leishmaniasis, which can cause skin lesions and occasionally fever, chills, diar-
rhea, weight loss, and anemia. It is caused by a parasite and transmitted by bites from a
tiny sand fly. Twenty-two cases were found among military personnel, but no cases have
yet been found in a blood recipient. AABB, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1992); AABB,
ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON DONOR STATUS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL RE-
TURNING FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AREA (Apr. 3, 1991); Melissa Healy, Veterans of
Gulf War Face Year's Ban on Giving Blood, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1991, at A19, col. 1.
21. Five cases of transfusion-transmitted Yersinia entercolitica infection were re-
ported in 1989-1990. All were fatal. The agent is anerobic and thrives at the normal
temperature for storing blood. Half the donors gave histories of diarrheal illnesses within
thirty days of donation. Blood tests are available but not yet used routinely. Centers for
Disease Control, Update: Yersinia enterocolitica Bacteremia and Endotoxin Shock Asso-
ciated with Red Blood Cell Transfusion-United States, 1991, 40 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 176 (1991). FDA officials met with the industry on August 16,
1990 to review the problem and held a hearing to discuss possible measures. U.S. Food
and Drug Administration, Yersinia enterocolitica Problem: Summary, statement
presented by the FDA to the FDA Blood Products Advisory Committee, 31st Meeting
(Jan. 17-18, 1991).
22. See Ross D. Eckert, Blood, Money, and Monopoly, in Ross D. ECKERT &
EDWARD L: WALLACE, SECURING A SAFER BLOOD SUPPLY: Two VIEWS chs. 3-4 (1985).
23. Douglas M. Surgenor et al., Collection and Transfusion of Blood in the
United States, 1982-1988, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1646, 1648 (1990).
centers. The remaining collections are divided about equally between
the other two groups. The Council of Community Blood Centers
(CCBC) includes twenty-one large, regional centers that split from
the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) in 1962. The
AABB was formed in 1947 to counter the expanding blood program
of the ANRC. In 1992 1,572 hospital transfusion services, 649 hos-
pital blood banks, and 185 blood centers (including nearly all CCBC
centers and all ANRC regional centers) belonged to the AABB.24
The AABB is the professional society for individuals and institu-
tions engaged in transfusion medicine and blood banking. Its Com-
mittee on Standards has notice-and-comment procedures and every
two years publishes Standards for Blood Banks and Transfusion
Services (Standards) with minimum-performance guidelines for
members.25 The Standards specify the rules for donor screening and
blood testing that determine the transfusion risks patients bear. The
AABB inspects and accredits member facilities, and AABB accredi-
tation is sufficient for licensing requirements in eight states." It pro-
vides continuing education, publishes a professional journal, keeps a
registry of donors with rare blood types, comments on legislation and
regulations, assists members on litigation, and files amicus curiae
briefs in their behalf.2 7 Apparently the majority of the AABB's
10,000 individual members view it as both a professional association
and a trade association.28
Most blood banks operate not-for-profit as regional monopolies or
cartels. A few large hospitals in major cities collect blood, but they
rarely compete for donors openly with the blood center in their re-
gion. Blood for tranfusion has been collected strictly from noncash
"volunteers" since the adoption of the National Blood Policy by the
24. AABB, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1992); Letter from Joel Solomon, AABB
Exec. Director (Mar. 16, 1992).
25. AABB STANDARDS COMMITTEE, STANDARDS FOR BLOOD BANKS AND TRANS-
FUSION SERVICES (F. Widmann 14th ed. 1991) [hereinafter AABB STANDARDS]. Items
of immediate concern are published in AABB newsletters without notice and comment.
Paul V. Holland, Blood Establishments: How AABB Standards Are Created, abstract of
presentation in The Nation's Blood Supply: Is Absolute Safety Achievable?, A Confer-
ence cosponsored by the Food and Drug Administration and the National Heart, Lung,
and Blood Institute, Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences (Nov. 1, 1989),
at 16.
26. AABB, THE INSPECTION AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM (1989). AABB stan-
dards are the floor in California. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1602.1 (West Supp.
1989).
27. AABB, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1991); AABB, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 13-
14 (1992).
28. In 1988 AABB's President said that the debate over which kind of association
the AABB was, which had been "divisive" among the membership, had "cooled."
AABB, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1989).
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Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1975 .29 That pol-
icy-a broad statement of goals, not a law or regulation-favored
switching from a mix of cash and noncash donors to strictly noncash
donors. Its advocates argued that noncash blood and noncompetitive
banks would reduce transfusion disease, but that is debatable.30
Banks claim to charge hospitals (and thus patients) for soliciting,
collecting, transporting, and processing blood, but not for the blood
itself. The AABB, ANRC, and CCBC have clearinghouses for bar-
ter exchange among members. Cash sales between banks are
common.
3 1
C. Collection, Donor Screening, and Transfusion
About four million Americans receive transfusions each year. The
average recipient gets 5.4 units of components or in sbme cases
whole blood.32 Transfusions of whole blood or red cells, the most
common therapy, peaked at 12.2 million units in 1986. These tranfu-
sions fell to 11.6 million units in 1987-the first decline in a dec-
ade-presumably in response to fears of AIDS.33 Donors are
interviewed and their blood is drawn, tested, and processed at a re-
gional center (often called a blood bank). Then it is shipped to the
hospital transfusion service (sometimes also called a blood bank). In
the hospital laboratory it is checked for dangerous reactions against
the recipient's blood. Figure 1 shows the route blood takes from do-
nor to hospital to patient. 4
29. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, National
Blood Policy: Proposed Implementation Plan; Requests for Commehts, 39 FED. REG.
9329 (1974).
30. Eckert, supra note 22, at ch.2.
31. United Blood Services and Blood Centers of America also operate exchanges.
Gilbert M. Gaul, Why There Is No National Exchange for Blood, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 25, 1989, at A9, col. 1; How Blood, the "Gift of Life," Became a Billion-Dollar
Business, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 24, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
32. Paul D. Cumming et al., Exposure of Patients to Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Through the Transfusion of Blood Components That Test Antibody-Negative,
321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 941 (1989). Components are separated by centrifuging whole
blood. One or more units of a particular component may be given to patients, depending
upon their condition. Red cells transport oxygen and replace blood lost during hemor-
rhage or surgery. White cells fight infection. Platelets control bleeding and replace those
destroyed by disease or chemotherapy. Plasma, the amber, watery fluid through which
blood cells travel, also contains vital immune and coagulation proteins. Blood banks sell
some of their donated plasma to firms that manufacture blood derivative products. In
1987 in the ANRC system a donated unit of whole blood was converted into 1.54 compo-
nent units, on average. Id.
33. The decline continued in 1988. Surgenor et al., supra note 23, at 1648.
34. This subsection and the next discuss industry practices and FDA regulations as
FIGURE 1






Source: Paul Ness, What Can Go Wrong with Transfusion, in
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANS-
FUSION MEDICINE: MANAGING RISK IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT,
App. 2, at 192 (G. Clark ed. 1986).
of December 1991.
BLOOD CENTER
[VOL. 29; 203. 1992] AIDS Blood-Transfusion Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Donation begins at the blood center with an interview and a mini-
physical examination by a qualified physician or by persons trained
by and under the supervision of a physician. Since the early 1970s
the FDA has required that donors be screened for "[f]reedom from
any disease transmissible by blood transfusion, insofar as can be de-
termined by history and examinations." Donors are excluded if they
give a history of malaria, travel within six months to endemic areas,
or having emigrated within three years from endemic countries.
They are also excluded if they give a history of any of the following:
viral hepatitis; within twelve months had close contact with a person
having viral hepatitis, had a tattoo (increasing the risk of hepatitis),
or had received a transfusion of blood or components capable of
transmitting viral hepatitis; or present or past clinical or laboratory
evidence of infection with viral hepatitis, HTLV-I/II, or HIV. They
are also excluded if they previously donated the only unit of blood or
components to a patient who developed any of those viral infections.
Donors are asked if they are feeling well, have acute respiratory in-
fections, have had serious illnesses, or are taking prescription drugs
(to which the transfusion recipient could be allergic). The examina-
tion takes pulse, weight, blood pressure, and temperature, tests the
blood hemoglobin level to make sure the donor is not anemic, and
checks arms for evidence of infectious skin diseases and self-injected
drugs. Donors may not give more than once every eight weeks. 5
HIV is transmitted mainly through sex, transfusion, and sharing
intravenous needles among drug addicts. In February 1990 the FDA
listed the following high-risk groups:
- Persons with clinical or laboratory evidence of HIV (AIDS vi-
rus) infection;
- Men who have had sex with another man even one time since
1977;
- Past or present intravenous drug users;
- Persons with hemophilia or related clotting disorders who have
received clotting factor concentrates [batch products made from
35. 21 C.F.R. § 640.3 (1991) [adopted 38 Fed. Reg. 32089, Nov. 20, 1973, as
amended 49 Fed. Reg. 23834, June 8, 1984; 50 Fed. Reg. 4138, Jan. 29, 1985; 51 Fed.
Reg. 15611, Apr. 25, 1986; 55 Fed. Reg. 11013, Mar. 26, 1990]; AABB STANDARDS
§§ B1.000 and B1.200. All blood banks ask donors the questions that the FDA and
AABB require, but otherwise the procedure varies considerably in format and content.
Donna J. Mayo, American Institutes for Research, Increasing the Safety of the Blood
Supply by Screening Donors More Effectively, presented to the FDA Blood Products
Advisory Committee, 31st Meeting, at 5 (Jan. 17, 1991). In late 1991 the AABB was
considering a uniform set of donor history questions for all members. Member Comment
Sought on Uniform Donor History Questions, AABB NEWS BRIEFS, Sept. 1991, at 9-12.
pools of plasma of thousands of donors];
- Persons born in or emigrating from countries where heterosexual
activity is thought to play a major role in transmission of HIV-1 or
HIV-2 infection (i.e., Haiti, sub-Saharan Africa, and islands located
near these areas of Africa);
- Persons who have had sex with any person meeting the above
descriptions;
- Men and women who have engaged in sex for money or drugs
since 1977 and persons who have engaged in sex with such people
during the preceding six months.3"
From early 1983 to December 1990, the period of most of the
litigation covered in this Article, individual donors were never asked
directly about their sexual preference or promiscuity. Such ques-
tions, FDA and industry experts believed, could offend some low-risk
donors, lead some high-risk donors to lie, and alienate others into
donating regardless of their health."7 In March 1983 the FDA rec-
ommended, and blood banks adopted, the "voluntary self-exclusion"
process. Donors were given a pamphlet stating the signs and symp-
toms of AIDS, how it is spread, the list of high-risk groups, and
warning those who had contact with persons at risk not to donate.
Donors signed a consent that they had read and understood the pam-
phlet, and that they agreed not to donate if they considered them-
selves at risk. They could ask clarifying questions of blood bank
personnel, but they were not questioned directly. They alone decided
whether to donate.
In December 1990, however, to end a political brouhaha, the FDA
reversed course and recommended direct questioning of donors.
Since 1984 the FDA had excluded Haitians who had emigrated
since 1977, but in early 1990 it excluded them regardless of when
they emigrated. Haitian-Americans claimed discrimination and held
demonstrations in several cities. Based on data presented by the
CDC in a public hearing, the FDA estimated that abandoning the
Haitian exclusion, without adding any other precaution, could spread
HIV infection to between 15 and 36 additional transfusion recipients
each year.38 The FDA resolved the controversy by recommending
36. Memorandum from Paul D. Parkman, Director, Center for Biologics Evalua-
tion and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Recommendations for the Pre-
vention of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission by Blood and Blood
Products, to all registered blood establishments (Feb. 5, 1990). These risk categories
were adopted in a series of FDA memoranda since March 1983, discussed infra at notes
82-83.
37. RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC 238 (1987); Eckert, supra note 22, at 64 n. 30.
38. See Blood Stigma, Blood Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, at 20; Around the
Nation" 50,000 Protest Ban on Blood Donors by Haitians, Africans, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 1990, at A7; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Position Statement,
presented to the FDA Blood Products Advisory Committee, 29th Meeting (Apr. 20,
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that, instead of excluding Haitian-Americans, blood banks should
question every donor about all risk factors including sexual behavior.
At the same time it excluded anyone treated for syphilis or gonor-
rhea in the preceding twelve months and extended the exclusion for
anyone who had been transfused or had exchanged money or drugs
for sex from six to twelve months.3 9
Some high-risk persons may be under pressure from colleagues or
friends to donate. Therefore, the FDA recommended blood banks
also use "confidential unit exclusion," a procedure to give donors a
second opportunity to decide whether their blood should be trans-
fused. At many blood banks donors choose in privacy between one
bar-coded label indicating that it should be used and another indi-
cating it should not.4"
Nevertheless, some high-risk people donated even though they
were given the pamphlet and an opportunity to ask questions. To
avoid offense, the pamphlet was not sexually explicit, so some proba-
bly missed the point. Many did not read it. Others found it difficult
to understand. Self-exclusion also required some donors to make so-
phisticated medical judgments beyond their capabilities, e.g., about
half of bisexual men do not consider themselves high risk. In 1988
the Public Health Service found "recognized deficiencies in the sys-
tems used by blood and plasma establishments to educate donors
about risk behaviors."'" A CDC study of HIV-infected donors in
1990); FDA Advised to Drop Geographic Exclusions for HIV- Adopt Behavior Risk
Questions, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Apr. 20, 1990, at 1-3; Bill to Ban Geo-
graphic Exclusion of Blood Donors Introduced in Congress, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra
note 14, May 4, 1990, at 3-4; Haitian-Americans March on White House to Protest
Discrimination by FDA, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Oct. 26, 1990, at 2-3.
39. Memorandum from Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr., Acting Director, Center for Bio-
logics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Revised Recom-
mendations for the Prevention of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission
by Blood and Blood Products-Section I, Parts A & B Only, to all registered blood estab-
lishments (Dec. 5, 1990), reprinted in Blood Supply Safety, Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 85-92 (Apr. 18 and May 15, 1991) [hereinafter Blood Supply
Safety (1991)]. These donor screening recommendations were under review by the FDA
in spring 1992.
40. The bar codes are so similar that not even the screening interviewer can tell
the difference. Donations designated "Do Not Use" are quarantined and destroyed. The
donor's choice is kept confidential. In either case the blood is tested for anti-HIV, and
the donor is notified of a positive result. Some blood banks instead use a secret or sealed
ballot containing only the donation's number or code. Others provide a phone number for
donors who change their mind. B.R. Loiacono et al., Efficacy of Various Methods of
Confidential Unit Exclusion in Identifying Potentially Infectious Blood Donations, 29
TRANSFUSION 823 (1989).
41. Report of the Workgroup on Blood and Blood Products, Second Public
1988-1989 revealed that almost two-thirds donated even though they
knew that they had engaged in high-risk conduct. Of these only five
percent used the confidential exclusion."2 In 1988-1989 only one of
five ANRC donors who tested positive for anti-HIV excluded volun-
tarily." A 1990 study found that over 40% of blood donors who
were at risk were not effectively screened by the procedures in
place."
After donation, each unit is given an identification number, and a
preservative is added to extend shelf life. The FDA requires that
blood centers test for ABO blood groups, Rh type, and antibody
markers indicating exposure to syphilis, hepatitis B, and HIV.4" The
AABB requires testing for antibody to the viruses that cause leuke-
mia (HTLV-I and -II) and hepatitis C, and for two liver abnormali-
ties that are "surrogate" markers for exposure to hepatitis.4
The test for anti-HIV has an error rate even if done properly,
which is why careful donor screening is so important. Antibody tests
inherently have "window" periods in which asymptomatic persons
harboring a virus will not react to the test. Anti-HIV is measured by
color; a positive test is recorded when the observed intensity of color
exceeds the cutoff value.47 Individuals differ in the time after infec-
tion needed to produce enough antibody for the test to register posi-
tive. Initially HIV's window was thought to be three months, but in
Health Service AIDS Prevention and Control Conference, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 58
(Supp. 1 1988).
42. L.S. Doll et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1-Infected Blood Do-
nors: Behavioral Characteristics and Reasons for Donation, 31 TRANSFUSION 704
(1991). See also L.R. Peterson et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type ]-Infected
Blood Donors: Epidemiologic, Laboratory, and Donation Characteristics, 31 TRANSFU-
SION 698 (1991); Susan F. Leitman et al., Clinical Implications of Positive Tests for
Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I in Asymptomatic Blood Donors,
321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 917 (1989); Kenrad E. Nelson et al., Blood and Plasma Dona-
tions Among a Cohort of Intravenous Drug Users, 263 J. A.M.A. 2194 (1990); Dale D.
Chitwood et al., The Donation and Sale of Blood by Intravenous Drug Users, 81 AM, J.
PUB. HEALTH 631 (1991).
43. Daniel N. Mendelson & S. Gerald Sandier, A Model for Estimating Incre-
mental Benefits and Costs of Testing Donated Blood for Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus Antigen (HIV-Ag), 30 TRANSFUSION 73 (1990).
44. In 1988 the FDA contracted with a research organization to suggest better
ways to inform and exclude high-risk donors. Donna J. Mayo et al., Screening Potential
Blood Donors at Risk for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 31 TRANSFUSION 466, 472
(1991). Their conclusions were incorporated into the FDA recommendations for donor
screening. Blood Supply Safety (1991), supra note 39.
45. 21 C.F.R. § 640.5 (1991) [adopted 38 Fed. Reg. 32089, Nov. 20, 1973, as
amended 50 Fed. Reg. 4138, Jan. 29, 1985; 53 Fed. Reg. 117, Jan. 5, 1988]; 21 C.F.R.§ 610.45 (1991) [adopted 53 Fed. Reg. 116, Jan. 5, 1988].
46. AABB STANDARDS § B5.500; AABB, ANRC, & CCBC. JOINT STATEMENT ON
THE INTRODUCTION OF TESTING VOLUNTEER BLOOD DONORS FOR HEPATITIS C VIRUS
INFECTION, with Attachment (Apr. 30, 1990).
47. Consensus Conference, The Impact of Routine HTLV-Ill Antibody Testing of
Blood and Plasma Donors on Public Health, 256 J. A.M.A. 1778, 1779 (1986).
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rare cases it may be up to forty-two months for some high-risk per-
sons.4 8 In 1989 the CDC estimated that ninety-five percent develop
detectable antibody within six months.4 9 The window period also
presents risks for recipients of organ and tissue transplants. 50
48. S. Zaki Salahuddin et al., HTLV-Ill in Symptom-Free Seronegative Persons,
8417/8418 LANCET 1418-19 (1984); Annamari Ranki et al., Long Latency Precedes
Overt Seroconversion in Sexually Transmitted Human-Immunodeficiency-Virus Infec-
tion, 8559 LANCET 589 (1987); David T. Imagawa et al., Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Type I Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegative for Prolonged
Periods, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1458 (1989); William A. Hazeltine, Silent HIVInfec-
tions, id. at 1487-89; Homayoon Farzadegan et al., Loss of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Type I (HIV-) Antibodies with Evidence of Viral Infection in Asymptomatic Ho-
mosexual Men: A Report from the Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study, 108 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 785 (1988); Steven M. Wolinsky et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Type I (HIV-1) Infection a Median of 18 Months before a Diagnostic Western Blot:
Evidence from a Cohort of Homosexual Men, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 961 (1989);
Jean-Claude Ameisen et al., Antibodies to the nef Protein and to nef Peptides in HIV-I-
Infected Seronegative Individuals, 5 AIDS RESEARCH & HUMAN RETROVIRUSES 279
(1989); Fabrizio Ensoli et al., Plasma Viraemia in Seronegative HIV-1-Infected Individ-
uals, 5 AIDS 1195 (1991). For a summary of some of these studies see Jay S. Epstein,
The Enigma of Silent HIV Infections, abstract of presentation in The Nation's Blood
Supply: Is Absolute Safety Achievable?, supra note 16, at 12-14.
49. C. Robert Horsburgh, Jr. et al., Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection Before Detection of Antibody, 8664 LANCET 637 (1989). The likelihood of "si-
lent" HIV infections-those that do not produce a detectable antibody response-that
are prolonged, variable, and transmissible is controversial, and the literature has skeptics.
See Jerome E. Groopman et al., Lack of Evidence of Prolonged Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection Before Antibody Seroconversion, 71 BLOOD 1752 (1988); J.
Brooks Jackson et al., Absence of HIV-I Infection in Antibody-Negative Sexual Partners
of HIV-I Infected Hemophiliacs, 29 TRANSFUSION 265 (1989); Joseph Gibbons et al.,
Silent Infections with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I Are Highly Unlikely in
Multitransfused Seronegative Hemophiliacs, 76 BLOOD 1924 (1990); David Imagawa &
Roger Detels, HIV-1 in Seronegative Homosexual Men, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250
(1991); Tzong-Hae Lee et al., Absence of HIV-1 DNA in High-Risk Seronegative Indi-
viduals Using High-Input Polymerase Chain Reaction, 5 AIDS 1201 (1991); Richard A.
Koup & David D. Ho, Immunosilent HIV-1 Infection: Intrigue Continues, id. at 1263;
J.J. Lefrre et al., No Evidence of Frequent Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 'I
Infection in Seronegative At-Risk Individuals, 31 TRANSFUSION 205 (1991); Claus Niel-
sen et al., Prevalence of HIV Infection in Seronegative High-Risk Individuals Examined
by Virus Isolation and PCR, 4 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 1107
(1991); Li-Zhen Pan et al., Lack of Detection of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in
Persistently Seronegative Homosexual Men with High or Medium Risks for Infection,
164 J. INFECTIOUs DISEASES 962 (1991); Sabine Yerly et al., Absence of Chronic Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Without Seroconversion in Intravenous Drug Users: A
Prospective and Retrospective Study, id. at 965.
50. In 1985 a Virginia man transmitted HIV-1 to seven recipients of his organs
and tissues although his blood tested negative twice before the transplants were per-
formed. Three recipients of fresh organs died from AIDS-related conditions by 1991. All
told, he provided four fresh organs and fifty-four tissue grafts. R.J. Simonds et al.,
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I from a Seronegative Organ
and Tissue Donor, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 726 (1992).
Risk also arises from blood bank clerical errors. In 1988 an inves-
tigation by the ANRC revealed that it mistakenly released 2,420
units (out of more than 6 million checked) as a result of "serious
deviations" from its standard operating procedures. Thirty ANRC
centers were involved; errors were concentrated at four. The FDA
revoked the license of one center, and the ANRC voluntarily asked
that the license of another be revoked. Several employees were de-
moted or fired. Errors included mislabelling, accepting high-risk do-
nors, failing to quarantine or destroy reactive units, and releasing
units to hospitals before checking records."
Physicians notify their hospital transfusion service of how many
units they expect to use for each procedure, and units are ordered
from the regional blood center.52 Figure 1 shows that. the hospital
process begins with taking the patient's history, noting pregnancy or
prior transfusions which could predispose the patient to dangerous
antibody reactions. A sample of the patient's blood is tested in the
laboratory for its ABO-Rh group and then "crossmatched" to a
compatible unit to check for reactivity. The identification number for
each unit must be documented on the medical chart so that later a
disease in the patient can be traced to the right donor, or a disease in
the donor can be traced to the right patient. Risks in the hospital
arise from inaccurate patient histories, mislabeling, improper refrig-
eration that allows bacteria to grow, transfusing the wrong unit(s) or
product(s), or transfusing them too rapidly. 3 Informed consent for
transfusion is relatively new and not universal, 4 so patients
tranfused while unconscious may not realize that they have been ex-
posed to risk.
51. Gilbert M. Gaul, Red Cross: Tainted Blood Released to Public, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Sept. 15, 1988, at IA, col. 1; Tainted Blood Recalled After Screening Lapses at
Centers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1988, pt. 1, at 27, col. 4; D.C. Red Cross Closes Labora-
tory Due to Errors, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, July 8, 1988, at 1; Tele-
phone Interview with Mr. Steve Maciello, Director of Case Management, Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, Md.
(Nov. 13, 1991) (notes of interview in author's possession); Letter from Gerald V. Quin-
nan, Jr., Acting Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, United States
Food and Drug Administration, Bethesda, Md. (Dec. 2, 1991).
52. The materials in this paragraph are based on Paul Ness, What Can Go Wrong
with Transfusion, in LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE: MANAGING RISK IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 29-30 (AABB ed. 1986) [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES IN
TRANSFUSION MEDICINE].
53. Of the roughly 4 million persons transfused each year, about 1,200 serious and
unpredictable reactions occur within a few hours or days. Crossmatch errors cause about
500 more. About 80 are catastrophic. Improper administration of blood to the patient
causes complications in another 1,200. Blood and Safety, 15 HARV. MED. SCH. HEALTH
LETTER, Nov. 1989, at 1.
54. David E. Willett, Transfusion-Transmitted Diseases: Legal Aspects, in LEGAL
ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE: MANAGING RISK IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 65-
67 (AABB ed. 1986).
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D. Regulation by the FDA
The FDA is authorized by the Public Health Service Act55 to reg-
ulate the 2,400 establishments that collect, process, store, test, or
distribute blood or components in interstate commerce. Licensed es-
tablishments are inspected annually. Centers that distribute blood
and components for sale, barter, or exchange must simultaneously
obtain an establishment license to operate the facility and a product
license for each component they prepare. The FDA may revoke or
suspend licenses; penalties include fines and imprisonment. It also
may seek an injunction to recall products. 6 Blood banks must adopt
good manufacturing practices that they may not change without ap-
proval. These cover personnel, facilities, equipment, supplies, stan-
dard operating procedures, uniform content-of-container labels for
finished products, laboratory controls, records, and reporting.5 7
Banks may utilize the current standard operating procedures in the
manuals of the AABB, ANRC, or other organizations or individual
bank procedures approved by the FDA, as long as they are "consis-
tent with, and at least as stringent as" FDA regulations. 8 Banks
must promptly notify the FDA of errors or accidents in the manu-
facture of products that could affect their safety, purity, or
potency.59
The FDA requires that each unit of blood and components carry a
container label warning that "[t]his product may transmit infectious
agents." 60 Blood collectors must provide hospitals and physicians
with an instruction circular that describes each product, its source
and preparati6n, the laboratory tests performed, directions for stor-
age and administration, indications for proper use and side effects,
and warnings. The circular is referred to on the container label and
is considered to be an extension of the label, much like a package
insert. 61 The Circular of Information for the Use of Human Blood
and Blood Components is produced for the industry and revised
from time to time by an AABB committee that "coordinate[s]" with
the ANRC, CCBC, and FDA. It has the approval of the FDA. 2
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 262, 263 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
56. 21 C.F.R. pts. 600, 601 (1991).
57. 21 C.F.R. pt. 606 (1991) [50 Fed. Reg. 35469, Aug. 30, 1985, as amended at
53 Fed. Reg. 116, Jan. 5, 1988; 55 Fed. Reg. 11014, Mar. 26, 1990].
58. 21 C.F.R. § 606.100(d) (1991).
59. 21 C.F.R. § 600.14(a) (1991).
60. 21 C.F.R. § 606.121(c)(9) (1991).
61. 21 C.F.R. § 606.122 (1991).
62. AABB, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1989).
The 1991 Circular declared "WARNING: The risk of transmitting
infectious agents is present. Careful donor selection and available
laboratory tests do not eliminate the hazard." It acknowledged that
donor screening and testing "do not totally eliminate" the risk of
transmitting HIV and other retroviruses. It also stated that "as a
whole or in part [it] cannot be considered or interpreted as an ex-
pressed or implied warranty of the safety or fitness of the described
blood or blood components when used for their intended purpose. "63
At the hospital the FDA regulates laboratory testing, transfusion
administration, record-keeping, and reporting. After a fatal reaction
the hospital must notify the FDA by telephone as soon as possible
and in writing within seven days.64 Hospital laboratories that are ac-
credited by one of the approved national accreditation organizations
for hospitals or pathologists do not require separate establishment
licenses.65 States with standards that meet or exceed federal stan-
dards are also exempt. 6 The FDA's rules are only minimum precau-
tions and probably do not pre-empt local rules that are more
stringent, although the industry favors pre-emption.17
Enforcement actions by the FDA against blood banks increased
six-fold from 1986 to 1989. In 1988 it increased routine inspection of
all blood banks from biennial to annual, but has suspended only one
establishment license.6 8 After the deficiencies at the ANRC were re-
vealed in 1988, the FDA negotiated an agreement with ANRC to
improve its operations.6 9 In 1990 an inspection of ANRC National
Headquarters by the FDA revealed hundreds more errors: 230 cases
63. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, CIRCULAR OF INFORMATION FOR THE USE OF
HUMAN BLOOD AND BLOOD COMPONENTS 1, 7 (Aug. 1991) (emphasis in original).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 606.170(b) (1991); AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, supra note 63, at
4. All blood banks and transfusion services must have standard operating procedures to
investigate adverse donor and recipient reactions, which the FDA reviews during annual
inspections. 21 C.F.R. § 606.100(b)(9) (1991). In 1990 the FDA received reports of 53
fatal transfusion reactions from blood banks nationwide. But not all such deaths are re-
ported accurately by hospitals. Ralph Frammolino, Medical Lab Error Linked to Man's
Death, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at A24, col. 1.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(e)(1) (1991).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a(p)(2) (1991).
67. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, Fla., 722 F.2d
1526 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Blood and Plasma Organizations
Urge FDA to Preempt State and Local Laws, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, May
10, 1991, at 4-5.
68. Food and Drug Administration Suspends Blood Bank's License, AABB
BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, July 21, 1989, at 2; Gilbert M. Gaul, The Loose Way
the FDA Regulates Blood Industry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
69. Memorandum from Paul D. Parkman, Director, Center for Biologics Evalua-
tion and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Control of Unsuitable Blood
and Blood Components, to all registered blood establishments (Apr. 6, 1988); National
Affairs Symposium Covers Recent Controversial FDA Actions, AABB BLOOD BANK
WEEK, supra note 5, Oct. 21, 1988, at 4; ARC and FDA Sign Voluntary Agreement to
Improve Operations, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Sept. 9, 1988, at 4-6; agree-
ment reprinted in Blood Supply Safety (1991), supra note 39, at 82-84.
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of possible transfusion AIDS and four fatal cases of bacterial con-
tamination that were not reported to the FDA; violations of testing
procedures; failure to monitor error reports; release of suspect units;
and failure to exclude high-risk donors7 0 More inspections of blood
banks in 1990-1991 disclosed more errors. One shut itself down
without the FDA sending a notice of intent to revoke its license. No-
tices were sent to four others; two closed voluntarily, and the others
either took or were taking corrective measures. The FDA concluded
that the ANRC had not complied with their 1988 agreement. The
ANRC launched a $120-million effort to centralize its recordkeeping
and testing within fourteen new laboratories by 199471
E. The Response of the Industry and FDA to the Risk of AIDS
It is essential to have in mind the changes in screening donors,
testing blood, and warning physicians that the industry made-and
70. Blood Supply Safety, supra note 16, at 128-36, Exhibit K; Inspection of
American Red Cross National Hdq., Form 483, by Mary T. Carden, Investigator, De-
partment of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration (Apr. 26-May
25, 1990); Gilbert M. Gaul, AIDS from Red Cross Blood Unreported, Study Says,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 10, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
71. Under 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.5, 601.6 (1991), the FDA may temporarily suspend a
blood center's license when inspections reveal grounds for revocation and a clear danger
to the public. When the inspection reveals serious problems short of that, the agency
must issue a notice of intent before revoking the license. The notice allows the blood
center to continue to make interstate shipments, provides for a reasonable period for it to
take corrective measures, and, if necessary, offers the opportunity for a public hearing.
The FDA may revoke the license if the firm does not correct the violations, and it may
request an injunction against a blood center that continues to operate without complying,
but no request has been necessary since 1984 or 1985. Telephone Interview with Mr.
Steve Maciello, supra note 51; Letter from Dr. Gerald Quinnan, supra note 51. See also
Blood Supply Safety (1991), supra note 39, at 1-16, 24-43, 98-99, 109-20, and 130-39;
Red Cross, FDA Testify at House Oversight Hearings; Focus Is on New Problems at
Portland Region, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Apr. 19, 1991, at 1-5; FDA
Warns Metropolitan Washington Blood Bank of Intent to Revoke License, CCBC
NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, July 19, 1991, at 4; Hilary Stout, Red Cross Plans Major
Changes at Blood Banks, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1991, at B4, col. 4; Edwin Chen, Inde-
pendent Blood Banks Review Safety, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1991, at A18, col. 4; Red
Cross Plans 14 Central Labs to Screen Blood, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1991, at A20, col. 4.
The FDA informed all blood banks of the kinds of errors that inspections and reports had
revealed and reminded them of their obligation under 21 C.F.R. § 600.14 to report errors
and accidents promptly to the FDA. Memorandum from Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr., Acting
Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, Responsibilities of Blood Establishments Related to Errors & Accidents in the
Manufacture of Blood and Blood Components, to all registered blood establishments
(Mar. 20, 1991), reprinted in Blood Supply Safety (1991), supra note 39, at 93-95;
Memorandum from Gerald V. Quinnan, Acting Director, Deficiences Relating to the
Manufacture of Blood and Blood Components, to all registered blood establishments
(Mar. 20, 1991), reprinted in Blood Supply Safety (1991), supra note 39, at 125-27.
the changes that it refused to make-as the epidemic unfolded. My
chronology is summarized in the Appendix. It shows that the three
groups of blood banks made policy jointly and that the decisions of
the FDA relied heavily on their advice.
What later was called AIDS emerged in 1977, but the first case
reports among homosexual men were published by the CDC in June
and July 1981.72 In July 1982 the CDC published three case reports
of AIDS among hemophiliacs. 3 Groups of experts in government
and industry usually discuss "early warning" information about new
transfusion threats. These groups include: the CDC, FDA, and Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH); the three blood-collecting organi-
zations, their specialized committees, and their annual meetings; ad
hoc groups; and public meetings of the FDA's Blood Products Advi-
sory Committee (on which blood banks in recent years have held the
chairmanship and up to two of the other ten voting seats). In 1982
public concern about AIDS arose in these groups. On July 27, 1982,
an open meeting of the Public Health Service considered the impli-
cations of recent homosexual and hemophilia cases for the manufac-
ture of blood products. Included were the CDC, FDA, NIH, the
National Hemophilia Foundation, homosexual men's groups, and
manufacturers of blood products. The report of that meeting stated
that AIDS had, among other things, "characteristics which suggest
an infectious etiology," and a "possible mode of transmission is via
blood products." But no recommendation was made or action
taken.74
In December 1982 an infant died in San Francisco of AIDS
twenty months after transfusion for Rh incompatibility. The high-
risk donor was well at the time of donation but died of AIDS after
eighteen months. 75 That case alarmed the CDC. It knew that re-
ported cases understated the extent of AIDS because its definition
was restrictive and borderline cases were not counted. It knew AIDS
was found among male homosexuals, intravenous drug abusers, and
persons who frequently received blood products-the same risk
72. Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250 (1981); Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumo-
cystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New York City and California, id. at 305-
08. This CDC publication is distributed widely.
73. Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among Persons
with Hemophilia A, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 365 (1982).
74. This conclusion was emphasized by the United States District Court in the first
AIDS case, Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1987), affd
in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aFid without opinion, 906 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir. 1990). See also SHILTS, supra note 37, at 169-71.
75. Centers for Disease Control, Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-California, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 652 (1982); Arthur J. Ammann et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency in an Infant:
Possible Transmission by Means of Blood Products, 8331 LANCET 956 (1983).
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groups for viral hepatitis. In Atlanta on January 4, 1983, the CDC
convened a national conference on a larger scale which included the
groups that met in July 1982. The likelihood that AIDS was caused
by a blood-borne agent dominated what some participants referred
to as "that horrible meeting. 76
The CDC urged blood banks either to ask donors about sexual
preference or to adopt "surrogate" tests. Most hepatitis viruses could
not be detected in blood tests. But certain liver abnormalities or an-
tibody markers common in persons who are exposed to hepatitis vi-
ruses could be identified. These surrogate tests for hepatitis were
controversial among blood bankers because they were only partially
effective and they rejected some safe blood. But it is important to
understand that hepatitis and AIDS have parallel risk
groups-which was also understood in 1983-so testing for one
reduces some transmission of the other. A CDC study of AIDS pa-
tients showed that one surrogate test identified all intravenous drug
users, ninety percent of male homosexuals, but only about five per-
cent of blood donors. It would cost about five dollars per unit in-
cluding replacements.77
In a fateful decision at Atlanta, blood bankers rejected the CDC's
recommendation to adopt that surrogate test (they changed their
minds over four years later). "Some participants [at the meeting]
were reluctant to accept the hypothesis that AIDS has been trans-
mitted by whole blood in the absence of additional evidence." The
group agreed that high-risk persons should not donate, but "no con-
senus was reached as to the best method of doing this."178 These are
important events for AIDS litigation.
Until the Atlanta meeting individual blood banks were on their
own in deciding how to respond to AIDS. Afterward the three blood-
collecting organizations coordinated the industry's response through
76. SHILTS, supra note 37, at 221.
77. Summary Report on Workgroup to Identify Opportunities for Prevention of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, January 4, 1983, in Blood Supply Safety,
supra note 16, Exhibit A, at 106-09; Centers for Disease Control, Opportunities for
Eliminating Blood Donors at Risk for Transmitting AIDS, Memorandum from Donald
P. Francis to Jeff Koplan (Jan. 6, 1983), reprinted in Blood Supply Safety, supra note
16, Exhibit B, at 110- 11; Anti-HBc as a Nonspecific Test for Transfusion-Associated
Infectious Agents, id., Exhibit D, at 112-15; Gaul, supra note 68; William A. Check,
Preventing AIDS Transmission: Should Blood Donors Be Screened?, 249 J. A.M.A. 567,
570 (1983); Joseph R. Bove, Transfusion-Transmitted Diseases: Current Problems and
Challenges, 14 PROGRESS IN HEMATOLOGY 123, 140-41 (1986).
78. Blood Supply Safety, supra note 16, Exhibit A, 106-07; and sources cited
supra note 77.
joint statements. On January 13, 1983, the AABB, ANRC and
CCBC said that evidence for transfusion-transmitted AIDS was "in-
conclusive" and "incomplete." Direct interrogation about a donor's
sexual preference or promiscuity was an inappropriate "invasion of
privacy" until more data were available.7 9
On March 4, 1983, a Public Health Service interagency group
reached a different conclusion. It surveyed the distribution of AIDS
cases that paralleled the epidemiology of the hepatitis B virus, the
case of the San Francisco infant, and others under investigation. It
recognized that the "[a]vailable data suggest that . . . AIDS is
caused by a transmissible agent" and "[t]he likelihood of blood
transmission." 80 On March 7, 1983, the AABB, ANRC, and CCBCjointly acknowledged that the conclusions of the Public Health Ser-
vice were "similar but not identical" to their previous joint state-
ment, but did not change their position. 81
On March 24, 1983, the FDA issued weak recommendations on
donor screening that reflected the industry's position. The main risk
group was defined as "sexually active homosexual or bisexual men
with multiple partners."8 2 The definition excluded symptomless ho-
mosexual men who were not promiscuous and-against the advice of
CDC-persons with certain liver abnormalities that could be de-
tected by surrogate tests. The FDA recommended confidential unit
exclusion in December 1984 and signed donor consents in October
1986. It extended the risk groups to "any male who has had sex with
another male since 1977" in September 1985 and to prostitutes in
October 1986.83
79. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFI-
CIENCY SYNDROME RELATED TO TRANSFUSION (Jan. 13, 1983), revised and reprinted as
Joint Statement on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Related to Transfu-
sion, 23 TRANSFUSION 87 (1983).
80. Centers for Disease Control, Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WEEKLY REP. 101 (1983).
81. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON PREVENTION OF ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME RELATED TO TRANSFUSION (Mar. 7, 1983).
82. Memorandum from John C. Petricciani, Director, Office of Biologics, National
Center for Drugs and Biologics, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Recommendations
to Decrease the Risk of Transmitting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
from Blood Donors, to all establishments collecting human blood for transfusion (Mar.
24, 1983). The risk group was defined in December 1984 as "males who have had sex
with more than one male since 1979, and males whose male partner has had sex with
more than one male since 1979." Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, Acting Director,
Office of Biologics Research and Review, Revised Recommendations to Decrease the
Risk of Transmitting Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) from Blood and
Plasma Donors, to all establishments collecting blood, blood components, or source
plasma and all licensed manufacturers of plasma derivatives (Dec. 14, 1984).
83. Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, Director, Office of Biologics Research
and Review, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to all registered blood establishments,
Revised Definition of High-Risk Groups with Respect to Acquired Immunodeficiency
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As patients learned about transfusion AIDS and the response to it
by industry and the FDA, some attempted to recruit their own do-
nors-called a "directed donation." Presumably family or friends
would provide an added margin of safety, especially in high-risk ur-
ban areas, or at least bring peace of mind. On June 22, 1983, the
AABB, ANRC, and CCBC, in another joint statement, recom-
mended that blood banks reject these requests. They believed that
the public's concern was "understandable, but excessive," and that
widespread directed donations would "seriously disrupt the nation's
blood donor system."84 One AIDS case that I discuss infra turned on
such a denial.
In January 1984 two studies published in medical journals linked
AIDS in transfusion -recipients with donors who were in high-risk
groups and had pre-AIDS blood abnormalities.85 In 1987 in the first
transfusion AIDS case, a United States district court took these pub-
lications as conclusive evidence for when "the medical community
reached a consensus as to the proposition that AIDS was transmissi-
ble by blood."86
In April and July 1984, scientific papers identified HIV (then
called HTLV-III). 7 On March 2, 1985, the FDA licensed the anti-
HIV test and recommended that blood banks use it as soon as possi-
ble. The AABB required testing for anti-HIV on July 1, 1985, two
months later.8 8 Some patients who became infected with the AIDS
Syndrome (AIDS) Transmission from Blood and Plasma Donors (Sept. 3, 1985); Memo-
randum from Elaine C. Esber, Director, Office of Biologics Research and Review, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, Additional Recommendations for Reducing Further the
Number of Units of Blood and Plasma Donated for Transfusion or for Further Manufac-
ture by Persons at Increased Risk of HTLV-III/LAV Infection, to all registered blood
establishments (Oct. 30, 1986).
84. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON DIRECTED DONATIONS AND
AIDS (June 22, 1983); Joint News Release (June 22, 1983), reprinted in Blood Supply
Safety, supra note 16, Exhibit G, at 116-17. See infra Section V.
85. James W. Curran et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
Associated with Transfusions, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69 (1984); Joseph Bove, Transfu-
sion-Associated AIDS-A Cause for Concern, id. at 115; S.C. Deresinski, AIDS Trans-
mission Via Transfusion Therapy, 8368 LANCET 102 (1984).
86. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in
relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1989), afd without opinion, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
87. Robert C. Gallo et al., Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic Re-
troviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224 SCIENCE
500 (1984); Jean L. Marx, Strong New Candidate for AIDS Agent, id. at 475; P. M.
Feorino et al., Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus Infection of a Blood Donor-Recipient
Pair with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 225 SCIENCE 69 (1984).
88. Owing to the delays in producing final regulations, the FDA did not require
anti-HIV testing until Jan. 5, 1988. See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768,
virus from untested blood shipped to hospitals during these two
months sued. They argued that blood banks should have recalled
untested units from hospital inventories once anti-HIV testing be-
came routine.
On January 13, 1983, the AABB, ANRC, and CCBC jointly
stated that "[flewer than 10 cases of AIDS with possible linkage to
transfusion have been seen despite approximately 10 million transfu-
sions [sic] per year."8 9 The anti-HIV blood test that was imple-
mented in March 1985 permitted estimates of how common HIV
infection among donors had been. The ANRC found the prevalence
of true positives in nine of its regional centers was 38:100,000, or
380 times greater than the "one in a million" estimate. Prevalence in
Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. was more than three times that
in Boston, Detroit, or Philadelphia and about ten times the average
rate for Tulsa, Oklahoma, Portland, Oregon, and Peoria, Illnois.90 If
the average patient got 5.4 units, each from a different donor,9 then
the real risk was 2,052 times the industry's prediction. Moreover, the
ANRC's survey was over two years after the FDA and blood banks
had adopted the voluntary self-exclusion rules. If those rules cut the
prevalence of HIV among donors, then the risk should have been
even lower in 1985 than in January 1983, when the one-in-a-million
estimate was made. Retrospective studies of the risk in San Fran-
cisco in 1983-84 indicate that the estimates of blood bankers at the
772, 779 (W.D. Ark. 1988), affd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989); see also infra note 264.
89. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFI-
CIENCY SYNDROME RELATED TO TRANSFUSION (Jan. 13, 1983). The three organizations
may have meant that 10 million units were transfused per year. At the time, it was
commonly estimated that about 3.5 million persons were transfused each year, and the
average transfusion was of three to four units of whole blood or components. A Los
Angeles blood banker said that the odds of getting AIDS-tainted blood were "ten million
to one." As AIDS Scare Hits Nation's Blood Supply-, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 25, 1983, at 71 [hereinafter As AIDS Scare Hits Nation's Blood Supply -]. A
San Francisco blood banker put the odds at about one per million in July 1983 and at
less than one per 500,000 in March 1984. SHILTS, supra note 37, at 345, 433. The chair-
man of an AABB committee of experts told a subcommittee of the House of Representa-
tives that the risk was "less than one in a million." Statement on AIDS and Blood
Transfusion Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Re-
sources of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., (1983)
(statement of Joseph R. Bove, Director, Yale-New Haven Hospital Blood Bank and
Chairman, AABB Committee on Transfusion-Transmitted Diseases and FDA Blood
Products Advisory Committee).
90. Julian B. Schorr et al., Prevalence of HTLV-Ill Antibody in American Blood
Donors, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 384 (1985). At the time the ANRC did not collect
blood in the high-risk communities of Houston, Miami, San Francisco, or New York.
91. Standard blood banking practice usually does not attempt to transfuse a pa-
tient with more than one component unit from the same donor. JOSEPH FELDSCHUH &
DORON WEBER, SAFE BLOOD: PURIFYING THE NATION'S BLOOD SUPPLY IN THE AGE OF
AIDS 108-09 (1990). The exception is packs of several units of platelets from a single
donor whose tissue type is compatible with the recipient's. Single-donor platelet packs
amounted to about 1 % of all transfusions in 1987. Surgenor et al., supra note 23, at
1648.
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time were even more inaccurate than estimates for the nation at
large.92
My chronology raises several questions about industry care levels
since 1983. Should it have adopted stronger donor-screening mea-
sures than the FDA recommended? Should it have adopted surro-
gate tests when the CDC recommended them? Should it have
encouraged, or at least not discouraged, directed donations? Should
it have issued warnings? Should the entire industry be liable for
choosing incorrect care levels if risks were managed by joint agree-
ments among the three blood-banking organizations?
III. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE RULES OF
LIABILITY
The main purpose of liability is to strengthen the incentives for
responsible conduct. For most activities our society chooses among
legal rules so that buyers or sellers receive signals for risk-manage-
ment. Accidents cannot be eliminated, but precautions can reduce
their rate and severity. Because precautions are costly, the logic of
liability law is to assign the duty to take them to whoever can avoid
the injury at lower cost-usually whoever has superior information
about risks. That strengthens incentives to control risks or to disclose
them.
In this Section I evaluate three liability rules-industry custom,
strict liability, and adequate warning. Issues of negligence and cau-
sation are difficult in the transfusion cases because of their factual
complexity. First I illustrate how the legal and economic principles
work in nonblood situations, and then I analyze the problem of lia-
bility for transfusion.
92. One source reported that it was about 1:440 units, or about one in eighty-one
patients, assuming the average transfusion was 5.4 units. SHILTS, supra note 37, at 546.
A retrospective study published in 1991 estimated that the risk peaked in 1982-1983 at
about 1.1 % per component unit transfused. Michael P. Busch et al., Risk of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission by Blood Transfusion Before the Imple-
mentation of HIV-1 Antibody Screening, 31 TRANSFUSION 4 (1991). Their estimate of
about 1% for 1983 and the first six months of 1984 was 10,000 times greater than the
1:1,000,000 estimate by San Francisco blood bankers in July 1983 and 5,000 times
greater than the estimate of 1:500,000 in March 1984. See supra note 89.
A. Industry Custom
Self-regulation by blood banks plays an important role in deter-
mining standards of care. Therefore it is important to know the ex-
tent to which courts will review an industry's customary practice.
The legitimacy of judicial review was established in The T.J.
Hooper,9" a 1932 admiralty case. In an oft-quoted passage, Judge
Hand held:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in
the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests,
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is re-
quired; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disre-
gard will not excuse their omission.9 4
Judge Hand cited three railroad cases as authorities. In Texas &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer95 Justice Holmes had held that
"[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done,
but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable pru-
dence, whether it usually is complied with or not." Hand traced the
doctrine to a 1868 Massachusetts case of negligence by a cattle
drover,96 but it goes back another decade at least.97
The T.J. Hooper's facts are tricky. During a gale, barges towed
by tugs whose captains did not have working radios were lost.
Nearby tows with working radios received reports of the gale early
enough to put into harbor. A natural experiment had occurred which
allowed comparison between two groups of tows, and Judge Hand
saw that the benefits of working radios obviously exceeded costs.
An adequate receiving set suitable for a coastwise tug can now be got at
small cost and is reasonably reliable if kept up; obviously it is a source of
great protection to their tows. Twice every day they can receive these
93. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
94. Id. at 740.
95. 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (custom of bumping and jerking cars is negligence if
brakeman is required to stand on ice-covered roofs of cars). See also Wabash Ry. Co. v.
McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454, 461 (1883) (railroad must take same degree of care in hiring
night telegraphic operators, who can cause collisions when messages are not transmitted
accurately, as in maintaining equipment and machinery); Shandrew v. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry. Co., 142 F. 320, 325 (8th Cir. 1905) (tests for defects in air hose that
exploded and killed brakeman, beyond tests customarily used, would have been ineffec-
tive and impractical).
96. Maynard v. Buck, 100 Mass. 40, 48 (1868) (custom of drovers for hire to
continue to end of route before returning to search for missing cattle was negligent).
97. Hilber v. McCartney, 31 Ala. 501, 508 (1858) (custom of steamboats of carry-
ing night torch-lights cannot affect liability of owners for a loss caused by failure to
protect cargo of baled cotton from spatks); Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100,
111-12 (1884) (custom of cutting a ladder hole in a mining platform in active operation
without providing lights, rails, or warnings was negligence). These cases and those cited
infra in notes 102 and 103 were complied in Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Services, S.C. Region, No. 88-496, 1988 AIDS LITIG, REP.
1460, 1465-66 (on certification to the Supreme Court of South Carolina from the U.S.
District Court (D.S.C.)).
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[weather] predictions .... Such a set is the ears of the tug to catch the
spoken word, just as the master's binoculars are her eyes to see a storm
signal ashore.98
He held that there was "no custom at all [in the industry] as to
receiving sets; some had them, some did not; the most that can be
urged is that they had not yet become general."99 The trial court
found that ninety percent of tugs had radios, although "many of
these radio sets were the personal property of the tug master, and
not supplied by the owner."' 0 William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner suggested the analogy of carpenters who bring their own
tools. If radios were a cost-effective safety device, they argue, then
"it is impossible to understand why the device is not customary in
the industry-as in fact it appears to have been."'' Requiring tug
owners to own radios, however, probably lowers the cost of monitor-
ing whether ships carried them. Custom lagged only if radio owner-
ship by tug owners was essential.
What I call the Holmes-Hand rule-that industry custom is sub-
ject to a cost-benefit test-is law in seven federal circuits. In about
half the circuits the custom is treated as some evidence of due care
but is not dispositive.10 2 In the others industry custom has been held
to be negligent. 3  In The T.J. Hooper the masters who did not have
working radios risked harm mainly to themselves. But in most of
98. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 739-40.
99. Id. at 740.
100. The T.J. Hooper, 53 F.2d 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
101. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 135 (1987).
102. Petition of J.E. Brenneman Co., 322 F.2d 846, 855 (3d Cir. 1963) (in negli-
gent damage to pier from fire on barge moored next to pier, custom is only evidence of a
standard of care); Gill v. Hango Ship-Owners/AB, 682 F.2d 1070, 1074 (4th Cir. 1982)
(in longshoreman's injury, proof of adherence to an industry practice or custom is not
dispositive on issue of negligence); Baker v. S/S Cristobal, 488 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir.
1974) (in longshoreman's injury, compliance with customs and practices of industry is
not alone due care, but is evidence of care); Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1212
(8th Cir. 1983) (applying Missouri law) (in motel where woman was raped, evidence of
deviation from accepted practice of security measures in other area hotels and motels has
evidentiary value but does not establish negligence conclusively).
103. Tug Ocean Prince v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1156 (2d Cir. 1978) (in
accident for oil spillage from towed barge that collided with submerged rock, custom and
usage do not justify negligence); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455,
462 (4th Cir. 1960) (applying Virginia law) (custom of mislabelling length and width of
nails used in orthopedic surgery, when one became stuck in patient's leg and caused
osteomyelitis, was negligent); Complaint of Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 426 (6th
Cir. 1982) (admiralty) (industry practice in mooring a vessel does not establish reasona-
bleness); Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, 704 F.2d 963, 967-68 (7th Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying Indiana law) (in truck driver's injury at lumber mill, compliance with custom is
not the standard for negligence).
these recent cases (only one of which is in admiralty) those who
managed risk affected the safety of others, as occurs when blood
banks manage risk for transfusion recipients. For example, in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Mehrtens, in a case
where oil spilled from a grounded barge, held that "[m]ethods em-
ployed in any trade, business or profession, however long continued,
cannot avail to establish as safe in law that which is dangerous in
fact."'104 In the Seventh Circuit Judge Posner, in a case where a
lumbermill employee's negligence injured a truckdriver, held that
"compliance with custom is not a defense to negligence."'105
In Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.'08 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict that industry cus-
tom was negligent. That 1932 case was decided six months before
Judge Hand's opinion in The T.J. Hooper, so neither case cites the
other. But the decision is consistent with the Holmes-Hand rule.
Boiler tube manufactured by defendant and sold to plaintiff exploded
when subjected to about half the boiler's allowable working pressure.
The jury found that the tube ruptured because it was manufactured
from defective steel that the manufacturer would have known about
had it tested the steel beforehand. Plaintiffs relied on two professors
of metallurgy who microscopically examined samples of tube from
the boiler. The experts found enough slag and other impurities to
conclude that the steel used 'was unfit, "imminently dangerous," and
that it caused the rupture. They testified that only by microscopic
examination of each "heat," or batch, of steel could the manufac-
turer determine whether the steel was sufficiently strong. Such a test,
they said, would have rejected the heat of steel from which the tube
that ruptured was made.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to war-
rant the jury's verdict that the manufacturer was negligent in failing
to employ microscopic tests. The fact that such tests were not incor-
porated into Wisconsin law or the specifications of the relevant pro-
fessional associations
is certainly strong evidence against the position taken by [the two experts];
but it does not dispose of their evidence as a matter of law. The fact that
the custom of manufacturers generally was followed is evidence of due care,
but it does not establish its exercise as a matter of law. Obviously, manu-
facturers cannot, by concurring in a careless or dangerous method of manu-
facture, establish their own standard of care.107
104. Tug Ocean Prince v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1156 (2d Cir. 1978).
105. Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, 704 F.2d 963, 967-68 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. 240 N.W. 392 (Wis. 1932).
107. Id. at 396; Boyce v. Wilbur Lumber Co., 119 Wis. 642, 97 N.W. 563, 565(1903). See also Hogge v. SS Yorkmar, 434 F. Supp. 715, 734 (D. Md. 1977) (in admi-
ralty, where vessel collided with bridge, failure to use outmoded whistle signals was not
conclusive, since an industry cannot establish its own standard of care).
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But the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of
whether the particular tube was manufactured negligently. The evi-
dence supported the conclusion that the manufacturer did not have
an obligation to test all tubes or a particular tube, "but merely an
obligation to establish by a suitable number of these tests the fitness
of a heat or quantity of steel for the purpose of making tubes.' ' 8
The court, however, did not disturb the jury's conclusions that: (1)
the manufacturer had superior information about the quality of steel
used to make tube, compared to information available to boiler em-
ployees or their employer; (2) custom did not establish a standard of
due care; and (3) a cost-effective way of monitoring the quality of
tubes was to test the quality of steel.
Since early 1983 the three blood-collecting organizations, acting
as trade associations for members, have managed transfusion risks
jointly. Therefore, it would be relevant to learn how courts have
dealt with negligence issues in other industries where firms manage
risks jointly.
The question of joint liability of substantially all the manufactur-
ers in an industry and its trade association was raised in Hall v. E. L
Du Pont De Nemours & Co."°9 In 1972 damages were sought for
eighteen separate accidents in which children were injured by blast-
ing caps. The precise manufacturer in most instances could not be
identified. 110 Plaintiffs alleged that manufacturers knew of the dan-
ger to children, took certain inadequate steps to warn, collusively
failed to add label warnings, and lobbied against legislation to re-
quire warnings.
Hall is a diversity case in which the United States district court
ruled on preliminary motions that required it to determine whether
the plaintiffs might succeed on the law and facts. For that purpose it
took the "gross first approach" of "assum[ing] the existence of a
national body of state tort law" based on "[a] growing consensus on
108. Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 240 N.W. 392, 401
(Wis. 1932).
109. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
110. The opinion covers two cases. In Chance v. Du Pont, plaintiffs, who could not
identify manufacturers of the injury-causing caps, sued substantially the entire industry
and its trade association. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 359. In Hall, other plaintiffs sued manu-
facturers in addition to those that made the injury-causing caps and dropped their com-
plaint against the trade association to maintain a diversity action. The court held that the
Hall plaintiffs' arbitrary selection of nonproducer defendants and their lack of need for
joint liability required dismissal of the claims against nonproducer defendants and sever-
ance of the remaining claims. Id. at 386. Thus, the Hall plaintiffs sacrificed in vain the
possibility of testing the Holmes-Hand rule against a trade association.
the substantive law in this country."111 The court held that if defend-
ants had joint control over the risk of injury and violated a legal
standard of care, then they could be jointly liable. It was not neces-
sary for plaintiffs to show that defendants were in a joint venture or
a profit-sharing plan to establish joint control over risk. Plaintiffs
could establish joint control by showing express agreement or con-
cert of action over care levels. Alternatively, they could demonstrate
evidence of defendants' parallel behavior sufficient to support an in-
ference of tacit agreement or co-operation. Plaintiffs could also sub-
mit evidence that defendants, acting independently, adhered to an
industry-wide standard or customary care level. The court said that
existence of industry standards would not support the imposition of
joint liability in all circumstances, but that they are germane.112
Plaintiffs alleged that manufacturers, through parallel practices,
knew that information collected by their jointly sponsored and
jointly financed trade association showed that children were injured
in accidents involving blasting caps. The court argued that it was
unlikely that individual manufacturers would collect information
about the nationwide incidence and circumstances of blasting-cap
accidents involving children. It would have been reasonable to dele-
gate that function to a trade association. Plaintiffs also alleged that
the manufacturers knew of feasible safety measures and had dele-
gated certain design functions to their trade association; therefore,
the risk to children was foreseeable. Such allegations were held to be
a cause of action under strict liability and negligence principles.
Issues requiring factual development, the court held, were whether
defendants collected and shared this information as a group and
made joint decisions on the basis of known risks. Relevant issues in-
cluded the association's size, whether it was composed of few or
many firms (the blasting cap industry in this country comprised six
firms), its announced and actual safety objectives, internal
procedures of decision-making about safety, information-gathering
procedures about accidents, and lobbying activities about safety dur-
ing the period in question. 1 3 In sum, the court conceptualized Hall
as a case where a trial would determine whether manufacturers,
jointly through their trade association, had superior information
about risk. Attempts to apply Hall to cases of liability for drugs,
toxins, or asbestos, however, failed owing to distinguishable facts. 1 4
111. Id. at 360. Later the claims were severed and transferred in Chance v. E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
112. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 371-74.
113. Id. at 378. The activities of the trade association were documented in Chance,
371 F.Supp. at 441-43, 448.
114. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 143 (1980) (more than two hundred manufacturers made DES and they did not
delegate safety functions to a trade association); Sheffield v. Eli Lilly and Co., 144 Cal.
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Turning now to liability in medicine and other professions, custom
usually is the standard of due care. Professionals are expected to ex-
ercise reasonable care and to have and use a minimum standard of
knowledge and ability that is typical of members in good standing.
That standard is determined by the profession's "collective wisdom."
Whether or not it was met is established by expert testimony of like
professionals. Courts usually defer to other professions and are reluc-
tant to burden them with liability arising from "uneducated" judg-
ments by judges and juries. Following custom in similar
circumstances is not conclusive, but it is strong evidence of nonnegli-
gence if the custom has a rational basis. If neither evidence nor com-
mon experience indicates otherwise, custom without a cost-benefit
test will usually establish nonnegligence as a matter of law. 115
Helling v. Carey 6 was a short-lived exception to that rule. In
1974 the Washington Supreme Court reversed a trial court's judg-
ment for defendant ophthalmologists following a defense verdict,
which was affirmed on appeal, in a malpractice action against them
for failure to detect glaucoma earlier in a thirty-two-year-old wo-
man. The professional standard was not to test patients under forty
years old unless they had suspicious symptoms or complaints. The
standard pressure test for glaucoma was simple, harmless, and inex-
pensive, but was administered only after the patient's tenth office
visit over a five-year period. Failure to test this glaucomatous person
caused a devastating result that could have been arrested with early
detection. Citing The T.J. Hooper, the court held that the defend-
ants were negligent as a matter of law in following the professional
standard.117
Landes and Posner argue that it was anomalous for the court to
App. 3d 583, 604, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 883 (1983) (no joint action would result in pro-
duction of defective polio vaccine and not all vaccine was defective, so manufacturers had
no collective duty to warn of danger); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
597 F. Supp. 740, 821-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (no evidence of a collective industry-wide
decision among the seven manufacturers to control or not control dioxin content); Mar-
shall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying Michigan
law) (no evidence of joint control over risk, and no trade association for asbestos manu-
facturers to delegate safety functions to); Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp.
1454, 1459 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law) (asbestos produced by large
number of small firms that did not attempt to control risk jointly).
115. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 33
at 193-95 (5th ed. 1984).
116. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
117. Id. at 516, 519 P.2d 981, 983. In a separate opinion Justice Utter argued for
strict liability and implied that his colleagues had confused strict liability with negli-
gence. Id. at 517, 519 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Utter, J., concurring).
find an ophthamologist negligent for following a standard, without
striking down the standard on the basis of its expected benefits and
costs. Apparently the "over forty" care level for glaucoma had long
been criticized in medical texts, so the court may have achieved the
right result for the wrong reason."' In Washington, Helling was
"restricted solely to its own 'unique' facts" by courts after being re-
jected by the legislature.1 9 The California Court of Appeal rejected
Helling for malpractice. 2 ' In the 1980s a few jurisdictions moved
away from custom toward a reasonable care standard for malprac-
tice. 2 ' But in the blood cases, as I show infra, the courts usually
reject the Holmes-Hand rule in favor of custom as the standard of
due care.122
Suppliers have weaker incentives to compare benefits and costs if
custom is the standard of due care. Regulation, as an alternative to
liability, in principle can attempt to implement the Holmes-Hand
rule by forcing an industry to compare costs and benefits before
choosing care levels, but the evidence indicates that this did not oc-
cur in blood banking. Following the holding in Hall, plaintiffs suing
an industry of professionals under the Holmes-Hand rule would have
to show that the professionals delegated the choice of care levels to
their trade association, that the association had control over risk,
that it chose without making cost-benefit tests, and that injury from
such choices was foreseeable.
B. Strict Liability
The key to managing risk in transfusion or any other activity is to
have information about risk. The crucial role such information plays
in assigning liability can be illustrated best by a case in which facts
and causation are simple. In Nelson v. Hall,123 a 1985 California
case, a veterinary assistant sued the owner of a dog for injuries sus-
tained to her face when bitten during the course of medical treat-
ment. The trial court granted the defendant dog owner summary
judgment, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed and denied
review.
California's "Dog Bite Statute"'2 4 makes the owner strictly liable
118. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 101, at 138.
119. Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 574 n.3, 550 P.2d 1158, 1162 n.3
(1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (West 1988).
120. Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 494-95, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498-99
(1977).
121. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32
at 30 (Supp. 1988).
122. See infra part IV.B; see, e.g., Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297
S.C. 430, 432, 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1989).
123. 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1985).
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342 (West 1985); Nelson, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 712 n.1,
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for damages to a person who is bitten while in a public place or
lawfully in a private place, including the property of the dog's owner,
regardless of the dog's former viciousness or the owner's knowledge
of it. But the court of appeal concluded that "Amos," a hundred-
pound black Labrador-German shepherd mix, was delivered to the
veterinary office for treatment over which his owner had no control
and that the staff assumed the risk.
Plaintiff had been an assistant for thirteen years, and for two
years at that establishment. "Amos" had been treated there for six
years. The staff knew that "Amos" might attempt to bite his han-
dlers, and a notation of "careful" was on his treatment card. The
staff knew that dogs undergoing sedation might bite. Dogs known to
be vicious usually were muzzled during treatment. "Amos" bit the
assistant while undergoing sedation without a muzzle. The assistant
had been bitten less severely at least five times before, on some of
the occasions by sedated dogs, and one bite had required treatment.
The court held that dog bites were a known occupational risk that
she had appreciated and voluntarily accepted.
Apparently the owner of "Amos" did not know of his vicious
propensities or that he had tried to bite handlers before. Thus, the
complaint was based on strict liability rather than negligence. The
court said, however, that such knowledge could have been the basis
for a negligence action. "[I] f a dog owner purposefully or negligently
conceals a particular known hazard from a veterinarian, he or she
would not be relieved of liability, for this would expose the injured
person to an unknown risk."' 2
Responsibility for avoiding the accident in Nelson was assigned to
the party with superior information, or what Rodney T. Smith and I
211 Cal. Rptr. at 670 n.1.
125. Nelson, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 788 n.4, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 673 n.4; Lipson v.
Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 644 P.2d 822, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1982) (fire fighter
may recover when the act resulting in his injury, such as defendant's misrepresentation of
or failure to warn of known, hidden danger, is independent of the act that created the
fire); Prays v. Perryman, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1133, 262 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1989) (dog
groomer did not assume risk when bitten after owner took dog out of cage on leash under
owner's exclusive control while groomer was deciding whether it would be safe to pro-
ceed); Harrold v. Rolling "J" Ranch, 228 Cal. App. 3d 260, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1990)
(experienced rider did not impliedly assume a known or ordinary risk because she was
not specifically informed of the rented horse's dangerous propensity to be spooked or that
it had thrown riders before); Cohen v. McIntyre, 233 Cal. App. 3d 201, 277 Cal. Rptr.
91 (1991) (veterinarian who muzzled dog that snapped at him, and was bitten after he
removed muzzle while dog was under his exclusive control, voluntarily assumed a known
risk even if the owner concealed the dog's propensity to bite people).
have called the underlying structure of information costs.1 26 Both
parties were obligated to use or disclose what information they had.
The consumer did not realize her dog had a history of biting and
knew nothing of how sedated dogs behaved in veterinarian offices.
She could have avoided the risk only by forgoing treatment. The as-
sistant could have avoided injury by reading the treatment card pro-
vided for "Amos" and applying a muzzle-the cost-effective
precaution. Nelson was followed in California appellate cases involv-
ing animals and job risks.121
The influential Restatement (Second) of Torts also assigns liabil-
ity by comparing the information held by the consumer and the sup-
plier. Under Restatement section 402A, 128 strict liability "applies
only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in
a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him. '1 29 An unreasonably dangerous
product is one that is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. 1' 3 0
126. Ross D. ECKERT & RODNEY T. SMITH, STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS IN
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lowe Institute of Political Economy, Claremont McKenna Col-
lege, June 1988 draft, at 3-4, 29-31, 37-44).
127. Willenberg v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 185, 229 Cal. Rptr. 625
(1986) (veterinarian leaped upon by dog from examination table as he entered office
assumed a risk inherent in his job); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243
Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988) (jockey injured during a race assumed risk of infractions of rough
riding rules, which are within the ordinary expectations of participants); King v. Magno-
lia Homeowners Association, 205 Cal, App. 3d 1312, 253 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1988) (air
conditioner repairman injured on falling from ladder after scaling it a second time under-
stood danger and assumed risk); Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467,
255 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1989) (stuntwoman in motion picture was responsible for portion of
catastrophic injury caused by failure to request safety belts, but did not assume risk
caused by director's decision, between first and second takes, to double speed of stunt
without informing her); Ford v. Gouin, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870
(1990) (experienced water skier, who skied barefoot and backward down a narrow chan-
nel that he was familiar with, assumed the risk that the driver of the boat might veer
from a straight course and cause the skier to hit his head on an overhanging branch);
Knight v. Jewett, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1991) (woman injured in
touch football game, playing without an agreement of rules beforehand and after rough
play occured, voluntarily and knowingly assumed risks that are within the ordinary ex-
pectations of participants); Hacker v. City of Glendale, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 371 (1991) (professional tree trimmer voluntarily assumed the risk of electrocution
because he had general knowledge of the risk and understood that high-voltage lines
passed through the tree he was hired to trim); Donahue v. San Francisco Housing Au-
thority, 230 Cal. App. 3d 135, 281 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1991), rev. granted No. S021823,
284 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1991) (fire inspector who had inspected a building many times and
who noticed that concrete steps were wet and muddied understood and voluntarily as-
sumed the risk of falling whether or not he realized that the steps lacked non-slip adhe-
sive treads).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
129. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
130. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
[VOL. 29: 203. 1992] AIDS Blood-Transfusion Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
C. Adequate Warnings
When and how well blood banks warned physicians of the risk of
transfusion AIDS has been raised in litigation. Therefore, it is im-
portant to know the duties to warn that courts have imposed on
other firms and industries in factually simpler cases. The general
rule is that if a supplier has better information about foreseeable
product risk than consumers do, and risk cannot be reduced cost-
effectively, then its duty to the consumer is discharged by issuing a
warning. The rule applies whether the supplier is a single firm or an
industry acting jointly.
In Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co.,"'1 a 1965 California action in
strict liability and negligence, five workers were killed or injured in a
dynamite explosion in an exploration tunnel at a dam site. Defend-
ant argued that it was generally known to users and sellers that dy-
namite fuse was usually manufactured to burn at the rate of one foot
in forty seconds, although some fuse was made to burn faster. A
safety order required that a three-foot sample of each lot of fuse be
tested for its burn rate in open air by the State of California. Fuse
was sold in rolls of three thousand feet without its burn rate printed
on either the fuse or its paper wrapper.
The California Court of Appeal reversed a motion for summary
judgment granted to defendants. Defendants had not shown that
consumers were aware that manufacturers did not customarily give
warnings of burn rates, that it was common knowledge in the indus-
try that fuse was customarily manufactured to burn at the rate of
one foot every forty seconds, that the fuse that caused the explosion
was manufactured to that specification and was not one of the rarer
fuses that burned faster, or that it was the custom of manufacturers
to make fuse to burn at a given rate.
That custom, in any event, would not necessarily establish a standard of
care meeting the test of reasonability to be applied when the case is tried.
The existence of the state safety order may be evidence that it was reasona-
ble for suppliers of fuse in some instances not to warn regarding fuse tim-
ing. It is not, however, conclusive. 132
The case was remanded for trial to determine whether defendants
had a duty to warn under either strict liability or negligence.
Hall v. Du Pont also raised the issue of whether a group of manu-
facturers acting jointly had a duty to warn. The district court, again
generalizing from an assumed national body of tort law, held that
131. 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
132. Id. at 55, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
blasting cap manufacturers were not entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law on whether they met the duty to warn.
An "unreasonable risk" in any given situation depends on the balancing of
probability and seriousness of harm if care is not exercised against the costs
of taking precautions.
Activity involving a small likelihood of death or serious injury may re-
quire greater and more costly precautions than that involving a higher
probability of lesser harm.133
Children were not the intended users of blasting caps, but they may
have been foreseeable users.134 The court held that there is "no sharp
boundary between foreseeability-i.e., probability of harm-under
negligence and under strict liability principles." Under strict liabil-
ity, "the range of intervening acts which will insulate the defendants
from liability will be even narrower than under negligence princi-
ples. ' 135 The industry warned adults through printed notices on, and
inserted in, packages of blasting caps. Plaintiffs had to show thata
failure to warn children constituted a breach that was a "cause in
fact" and a "proximate cause" of the accidents. What kinds of warn-
ings would be effective for children required "a full factual
presentation. 1 8
The duty to warn in the Restatement's strict liability rule also de-
pends on information. A supplier who "has reason to anticipate that
danger may result from a particular use ... may be required to give
adequate warning of the danger . . . , and a product sold without
such warning is in a defective condition.' 37
Where . . .the product contains an ingredient ...whose danger is not
generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably
not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning
against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, devel-
oped human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of
the ingredient and the danger.13 8
D. Liability for Blood Transfusion39
In transfusion the information problem is similar to that in Nelson
v. Hall but more complex. The problem must be divided into what
133. Hall v. Du Pont, 345 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
134. Id. at 365.
135. Id. at 369-70.
136. Id. at 367. The court defined a "cause in fact" as a warning that could have
averted the particular accident and "proximate cause" as the absence of intervening
events that would have prevented a finding of liability. Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. h (1965).
138. Id. § 402A cmt. j (emphasis added).
139. The analysis in this section is adapted from ECKERT & SMITH, supra note
126. Similar conclusions were reached with a different analysis in Reuben A. Kessel,
Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J. L. & ECON. 265
(1974); Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24
STAN. L. REv. 439, 466, 479-80 (1972); and Comment, Liability Without Fault and the
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the patient knows, what the treating physician knows, and what the
blood bank knows.
Most patients start with zero information about the organization
and operation of blood banks that I described in Section II. Patients
normally deal with physicians and hospitals, not blood banks. Many
will not know even the name or location of their regional blood sup-
plier, let alone the routine precautions it takes. For patients who are
skeptical of the safety of blood-bank blood, the costs of learning
about the costs and benefits of alternative precautions would usually
be high and in an emergency would be prohibitive. 140 Consumers in
general, when facing high information costs, are not likely even to
know what safety improvements-such as additional screening or
testing-to bargain over. 4' Patients rely on their hospital to choose
a suitable blood bank, their physician to inform them of risks, and
the blood bank to do its job prudently.
Assuming that a patient understood the true risk of transfusion
and believed it was too high, how could the patient reduce it? An
elective surgery could be postponed or perhaps forgone. The surgeon
could be instructed to transfuse only if essential (which might slow
recovery). Switching hospitals in the same region probably would not
reduce risk, since most regions are served by a single blood bank.
Some patients would probably switch to a hospital in a different re-
gion with a reputation for safer blood. But each of these adjustments
is costly.
One relatively inexpensive way for patients to attempt to reduce
the risk would be to choose donors themselves. Such a request sig-
nals the blood bank that some patients believe that their potential
damages are high and that extra precautions are cost-effective.' 42
But the possibility of directed donors was limited by the industry's
strong opposition. Others deposited their own (autologous) blood in
advance of surgery, but by 1987 autologous blood grew to only three
AIDS Plaque Compel a New Approach to Cases of Transfusion-Transmitted-Disease,
61 U. COLO. L. REv. 81, 98-101 (1990).
140. See Kessel, supra note 139, at 282.
141. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 101, at 132.
142. Most producers do not have this information without some signal from con-
sumers. See ECKERT & SMITH, supra note 126. An additional complexity is whether a
consumer is willing to pay the extra cost or is willing only to have their insurer billed.
Private and governmental insurers sometimes are unwilling to pay for new procedures
until their effectiveness is documented, and such information was not available early in
the AIDS epidemic. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
percent of all collections. 1 3 Neither procedure is practical for emer-
gencies or when extensive transfusion is necessary (e.g., for some
chemotherapies, massive gastrointestinal bleeding, and some sur-
geries). Thus, other than choosing donors, switching regions, or for-
going treatment, patients can do nothing to reduce risks.
What patients know about risks, aside from what they read and
learn on their own, depends on what their physicians and hospitals
know and tell them. Under the rule of Canterbury v. Spence,' a
leading case in medical malpractice, the physician has a duty to
warn the patient-voluntarily, specifically, and in nontechnical
terms-of all "material" risks the patient needs to know to make an
informed choice between the proposed treatment and alternatives.' 4
The physician is not required to disclose every known risk and has no
duty to disclose in emergencies or to patients who are distraught or
incompetent. But "[a] very small chance of death or serious disable-
ment may well be significant."' 46 A duty to disclose may apply also
when the physician knows the patient attaches significance to a par-
ticular risk, whether or not the physician believes it to be material. 47
The knowledge or warnings that physicians can transmit to pa-
tients depends in part on what is published or communicated to them
by specialists in blood banking and expert government agencies.
Blood is both a biologic and a prescription drug.148 Under the
learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer of a prescription
drug, or a blood bank, 49 has a duty to warn only the physician. The
physician, in deciding on use, takes into account "the propensities of
the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient.' ' 0
Blood bankers, as I noted in Section II, have lower costs of acquir-
ing "early warning" information about new transfusion threats than
143. Not all hospitals offer the service, and it usually costs more than blood-bank
blood. Surgenor et al., supra note 23, at 1648.
144. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1973) (surgeon had duty to disclose to patient that surgery for back pain had I %
risk of paralysis).
145. The Canterbury rule that physicians must disclose all material risks may be
replacing the rule that physicians must disclose only what is customary practice in the
community. Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 239 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying Oklahoma
law) (what is material, not custom, is the standard of care); McNeill v. United States,
519 F.2d 283, 288 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying Federal Tort Claims Act and South Carolina
law) (geographical standard of care, if it exists, is not conclusive). See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 115, § 32 at 188, 191, 194-96; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 121, § 32
at 30.
146. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788.
147. Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. 1981).
148. 21 C.F.R. § 606.121(c)(8)(i) (1991).
149. Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 765, 527 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1974)
(blood bank's warning to physicians was adequate).
150. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Texas
law); Robert M. McKenna, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of
a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CH. L. Rav. 943, 958-59 (1988).
[VOL. 29: 203. 1992] AIDS Blood-Transfusion Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
hospitals, physicians, or patients. Their three trade associations are
in regular contact with each other, the CDC, the FDA, and other
cognizant federal agencies. These organizations can disseminate new
risk information quickly to member banks through bulletins, annual
meetings, and continuing education workshops. Most of these groups
were involved in the series of meetings that spread information about
AIDS in 1982-1983; non-A, non-B hepatitis in 1985-1987; HTLV-I
and HTLV-II in 1988; parasites in 1989; and HIV-2 and bacterial
infections in 1990.
Blood bankers know that their early information about transfusion
threats is superior to that of hospitals, physicians, and patients. They
also know the extent to which contaminated blood injures a human
being. They know that hospitals, physicians, and patients rely on
them to provide blood that is safe. They know that donors in certain
groups and some geographical areas are at greater risk for disease,
and they know that their knowledge about viral risks is superior to
that of donors.' 51 They know that they can discover viral defects in
blood at a cost below that of anyone else in the process. They know
which tests detect various agents or their markers and that they can
learn at relatively low cost which tests are cost-effective. They know
that the blood they ship to hospitals will be put to its intended use
and purpose. They know that the condition in which it was collected
and shipped usually will not be altered. 52 They know it will be used
without inspection for viral defects by patient or physician (who are
not qualified to inspect it anyway). They know that when faced with
a prospective epidemic, the productivity of early precautions is
high.153
Industry custom in blood banking rarely emerges from experimen-
tation and emulation by independent competitors. Minimum stan-
dards are set by the FDA, Which relies heavily on industry experts
151. Plaintiffs who sue donors for negligence (in addition to hospital and blood
banks) do not have a cause of action against the donors unless the donors knew or had
reason to know prior to donation that they were infected. Hubbell v. South Nassau Com-
munities Hosp., 46 Misc. 2d 847, 260 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1965).
152. Alteration of a product by the consumer is a defense available to the manu-
facturer. For example, a consumer who tethered the rear legs of a ladder without the
manufacturer's approval and used it on soft ground contrary to instructions that were
printed on the ladder could not recover for injuries. Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1966). Normally blood is used in the state that
it is supplied by the blood center, although occasionally it is manipulated at the hospital
laboratory to reduce the threat of dangerous reactions.
153. For the same point concerning liability generally, see ECKERT & SMITH,
supra note 126.
for advice. The AABB sets its own standards and accredits mem-
bers, and since 1983 the three blood-collecting organizations have
jointly set policy on matters that affect their liability for tranfusion
AIDS. Individual blood banks appear to have delegated control over
certain care levels-and thus over transfusion risks-to the three
blood-collecting organizations jointly in a manner similar to that of
the blasting-cap manufacturers in Hall. The AABB's counsel has
stated that professional standards are "[t]he most obvious place [for
a court] to look for the rules."' 54 The AABB says that its accredita-
tion program "provides a measure of protection" against lawsuits.'",
One might conclude that its standards are chosen at least partly with
regard to liability.
The basis for giving blood-banking organizations so much influ-
ence is that their information about risk and care levels is superior to
that of any single blood bank or anyone else. In AIDS litigation,
which I describe infra, defendant blood banks have argued that in-
dustry custom should be the standard of due care. That' is tanta-
mount to arguing that the group that sets industry standards has
expert status and superior information about risk. Industry custom
may be a reasonable rule if consumers and suppliers have identical
information, but clearly that is not the case for transfusion. Whether
the industry set cost-effective care levels early in the epidemic when
they would have been most effective can be determined only after a
factual inquiry such as in The T.J. Hooper or Marsh Wood Prod-
ucts. Whether the industry exercised joint control over risk as in
Hall, and issued adequate early warnings as in Canifax, also can be
determined only after a factual inquiry (which I discuss in Section
V).
IV. 'THE BLOOD CASES
Blood cases are complex because causation is difficult to discover
and establish. Obvious symptoms of hepatitis, if they appear at all,
can take several months to develop. Meanwhile the patient could be
exposed to more virus through other transfusions, skin cuts, travel to
high-risk areas, or other contacts. Symptoms of HIV infection take
years to develop, and some transfusion patients may belong to other
high-risk groups. Certain groups of donors are more likely to trans-
mit either hepatitis viruses or HIV. Specific laboratory tests for vi-
ruses in blood banking are rare, and indirect or surrogate
tests-including those for antibodies-have error rates. It may be
difficult to show in court that such a test could have prevented an
infection.
154. Willett, supra note 54, at 56.
155. AABB, supra note 26.
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A. Pre-AIDS Cases
The standards for transfusion liability that were applied to AIDS
cases in the 1980s emerged in cases of transfusion hepatitis in the
1960s and 1970s. These cases have been analyzed elsewhere.' 56 My
discussion emphasizes that courts in some states without "blood
shield laws" held blood banks strictly liable owing to their superior
information about risk. That led blood banks to lobby for and secure
statutory shields nationwide.
1. Implied Warranty
The first exemption from implied warranty occurred in a 1954
New York action, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.57 Under im-
plied warranty a seller is liable for harms from goods that are not of
merchantable quality or fit for their intended purpose. The plaintiff
sought recovery for damages from hepatitis on the theory that it was
a sale under New York sales law for a hospital to supply her with
tainted blood for a separate fee. She claimed that defendant knew
the purpose for which the blood would be used, that she relied on
defendant's skill and judgment in supplying safe blood, and that the
sale triggered the implied warranty imposed by the statute. The hos-
pital moved to dismiss on the ground that the transaction did not
constitute a sale. The New York Supreme Court denied the motion,
and its appellate division affirmed. But the New York Court of Ap-
peals reversed. What the patient had bargained and contracted with
the hospital to provide, the court said, was medical services that
were exempt from implied warranty. The medicines, drugs, or blood
she received were not separate sales transactions and were "inciden-
tal to" and "not divisible" from her medical treatment. Moreover, no
blood tests were available in 1954 to detect hepatitis viruses, and
plaintiff did not allege negligence. Making the hospital liable regard-
less of fault, the court held, would be tantamount to making it an
156. Franklin, supra note 139, at 456-61; Comment, Transfusion-Associated Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Blood Bank Liability?, 16 U. BALT. L.
REV. 81, 95-100 (1986); Comment, Hospital and Blood Bank Liaiblity to Patients Who
Contract AIDS Through Blood Transfusions, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875, 882-83 n.36,
887-88 n.62 (1986); Comment, Strict Liability for Blood Derivative Manufacturers:
Statutory Shield Incompatible with Public Health Responsibility, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J.
443, 450-59 (1984); Note, Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption from
Strict Products Liability in California: A Reassessment, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 1101, 1108-
14 (1986); Note, Liability for Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 14 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 141, 166 n.205 (1988).
157. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
insurer against "bad" blood.
Perlmutter was a four-to-three decision, and it was not clear that
it would be followed. Accordingly, associations of blood banks, hospi-
tals, and physicians began to lobby legislatures for statutes that de-
clared blood to be a "service" rather than a product or a sale, which
was exempt from implied warranty. By 1965 three states had en-
acted exemptions.158
By 1966 four jurisdictions had adopted Perlmutter for hospitals
and two jurisdictions extended it to blood banks that furnished blood
to the hospitals for a separate fee.159 The Perlmutter majority was
more sensitive to factual distinctions than were the courts that ex-
tended it to blood banks. Hospitals have higher costs of screening
donors and testing blood than blood banks. Accordingly, the Perl-
mutter majority made a reasonable decision for a hospital under ei-
ther a strict liability or a negligence standard, and presumably would
have recast its argument had a blood bank been the defendant. 100
Nevertheless, a narrow ruling for a hospital was extended to cases
with different facts and triggered heavy lobbying by blood banks for
shield laws.
Florida courts were the first to reject extending Perlmutter to a
blood bank. In an important 1966 case, Russell v. Community Blood
Bank,"' the facts, plaintiff's theory of recovery, and trial court hold-
ing were essentially the same as in Perlmutter. Florida had neither a
shield law nor a common-law case in point. The Florida District
Court of Appeal, reversing a motion to dismiss, held that "[i]t seems
to us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it
into the shape of a service, and then employ this transformed mate-
rial in erecting the framework of a major policy decision." ''" The
court argued that the rationale underlying Perlmutter and other
cases denying liability was not the sales-service distinction. It was
whether public policy should hold hospitals or blood banks liable for
defective blood that was "unavoidably unsafe" owing to the presence
of viruses that were undetectable with existing laboratory tests. 6 3
The Restatement published the previous year raised the issue of
whether or not a product was "unavoidably unsafe.' ' 4 Restatement
158. Franklin, supra note 139, at 475 n.204.
159. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. App. 1966),
rev'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
160. The Blood Transfusion Association, possibly a blood bank, was a third-party
defendant to the action, but the hospital was the appellant and the majority and dissent-
ing opinions address only the issue of the liability of a hospital. See Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hosp., 129 N.Y.S. 232, 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
161. 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
162. Id. at 752.
163. Id. at 752-53.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). My analysis parallels that
of ECKERT & SMITH, supra note 126.
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section 402A assigns strict liability to the seller for physical harm
caused by defects whether the product is processed or is supplied
untreated in its natural state (like uncooked, untreated poisonous
mushrooms)."6 5 A defective condition "may arise not only from
harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself either as
to presence or quantity, but also from foreign objects contained in
the product."' 66 The product must "reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold" and
without subsequent mishandling or alteration by the consumer. 67
Restatement comment k exempts such "unavoidably unsafe" prod-
ucts as prescription drugs or vaccines with dangerous side effects for
some persons in spite of proper preparation and warnings.'68 A prop-
erly prepared product is one for which the manufacturer has made
all expenditures on safety that are justified by the gains to society
from reduced accidents. If warnings are adequate, then consumers
assume remaining risks.
The Florida District Court of Appeals held that a blood bank
could be subject to implied warranty, but it could use comment k as
a defense by proving that the particular defect was undetectable and
unremovable."6 9 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action in implied warranty and
that the motion to dismiss was rejected correctly. But it held that it
was premature for the court of appeals to delve into the matter of
whether hepatitis viruses were detectable. Whether a method of de-
tection existed and whether it would constitute a legal defense were
questions of fact that should not be settled by a pronouncement of
law. 17 0
In an important concurring opinion,'' Justice Roberts argued that
blood containing undetectable hepatitis virus was adulterated and
unreasonably dangerous, not unavoidably unsafe. He distinguished
the case of a retail druggist who was sued by a patient for the harm-
ful effects of a prescription that the druggist filled with a prepack-
aged drug. Under comment k the druggist could not be liable for
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. e.
166. Id. cmt. h.
167. Id. § 402A(1)(b) cmt. g.
168. Id. cmt. k.
169. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d at 755.
170. Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 118 (Fla. 1967) (per
curiam).
171. Id. at 118-21 (Roberts, J., concurring).
breach of implied warranty as long as the drug was unadulterated. 17 2
The druggist could have done nothing to reduce liability. Sellers are
not liable for useful and desirable products, Justice Roberts argued,
that are "attended with a known risk to the consumer," as long as
they are properly prepared with adequate warnings. But manufac-
turers of adulterated products that "produce a harmful effect upon
any consumer" -such as toxins in tinned meats or nails in paper-
wrapped candy bars-were liable under implied warranty whether or
not they could have known of the defect.1"3 Blood containing viruses
that were dangerous to any consumer was adulterated, Justice Rob-
erts maintained (and, I might add, more dangerous than nails in a
wrapped candy bar), and an exception to the rule could be created
only by the legislature.
The Florida Legislature did enact a shield law, but Florida courts
applied the Russell rule to pre-existing cases. A hospital operating a
blood bank that transfused infective blood was liable for breach of
warranty similar to that of a regular blood bank.17" In 1973 the
Florida Supreme Court adopted Justice Roberts's rejection of the
comment k defense by a blood bank.' 75 Appellate courts in three
other states held that whether a recognized method to detect hepati-
tis viruses was available was a factual issue to be settled at trial and
that it was erroneous for trial courts to decide it with a pronounce-
ment of law.'1 6 But many more jurisdictions held that detectability
mattered, thereby avoiding Restatement strict liability judicially. 17 7
172. McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., Division of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 174 So.
2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
173. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 120 (Fla. 1967)
(Roberts, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). See also Blanton v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944) (toxins in canned beef); Sencer v. Carl's Mar-
kets, 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950) (en banc) (toxins in canned fish); Florida Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953) (broken glass in sealed bottle); Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963) (lung cancer from cigarettes);
Wagner v. Mars, Inc., 166 So. 2d 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (nails in paper-wrapped
candy bar).
174. Mercy Hosp. v. Benitez, 257 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (per
curiam).
175. Rostocki v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, 276 So. 2d 475, 476-77 (Fla.
1973).
176. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 329, 232 A.2d 879, 887
(1967), rev'd and remanded, 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 68 (1969); Hoffman v.
Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 508 n.12, 267 A.2d 867, 870 n.12 (1970); Gilmore v.
St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Okla. 1979).
177. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 195 Colo. 529, 579 P.2d 1158
(Colo. 1978), rev'd, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J.
Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972), rev'd, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974),
afjd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (per curiam); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp.,
403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. App. 1979); Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841, 847 (5th
Cir. 1975) (applying Louisiana law); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d
1075, 1077 (1974); Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, Inc., 62
Cal. App. 3d 417, 419, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92, 93 (1976); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp.,
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The comment k defense would reappear in AIDS litigation.
2. Strict Liability in Tort
Strict liability emerged in a 1970 hepatitis case in Illinois, Cun-
ningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital.17 8 The trial court granted
the hospital summary judgment on the ground that strict liability in
tort, which the Illinois Supreme Court adopted in a 1965 automobile
case, did not apply to blood. The appellate court reversed, and the
supreme court affirmed. It held that unaltered but dangerous blood,
as with untreated poisonous mushrooms, was a product under Re-
statement section 402A. "There can be no question," the court said,
"that blood containing hepatitis virus is 'in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.' "9 The court ex-
pressly followed Russell even though ten jurisdictions had adopted
Perlmutter for hospitals or blood banks and legislatures in some
twenty-five states had enacted shield laws. It held that supplying in-
fective blood for consideration was a sale that made the blood bank
or hospital strictly liable. It recognized the factual difference be-
tween hospitals and blood banks, but held that a hospital was in the
chain of distribution even if providing blood was only part of its total
service.'80
Following the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts in Russell,
the Illinois court rejected the Restatement's comment k defense. It
held that the "unavoidably unsafe" exception was limited to "prod-
ucts which are not impure and which, even if properly prepared, in-
herently involve substantial risk of injury to the user." Whether or
not viruses were detectable was "of absolutely no moment." The con-
sequences of injury from dangerous blood should not "fall upon the
individual consumer who is entirely without fault"' 8 (or, I would
add, information).
After Cunningham blood banks, hospitals, and physicians in 1971
308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33 Cal. App.
3d 606, 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1973); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., 368 So. 2d
1219, 1220 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (for transfusion malaria). See also Beth Rabkin &
Michael S. Rabkin, Individual and Institutional Liability for Transfusion-Acquired Dis-
eases: An Update, 256 J. A.M.A. 2242, 2243 (1986).
178. 47 I11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Note, Strict Liability for Disease
Contracted from Blood Transfusion, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 80 (1971); Kessel, supra note
139, at 277-78; Franklin, supra note 139, at 459-60.
179. 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
180. Id. at 492, 266 N.E.2d 897, 901.
181. Id. at 496-97, 266 N.E.2d 897, 903-04.
obtained a shield law from the Illinois Legislature. 182 In 1971 a
shield against any civil liability save negligence was enacted in
Washington State.i 83 An action for damages from hepatitis, Reilly v.
King County Central Blood Bank, Inc.,84 was brought before the
effective date of the statute. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the blood bank. But the Washington Court of Appeals, fol-
lowing Cunningham, held that a nonprofit blood bank supplying
blood for a fee was a sale subject to strict liability in tort. By 1972
forty-one states had statutes declaring blood to be a service rather
than a product or exempting it from strict liability in either contract
or tort.185
In a 1981 action for hepatitis against a Louisiana hospital and
blood bank, DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co.,'86 the
trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. It found no causa-
tion or negligence, and the Louisiana Civil Code exempted blood
banks from implied warranty. 8 7 The court of appeals affirmed, but a
split Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. The civil code provision de-
fining blood as a medical service exempt from implied warranty of
merchantability and fitness, the majority held, did not govern the
tort liability of blood banks. Evidence regarding the cause of plain-
tiff's hepatitis was circumstantial but sufficient to indicate that the
transfusion was the cause. 88 At the time tests for hepatitis B were
182. Franklin, supra note 139, at 475 n.205.
183. Garvey v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 756, 757, 697 P.2d 248, 249
(1985).
184. 6 Wash. App. 172, 174, 492 P.2d 246, 248 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (en banc).
185. Franklin, supra note 139, at 474-76.
186. 385 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981), on
remand, 410 So. 2d 279 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982), cert. denied,
427 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1983).
187. Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, 333 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
337 So. 2d 220 (La. 1976) (exemption of blood bank from strict liability for implied
warranties was constitutional).
188. This case illustrates the occasional complexities of showing causation for viral
transfusion disease. Mrs. DeBattista was given three units of blood on Feb. 14, 1973, had
hepatitis B symptoms one month later, and was hospitalized for severe hepatitis after one
more month. The test for hepatitis B antigen on one of her donors was negative, but he
was rejected when he tested positive on attempting to donate sixty days later. It was
subsequently learned that he was schizophrenic and had lied about a history of syphilis at
the first donation. Mrs. DeBattista's sister had contracted hepatitis B by transfusion at
the same hospital one year earlier and the two visited regularly thereafter. Mrs. DeBat-
tista's severe hepatitis symptoms emerged about the same time as her donor's attempt to
donate a second time. The trial court found no negligence by the blood bank and did not
expressly determine whether her hepatitis was transmitted by transfusion. The court of
appeals, taking into account her sister's hepatitis and the possibility that her donor could
have been infected between the first and second visits to the blood bank, held that the
plaintiff failed to establish causation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, noting that the court of appeals may have reversed the trial court's
"implicit factual finding," reconsidered the evidence and reversed because the transfusion
was "the most reasonable cause" of her disease. DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins.
Co., 385 So. 2d 518, 521 (La. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 403 So. 2d 26, 28-29 (La. 1981).
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only thirty percent effective, so the issue was whether the blood bank
was liable without a finding of negligence.
The supreme court adopted the Restatement's definition of strict
liability that already was established in Louisiana products liability
law. "'Unreasonably dangerous' means," the court said, "simply
that the article which injured the plaintiff was dangerous to an ex-
tent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary con-
sumer" having "the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." Hepatitis-contaminated blood is unreasona-
bly dangerous because "[t]he risks involved in receiving a transfu-
sion of blood in this condition are certainly greater than a reasonable
consumer would expect."'18 9 That view is consistent with the blood
bank's lower costs of discovering defects. But the legislature "over-
ruled" the court's opinion "within weeks" after it was rendered and
before it was published. Blood banks were exempted from "[s] trict
liability or liability of any kind without negligence" for disease
transmitted by "any infectious agent undetectable by appropriate
medical and scientific laboratory tests."'190
It is clear that courts in four states, absent shield laws, would have
held blood banks strictly liable in either contract or tort. But strict
liability for blood banks in even a few states also affects banks in
other states that sell, barter, or exchange with them. AABB's coun-
sel observed in 1985 that
[b]ecause [some courts reversed Perlmutter], and also because we're aware
that judges can change their minds-and sometimes do with remarkable
swiftness and for remarkable reasons-we went to the state legislatures
throughout the country. In all but four states [in 1985] there are laws on
the books which, in effect, say that blood banks and others engaged in the
provision of blood will not be strictly liable.191
AABB's executive director acknowledged that "blood banking enjoys
protection unique to any other product or industry in the world [sic].
As far as I know, there is no other product that is immune from
189. DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26, 30-31 (La. 1981).
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797 (West 1990); Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner
Medical Found. Hosp. and Clinic, 468 So. 2d 720, 722 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd, 470 So. 2d
878 (La. 1985) (per curiam); Note, Liability of a Blood Supplier in Louisiana for
Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 34 Loy. L. REV.
164, 176-77 n.98 (1988).
191. Willett, supra note 54, at 58-59.
strict liability."' 92 By mid-1990 blood bankers had obtained statu-
tory shields in all but one state. 93
3. Negligence
Numerous jurisdictions during the pre-AIDS era declared that
blood banks or hospitals were not exempt from negligence in princi-
ple.1 94 But as a practical matter they were, as long as their conduct
at the time was consistent with the standard of professional care.195
Courts defer to other professions as a rule, 98 so blood banks were
not held to the usual negligence criterion-the "reasonable man" or
cost-benefit standard-of what an ordinarily prudent person would
have done in similar circumstances. 97
Post-transfusion hepatitis was common before AIDS,' 8 but the
literature reveals fewer than a dozen appellate cases in negligence. A
licensed blood bank could be held negligent if it could not show that
it followed FDA minimum rules and its own standard operating pro-
cedures in asking donors about their health and risk factors.'"9
Warning physicians about hepatitis risks in printed messages on
blood containers and in circulars distributed to hospitals was held to
192. Statement of Gilbert M. Clark, in LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE,
supra note 54, at 110; Franklin, supra note 139, at 475 n.205.
193. See supra note 8.
194. Gilmore v. St. Anthony's Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200 (Okla. 1979); Heirs of Fruge
v. Blood Servs., 500 F.2d 841, 848 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Louisiana law); Hoder v.
Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205, 209-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), superseded by statute in
Sicuranza v. Northwest Florida Blood Center, 582 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 417,
418, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92, 93 (1976); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314,
332-33, 232 A.2d 879, 888-90 (1967), rev'd, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); McDaniel v. Baptist
Memorial Hosp., 352 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (applying Tennessee law), arfd,
469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972); Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 339
N.E.2d 846 (1974); Samuels v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (applying New York law), affd in part, rev'd in part, 591 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1979); Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (applying Ten-
nessee law), arfd, 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33
Cal. App. 3d 606, 612 n.3, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 n.3 (1973); Tufaro v. Methodist
Hosp., 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
195. Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359, 363-64, 506 P.2d 449, 451-52
(1973); Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (applying
Tennessee law), arid 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975).
196. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
197. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied,
160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947).
198. It was estimated that 7-17% of transfusion recipients in the 1960s and 1970s
received hepatitis of one kind or another. A commonly-cited national average was 10%.
Richard D. Aach & Richard A. Kahn, Post-Transfusion Hepatitis: Current Perspec-
tives, 92 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 539 (1980); Joseph R. Bove, Transfusion-Associ-
ated Hepatitis and AIDS: What Is the Risk?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 242, 243 (1987);
Harvey J. Alter et al., Posttransfusion Hepatitis after Exclusion of Commercial and
Hepatitis-B Antigen-Positive Donors, 77 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 691 (1972).
199. See cases cited supra note 194.
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be adequate.200 Three courts held that physicians did not have to
warn patients of hepatitis because the risk of death was "relatively
minor."'20 1 One jurisdiction held that a blood bank could use the Re-
statement's comment k defense if it had warned physicians by the
best methods then known.20 2
Blood banks were not negligent if they tested according to the
AABB and FDA standards. Plaintiffs could not establish a standard
of care with testimony from one or two experts who favored using
additional routine tests.20 3 In 1973 a Montana blood bank was held
not negligent in failing to use a surrogate test for hepatitis that mea-
sured certain liver abnormalities (called SGOT).0 4 The blood bank
established that it had followed the AABB and FDA rules, that no
blood bank in the country used the test routinely, that no profes-
sional group ever recommended the test for that purpose, and that,
in spite of controversy over its utility, industry experts concluded it
was not a useful or meaningful test for screening blood donors. 20 5
200. Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 765, 527 P.2d 1075, 1077 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1974).
201. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (1976) (recipient must accept the relatively minor risk of hepati-
tis); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105 (1970)
(patient who signed consent for transfusion did not need to be warned of the extra risks if
commercial blood was used); Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn.
1974) (applying Tennessee law) (risk of incidence of hepatitis shown was remote and
inconsequential), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975); Willett, supra note 54, at 63-64.
202. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 195 Colo. 529, 579 P.2d 1158
(1978), rev'd, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983).
203. Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105
(1970); Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359, 506 P.2d 449 (1973); Hines v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). See also Sawyer v.
Methodist Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (applying Tennessee law) (hospi-
tal blood bank that followed AABB standards was not negligent), arid, 522 F.2d 1102
(6th Cir. 1975). But an Oklahoma blood bank was denied summary judgment simply
because it followed industry practice. Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200,
1206 (Okla. 1979).
204. Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359, 506 P.2d 449 (1973).
205. Id. at 361, 506 P.2d 449, 452. Montana subsequently exempted blood banks
from liability if they used the tests according to the latest AABB recommendations.
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-33-104 (1987), cited in Comment, Hospital and Blood Bank
Liability to Patients Who Contract AIDS Through Blood Transfusions, supra note 156,
at 890 n.75.
B. The AIDS Cases"6
The statutory and case law that emerged in the era when hepatitis
was the worst transfusion disease was extended to AIDS. Statutory
shields remained intact for strict liability. Following FDA minimum
rules and industry custom usually remained the standard of due care
in negligence actions.
1. Strict Liability
Case law in six states and the District of Columbia has held that
blood that transmits AIDS is not a product for the purpose of strict
liability in contract or tort.2"7 The District of Columbia never had a
206. I followed approximately 136 lawsuits from published opinions, newspaper ac-
counts, and the pleadings, judgments, orders, and memoranda published in the AIDS
Litigation Reporter through Apr. 10, 1992. I focused on 32 cases (24%) against private,
nongovernmental blood banks (or hospitals that operated their own blood banks or pro-
vided blood banking services) that were disposed of either on summary judgment or after
a trial. I eliminated 10 cases (7%) that were settled without making public the details. I
also ignored cases that defendants won because of expiration of timely claims under stat-
utes of limitations. I confined the study to plaintiffs whose only risk for AIDS, based on
the documents I read, was the transfusion of blood or components, each unit of which
was collected from a donor at a blood bank. That eliminated another 30 cases (22%) in
which the plaintiff had a history of transfusions of blood derivative products for a chronic
coagulation disorder and sued the manufacturer. These products are prescription
medicines made in batches from pooled plasma often from thousands of donors. Persons
with lifelong clotting disorders may ingest products from multiple batches of several
manufacturers. Another factual distinction between the blood products cases and the
blood bank cases is that manufactured products can be heated to kill viruses without
destroying the product's effectiveness. When manufacturers began heating procedures is
an issue raised in actions against them but not in actions against blood banks. See Note,
Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption from Strict Products Liability in
California: A Reassessment, supra note 156; Comment, Strict Liability for Blood Deriv-
ative Manufacturers: Statutory Shield Incompatible with Public Health Responsibility,
supra note 156.
For smaller surveys of transfusion AIDS cases see Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health
Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United
States, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621, 1624 (1989); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation
Project-A National Review of Court and Human Rights Commission Decisions, Part
I: The Social Impact of AIDS, 263 J. A.M.A. 1961, 1962 (1990).
207. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058-59 (D.D.C. 1987)(strict liability shield for hepatitis applies to AIDS), a d in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437(D.C. Cir. 1988), afld without opinion, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Kirkendall v.
Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768, 770 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)(blood is a service), afl'd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989); Shelby v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp., No. H-86-3780 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (Memorandum and Order); Shelby v. Gulf
Coast Regional Blood Center, No. H-87-901 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (applying Texas law)(blood banks exempt from strict liability provided donors are not paid cash) (WL
Allfeds); Miles Laboratories v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 734-35, 737-39, 556 A.2d 1107, 1119-
21, 1123-25 (Md. 1989) (Restatement and comments, adopted at common law before
amendment of shield statute, exempted blood product from strict liability if virus was
scientifically undetectable); Samson v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 295 S.C. 359; 368 S.E.2d
665 (1988) (shield does not violate equal protection clause of state's constitution); Sam-
son v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 297 S.C. 409, 410, 377 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1989) (exemption
from implied warranty limits liability to negligence); Cutler v. Graduate Hosp., 717 F.
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statutory shield for hepatitis or AIDS. Its common-law hepatitis
shield for hospitals emerged in a 1979 case.208 The trial court, fol-
lowing Perlmutter, granted the defendant summary judgment on
theories of strict liability in contract and tort. The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the Restatement's
comment k defense concerning the undetectability of the hepatitis
virus. It also made the policy judgment that screening donors too
carefully could harm "the public interest in assuring the ready avail-
ability of blood."20 9
In 1987 the shield was extended to blood banks in Kozup v.
Georgetown University.21 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the shield for hospitals applied logi-
cally to blood banks "with equal if not greater force." The AIDS-
causing agent had not been scientifically identified by the time of
transfusion in this case, so comment k, the court held, applied
equally to AIDS and hepatitis. Judgment for the blood bank also
kept the law tidy. "This result is consonant with that of nearly every
jurisdiction, and avoids the aberrational result that the [American
Red Cross] would be strictly liable in the District of Columbia for
conduct that would not be actionable in 49 of our 50 states."21'
In 1989 the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled on questions certi-
fied from the United States district court concerning a strict liability
action for AIDS from a 1983 transfusion. In 1986 Maryland's shield
for hepatitis was amended to insulate blood from strict liability in
contract or tort "for injection or transfusion into an individual for
any purpose," which was characterized as a "service." The court of
appeals refused to construe the 1986 amendment retroactively since
the intent of the legislature was unclear.21 2 But in 1976 Maryland
courts had adopted Restatement section 402A in an automobile case.
By implication, the court held, Maryland courts also adopted the
Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (applying Pennsylvania law) (1976 shield was not limited
to transfusion diseases then known to medical science); Howell v. Spokane & Inland
Empire Blood Bank, 114 Wash. 2d 42, 785 P.2d 815 (1990) (en banc) (amendment
extending strict liability shield to AIDS applies retroactively).
208. Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
209. Id. at 1133-34. The court rejected the use of implied warranty in Russell on
the incorrect presumption that the blood bank was a commercial organization. Id. at
1132. See Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 120 (Fla. 1967).
210. 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058-59 (D.D.C. 1987), affid in relevant part, 851 F.2d
437 (D.C. Cir. 1988), affd without opinion, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
211. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1060 (D.D.C. 1987).
212. Miles Lab. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 707-07, 737-38, 556 A.2d 1107, 1110-12,
1123-24 (1989).
comments to section 402A. The 1986 amendment was "tantamount
to legislative acceptance of the basic substance of Comment k" as
long as blood was tested by the highest known standards.
"[M]anifestly," the court held, "the seller was not in a better posi-
tion than the victim, or the victim's physician, to take precautions
against the unknowable defect in the product. 21 3
Although most jurisdictions have allowed blood banks to use the
comment k defense in either strict liability or negligence actions, I
would argue that it was done without understanding the heart of the
transfusion information problem. For example, the Maryland Court
of Appeals, in the passage just quoted, concluded that the informa-
tion about transfusion risks available to physicians was no better
than that available to blood bankers. I argue that both logic and the
behavior of blood bankers suggest that they have lower information
costs both about ways to screen out higher-risk donors and about
how to test blood most effectively. Although viruses themselves were
undetectable, blood bankers knew of indirect tests for abnormalities
associated with viral infection that would reject at least some dan-
gerous donors. Such tests are feasible, whether or not their use is
customary. Moreover, blood is shipped to the hospital in essentially
its natural state and usually is transfused without alteration. A Cir-
cular of Information about risks is sent by blood banks to hospitals
and physicians, not the other way around. Justice Roberts correctly
argued in 1967 for limiting comment k to unadulterated, properly
prepared drugs or other products with adequate warnings that re-
main dangerous to some persons, and for not applying it to infective
blood that is dangerous to everybody. Comment k weakens the in-
centives of blood bankers to compare the costs and benefits of more
careful screening and testing.214
2. Negligence
Whether blood banks screened donors, tested blood, and warned
physicians with sufficient care before the anti-HIV test was licensed
213. Id. at 704, 733, 556 A.2d at 1107, 1121. See also Howell v. Spokane &
Inland Empire Blood Bank, 114 Wash. 2d 42, 785 P.2d 815 (1990) (en bane).
214. My argument here is limited to the issues raised in these cases. But contami-
nated blood in one sense may not be different from, for example, a properly prepared
prescription drug with serious side effects for some consumers. Just as blood banks have
relatively low costs of reducing transfusion risks by screening donors or testing blood
more carefully, so drug manufacturers probably have relatively low costs of identifying
characteristics of high-risk consumers (such as those who smoke cigarettes or take cer-
tain other prescription drugs) by spending resources on further research and testing. If
the Restatement's comment k distorts the incentives of manufacturers to test, then they
may not supply the additional warnings needed to protect certain consumers, thereby
making "properly prepared" products riskier.
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in March 1985 has been their greatest potential liability. In seven-
teen of the twenty-three cases in my sample that raised these issues,
blood banks prevailed-seven on summary judgment 15 and ten after
trials (nine of them to juries).2 16 They lost four screening and testing
215. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) (applying
D.C. law) (transfusion Jan. 12, 1983), aft'd and remanded, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir.
1988), af'd without opinion, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Doe v. American Red
Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 637 (D.S.C. 1989) (applying South Caro-
lina law) (transfusion Jan. 1985); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region,
297 S.C. 430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (S.C. 1989); Memorandum and Order, Shelby v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. H-86-3780 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 1988); Shelby v. Gulf Coast
Regional Blood Center, No. H-87-901, 1988 AIDS LITIG. REP. 701 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(applying Texas law) (transfusion July 1984); Opinion and Order, Hoemke v. New York
Blood Center, No. 88 Civ. 9029 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1989) (transfusion Nov. 1981) (WL
Allfeds); Hoemke v. New York Blood Center, 720 F.2d 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 912
F.2d 550 (2nd Cir. 1990); Mason v. Blood Sys., No. CV 89-195696, Arizona Blood
Bank Granted Summary Judgment on Protocol Claim, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5404
(Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa County Oct. 11, 1990) (transfusion Aug. 1984); Anonymous
Blood Recipient v. William Beaumont Hosp., No. 89-363705-NH, 1991 AIDS LITIG.
REP. 5942 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Oakland County Feb. 7, 1991) (opinion) (transfusion Nov.
1983); Red Cross Dismissed from Suit over '83 Michigan Transfusion, id. at 5920-21;
Johnstone v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 826447, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6102
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Mar. 18, 1991) (transfusion Dec. 9, 1982); CA
Jury Issues Defense Verdict in Suit over 1982 Transfusions, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP.
6082-83; Jury Rules in Favor of Hospital in Early Transfusion-AIDS Case, CCBC
NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Apr. 12, 1991, at 3-4.
216. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (applying
Arkansas law) (transfusion Mar. 28, 1985), aff'd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989); Baker v.
Wadley Research Inst. and Blood Bank, No. 86-2728-C, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 2042
(Tex. Dist. Ct., Denton County Dec. 19, 1988) (charge of the court and jury certificate)
(transfusion Apr. 27, 1984); Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Petition, Baker, id. at 2048; De-
fendants' Second Amended Answer, Baker, id. at 2053; Texas Jury Finds for Blood
Bank in Suit by Widow of AIDS Victim, id. at 2028; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood
Bank, No. 891642 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Dec. 1, 1988) (transfusion
Feb. 1983) (judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict), affid in relevant part,
92 D.A.R. 4890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); 5-Year-Old Boy Awarded $750,000 by CA Jury in
AIDS Blood Suit, 1988 AIDS LITIG. REP. 1863-65; CA Sup. Court Affirms Vacation of
Verdict Against Irwin Memorial, 1992 AIDS LITIG. REP. 8536-37; Dale v. Irwin Memo-
rial Blood Bank, No. 884160, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 2760 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Fran-
cisco County Apr. 27, 1989) (judgment) (transfusion Feb. 1984); CA Jury Denies
Damages in AIDS Suit Against Irwin Blood Bank, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 2648-49;
O'Rourke v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 887431 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco
County July 24, 1989) (transfusions Oct. 1982 to Jan. 1983), afi'd, No. A047081, 1991
AIDS LITIG. REP. 6413 (Cal. Ct. App. Ist Dist., Div. 4, May 30, 1991); CA Jury Re-
turns Verdict in Favor of Blood Bank in AIDS Case, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 3036; CA
Appeals Ct. Affirms Verdict Absolving Blood Bank of Negligence, 1991 AIDS LITIG.
REP. 6387-88; California Sup. Ct. Refuses to Review Brendan O'Rourke Case, 1991
AIDS LITIG. REP. 6829; Eik v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 898251 (Cal. Super.
Ct., San Francisco County Dec. 7, 1989) (transfusion Nov. 1983); Blood Bank Vindi-
cated, Hospital Found Negligent in AIDS Death, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 3760-61; Cole
v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 901542, CA Court Grants Nonsuit, Directs Jury to
Find in Favor of Irwin, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 4745-46 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco
cases after trials.217 The ANRC lost a summary judgment motion
that was later vacated as moot.2 18 They won three cases arising from
failure to cooperate with plaintiffs' request for a directed donation.21 9
County June 28, 1990) (transfusion Aug. 1984); Murphy v. Community Hosp. of the
Monterey Peninsula, No. 84387, CA Jury Decides Unanimously in Favor of Hospital in
AIDS Suit, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5160 (Cal. Super. Ct., Monterey County Sept. 10,
1990) (transfusion Dec. 1983); Trial Brief of Defendant, Murphy, id. at 5172; Plaintiffs'
Response to In Limine Motions by Defendant, Murphy, id. at 5192; Wilson v. Irwin
Memorial Blood Bank, No. 864-989 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County, June 7,
1991) (transfusion 1983); CA Jury Relieves Irwin of Liability for Tainted Transfusion,
1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6466-67; Coe v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 877903 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco County Mar 3, 1992) (transfusion 1984); CA Jury Rules for
Blood Bank in Case that Established Damages, 1992 AIDS LITIG. REP. 7754-55; Coe v.
Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 3d 48, 269 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1990) (blood bank is subject
to cap on malpractice awards); CA Supreme Court Rejects Review of MICRA Applica-
tion Rulings, 1990 AIDS LiTIG. REP. 4899-90.
217. Clark v. United Blood Servs., No. CV-88-6981 (Nev. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct., Apr.
27, 1990) (donation May 1984); CA Man Awarded $970,000 by NV Jury in Blood Neg-
ligence Suit, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 4542; Nevada Judge Reduces HIV Recipient's
Award and Fees by $577,000, 1990 AIDS LiTIG. REP. 5098; Order (Sept. 7, 1990), id.
at 5128 (under appeal); Jackson v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., No. 48-95022-86 (Tex.
48th Jud. Dist. Ct. July 9, 1990) (transfusion Feb. 1983); TX Victim's Mother Receives
$121,000 for Hospital's Negligence, 1990 AIDS LiTIG. REP. 4900; Doe v. Puget Sound
Blood Center, No. 88-210861-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County Oct. 22, 1990) (trans-
fusion Aug. 1984); Infected Woman Awarded $1.8 Million by Washington State Jury,
1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5328-29; Conformance with National AIDS Guidelines Insuffi-
cient, Washington Jury Finds in Lawsuit Against Blood Center, CCBC NEWSLETTER,
supra note 14, Oct. 26, 1990, at 1-2; WA Blood Bank Denied Retrial After $1.8 Million
Plaintiff Award, 1991 AIDS LInG. REP. 5619; Beeson v. J.K. and Susie L. Wadley
Research Inst. and Blood Bank, No. 89-04827-E (Tex. 101st Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas
County, June 12, 1991) (transfusion 1983); Texas Jury Awards Infected Widow
$800,000 in Negligence Suit, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6460-61.'
218. Okoro v. Ame'rican Red Cross (D.C. Chapter), No. 5325-87, 1990 AIDS LI-
TIG. REP. 4907 (D.C. Super. Ct., Civ. Div. Dec. 8, 1989) (transcript of bench opinion)
(transfusion July 1984); Order Vacating as Moot Bench Ruling Denying Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Jan. 17, 1990), Okoro, id. at 4025.
219. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) (applying
D.C. law) (transfusion Jan. 12, 1983), affid and remanded, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir.
1988), a ffd without opinion, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1990); O'Rourke v. Irwin Memo-
rial Blood Bank, No. 887431 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County July 24, 1989)
(transfusions Oct. 1982 to Jan. 1983), affd, No. A047081, 1991 AIDS LITiG. REP. 6413
(Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist., Div. 4, May 30, 1991); CA Jury Returns Verdict in Favor of
Blood Bank in AIDS Case, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 3036; CA Appeals Ct. Affirms Ver-
dict Absolving Blood Bank of Negligence, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6387-88; California
Sup. Ct. Refuses to Review Brendan O'Rourke Case, AIDS LiTiG. REP. 6829 (1991);
Opinion and Order, Hoemke v. New York Blood Center, 720 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 28, 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 9029) (transfusion Nov. 1981), affd, 912 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.
1990). In a fourth case the jury verdict for plaintiff was reversed on appeal and re-
manded for retrial, as described infra in the text accompanying note 262. Osborn v.
Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 891642 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Dec. 1,
1988) (tranfusion Feb. 1983), rev'd in relevant part, 92 D.A.R. 4890 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); CA Sup. Court Affirms Vacation of Verdict Against Irwin Memorial, 1992 AIDS
LITIG. REP. 8536-37. A similar case was lost by the defendant hospital. Katz v. Childrens
Hosp., No. C 683 049 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Central Dist. Aug. 7, 1990) (trans-
fusion June 1984); CA Jury Awards $3 Million in Tainted-Transfusion Suit, 1990
AIDS LITIG. REP. 5024-25. The O'Rourke and Osborn cases raised issues of screening
and testing as well as directed donations, so they are counted in the sample under both
[VOL. 29: 203. 1992] AIDS Blood-Transfusion Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
They lost two of three for failing to recall untested units in hospital
inventories when routine anti-HIV testing began.220 The usual stan-
dard of due care in the AIDS cases, as with the hepatitis cases, was
industry custom and FDA rules.
3. The Kozup Case: Warning, Screening, and Testing
Kozup v. Georgetown University221 was the first transfusion AIDS
case to be decided, and it became an important precedent. The case
was a diversity action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Matthew Kozup was given three transfusions
on January 12-13, 1983, at two days of age. The blood was donated
to the ANRC in October 1982222 by an individual who appeared
healthy at the time but died later of AIDS. Matthew died at age
five, allegedly of AIDS complications. His parents sued the hospital
for battery and the hospital and ANRC jointly for negligence. They
alleged that defendants should have realized on January 12, 1983,
that AIDS was a transfusion risk and that defendants negligently
failed to obtain informed consent, to screen and test blood ade-
quately, or to suggest a directed donation. The district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and re-
manded on the battery count only.
categories. See supra note 216.
220. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (applying
Arkansas law) (transfusion Mar. 28, 1985), af'd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989); Belle
Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1004-06 (Colo. 1988);
C.W. v. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center, No. 87-CV-4127, Denver Blood Bank
Ordered to Pay HIV-Infected Woman $5.5 Million, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 2493 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Denver County Mar. 31, 1989) (transfusion Mar. 1985); Jury Awards Trans-fusion Recipient $5.5 Million in AIDS Case, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Apr.
7, 1989, at 1-2; Jury Decides Against Blood Bank in Transfusion Suit, AABB BLOOD
BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Apr. 7, 1989, at 1-2; Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint,
Carroll v. Blood Center of Southeastern Wisconsin, No. 753-411, 1988 AIDS LITIG.
REP. 1962 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County Dec. 9, 1988) (transfusion Apr. 23, 1985);
Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint, Carroll, id. at 1966; WI Man
Awarded $3.9 Million in Damages for Blood Contamination, id. at 1945; $3.9 Million
Verdict Against Blood Center, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Dec. 16, 1988,
at 1; Wisconsin AIDS Case Settled Out of Court, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra
note 5, Mar. 31, 1989, at 5.
221. 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), aJfd in part and rev'd in part, 851 F.2d
437 (D.C. Cir. 1988), affd without opinion, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
222. The district court's opinion did not state the date of the donation. Even if it
was October 31, 1982, the unit would have been about ten weeks old and therefore out of
date by today's FDA rules if transfused on January 12-13, 1983. Judging by the opinion,
this issue was not raised in the case.
The district court's decision was premised on what I see as four
serious errors: (1) a factual error concerning the risk of transfusion
AIDS in early 1983; (2) an error in determining causation; and (3)
an egregious factual error made (4) in applying the wrong negli-
gence standard.
The district court dismissed the informed consent and battery
counts because AIDS was not a "material" risk that physicians were
required to warn of in January 1983. Under the material risk rule of
Canterbury,223 a physician was required to warn when the risk of
paralysis from surgery was one percent. The standard for material
risk was "foresight, not hindsight."
As of January, 1983, only a single case of possible transfusion-related
AIDS had been diagnosed [in a patient without other risk factors], and that
only weeks before Matthew received the contaminated blood. This single
case stands in contrast to the approximately 3.5 million blood donations
[sic] annually. A risk of one in 3.5 million cannot be said to be material to
a reasonable patient in Matthew Kozup's situation.
22 4
The court found that a professional consensus that AIDS was trans-
missible by blood was not reached until January 1984, when two
studies linking several AIDS patients with donors having AIDS
blood abnormalities were published in medical journals.
Thus, what doctors "knew or should have known" about the risk of AIDS
in blood transfusion therapy [in January 1983] was virtually nothing: this
remote possibility cannot, as a matter of law, have amounted to a "material
risk" within the meaning of that term as set forth in Canterbury.22
The court held that no reasonable jury could conclude on the facts
that, had the Kozups been informed of a "one in 3.5 million possibil-
ity of contracting AIDS," any reasonable person in their position
would have refused transfusions that were absolutely necessary to
save their child's life.226
223. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
224. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (D.D.C. 1987) (cita-
tion omitted). Twice the district court confused transfusions with donations. At one junc-
ture it stated that "some 10,000,000 transfusions had been performed in 1982." Id. at
1052. Later it said that in 1982 there were "approximately 3.5 million blood donations
annually." Id. at 1053. Although the numbers of transfusions and donations are not
known precisely, it was reported circa 1983 that about 3.5 million persons were trans-
fused each year and that the average transfusion consisted of 3-4 units, so the number of
units donated was perhaps 10,000,000. AMERICAN BLOOD COMMISSION. FACT SHEET:
BLOOD AND ITS USE, cited in Eckert, supra note 22, at 1 n.1.
225. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1054. The district court held that under the "learned
intermediary rule" ANRC owed a duty to warn physicians only. Plaintiffs had no right
to be informed by hosital physicians of AIDS risks in January 1983, so whatever infor-
mation ANRC gave the hospital about AIDS was held to be "irrelevant" to the Kozups'
choice. Id. at 1054-55.
226. Id. at 1054. Whether a reasonable parent would have rejected transfusions in
these circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held, was the
standard for summary judgment for the tort of lack of informed consent but, in the
absence of any consent whatsoever, not for battery. A trial was required to determine if
the transfusions were necessary to save Matthew's life and whether his parents had given
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To determine what risk was material under Canterbury, the dis-
trict court made an apples-oranges comparison between a known sur-
gical risk of one percent and the unknown risk in early 1983 of what
was likely to be an infectious disease. The working hypothesis since
mid-1982 was that AIDS, as with hepatitis B, was transmitted
through sex, drug abuse, and blood by a. virus or other infectious
agent. All infectious diseases have incubation periods in which carri-
ers are asymptomatic. If AIDS was infectious, then the court should
have understood that physicians would realize-and most heads of
blood banks are physicians-that the true risk in early 1983 ex-
ceeded one in 3.5 million. And it did. A 1984 study showed that five
other cases had been diagnosed by December 1982.227 Moreover, the
risk of AIDS on January 12-13, 1983, should have been greater than
in mid-1985 when the ANRC published the risk estimate that ap-
pears in Table 1.228 On that basis the district court's estimate of the
January 1983 risk at "one in 3.5 million" was too low by 1,330
times. This is hindsight information, but it was published before the
Kozup decision was rendered.
The district court also erred in analyzing causation. The Kozups
alleged that the ANRC should have screened high-risk donors and
tested for surrogate markers of hepatitis infection. Surrogate tests
are important in AIDS litigation for two reasons: first, because
AIDS and hepatitis have parallel' risk groups, and second, because
on January 4, 1983, the CDC recommended that blood banks use
one of the tests-eight days before Matthew Kozup's transfusion.2 29
Evidence from key CDC officials about why they recommended that
surrogate test would be important to plaintiffs, but the federal gov-
ernment has prohibited them from being deposed in all but one
case.
23 0
Apparently stored blood samples indicated that Matthew's donor
would have been negative at the time of donation on the surrogate
test that the CDC recommended. "Thus, the critical element of cau-
sation," the court held, "wherein plaintiffs must show that the
consent for them. Kozup, 851 F.2d at 439-40.
227. Curran et al., supra note 85, at 72.
228. See supra note 90 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
229. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
230. The Department of Health and Human Services may prohibit testimony if
the number of requests would prevent CDC officials from doing their job. The CDC
provides plaintiffs with the documents they request, but remains neutral. Moore v. Ar-
mour Pharmaceutical Co., 129 F.R.D. 551, 555 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
ARC's failure to implement this test caused Matthew to become in-
fected, is absent." Whether the donor would have been negative on
the test that plaintiff claimed ANRC should have used became "the
critical element of causation," without which, the court held, plain-
tiff's case faced an "insurmountable hurdle."' 231 In effect, the court
converted a rule requiring a preponderance of the evidence-that the
existence of a contested fact was more likely than not-to a rule
requiring that the contested fact be a certainty before a blood bank
could be negligent for failing to use the test. Apparently the court
did not understand that medical tests have error rates and that there
was some probability of obtaining a false negative on this test.
Plaintiffs claimed that the industry, by not using surrogate tests,
had not adhered to the "standard of reasonable prudence" required
in The T.J. Hooper and its precedents. 232 The district court ex-
pressly rejected the Holmes-Hand rule because it would amount to
holding the ANRC to "a unique super-standard" and to abandoning
"[t]raditional yardsticks of negligence such as industry practice or
the standard of care of a reasonable practitioner." To make what
would have been non-negligent conduct for other blood banks negli-
gence for the ANRC would be "unfair and impractical." The court
did not discuss whether the test would have identified a sufficient
number of infectious persons to be worthwhile for the industry to
adopt, i.e., whether it would have passed a cost-benefit test. The
standard in Marsh Wood Products23 was to test each batch of steel,
not all boiler tubes from each batch or a particular tube. Blood is not
a batch product, so each unit must be tested individually, but the
logic of testing for contaminated blood is the same as for defective
steel. Although individual errors may occur, the issue is whether
enough contamination is detected to justify the expense.
Rejecting the Holmes-Hand rule led the district court to ignore
evidence about which experts had the best information about trans-
fusion risks. Scientists specializing in epidemiology are likely to have
superior information about the nature of epidemics than are blood
bankers or anyone else. The CDC, with federal responsibility for epi-
demiology, was so concerned about transfusion AIDS risks in Janu-
ary 1983 that it warned the industry and urged precautions publicly.
Physicians routinely rely on the CDC for information about disease
risks, but the Kozup court, by adopting custom as the standard of
due care, treated the CDC's view as no more important than anyone
else's.
If custom was the standard of due care, then the district court had
231. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058.
232. Id. at 1057-58; see supra notes 93, 95 and accompanying text.
233. 240 N.W. 392 (Wis. 1932). See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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to determine when custom changed. Accordingly, it prepared a chro-
nology of how it believed professional opinion changed from the year
before Matthew's transfusion to the year after. Matthew's donor vis-
ited the blood bank in October 1982, three months before CDC rec-
ommended surrogate testing. No organization of blood bankers,
hospitals, or federal health-care regulators recommended surrogate
testing in October 1982. "The medical community," the court said,
"was not yet convinced that AIDS had an asymptomatic carrier
state, a necessary predicate to a conclusion that AIDS might be
transmissible by blood." The suspected transfusion cases before Oc-
tober 1982 "lent support only to an hypothesis about the cause or
transmission of AIDS. They were far from sufficient to permit any
conclusions. 23 4
The court's most egregious error was failing to notice that a Pub-
lic Health Service interagency group, in a document of March 4,
1983, which the court cited in its opinion, concluded that
"[a]vailable data suggest that... AIDS is caused by a transmissible
agent" and "[t] he likelihood of blood transmission."235 In April 1983
a Department of Health and Human Services press release said that
"[a]lthough the cause of AIDS is not known, researchers believe it is
transmitted by an infectious agent."23 6 These facts suggest the likeli-
hood that a medical consensus emerged before January 1984. The
court's error affects several cases for transfusions after March 1983
in which other courts relied on the Kozup chronology.
Other publications reinforce the likelihood that a consensus
emerged before January 1984. One of the two papers on which the
court relied was accompanied by an editorial by a blood-banking ex-
pert, which the court did not cite, stating that "[a]lthough the data
from the [CDC] were not published until today, they had been ex-
tensively discussed, and the concept that AIDS may be spread by
transfusion has been with us for over a year."23 That expert later
said in another publication that cases in high-risk groups reported in
1981 and 1982 "provided the beginning evidence that AIDS could
234. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1056. Two experts testified that blood banks should
have used the surrogate test, but they did not advocate it in January 1983, and one of
them attended the Atlanta meeting where the CDC recommended it. "These two individ-
uals' opinions," the court said, "cannot alone create a standard of care or a prima facie
case of negligence, where they are entirely in opposition to the standard prevailing at
every hospital and blood bank in the nation." Id. at 1057.
235. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
236. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV, HHS NEWS, Mar. 25, 1983.
237. Bove, supra note 85, at 116. See also Curran et al., supra note 85.
be related to a viral agent that was capable of contaminating the
national blood and plasma supply. '23 That paper was published a
year before the Kozup decision.
The core question, which Kozup and subsequent decisions have ig-
nored, is why the experts in blood banking and the FDA were so
slow to agree with the CDC. Another way of asking that question is
to ask what their statistical decision rule was for adopting a new
precaution. Two hypotheses were possible. The null hypothesis was
that AIDS was not caused by a blood-borne agent and therefore that
no additional precautions were necessary. The alternative hypothesis
was that AIDS was caused by a blood-borne agent and additional
screening and testing was necessary. Assume blood bankers de-
manded sufficient evidence so that they would reject the null hypoth-
esis mistakenly-what statisticians call a Type I error-no more
than 5 percent of the time. That is, if the events in question were
repeated they would arise by chance only once in twenty times. A
.05 decision rule is weighted in favor of taking no action. It is a
common rule, but it is not sacrosanct. The choice of a rule depends
on the type of error that the decision maker wishes to minimize.2 39
For example one might choose a significance level of .10 or .20 if the
potential cost to society of rejecting the null hypothesis mistakenly
was extremely high. None of the documents I have seen indicates
what the decision rule of the blood bankers and their regulators was,
but they must have had one. They understand statistics and rou-
tinely deal with laboratory tests for which the probabilities of false-
positive and false-negative errors are calculated.240
The industry and the FDA chose "not testing" as the null hypoth-
esis, and then chose a demanding criterion for rejecting it. It is not
clear whether the industry and the FDA honestly disagreed with the
CDC over the probablity that AIDS was a blood-borne virus, or
whether they agreed on the probabilities but had different attitudes
toward gambling. Blood banks could have hedged the risk by recal-
ling units shipped to hospitals before January 1983, recommending
that transfusions be limited to emergencies until inventory was tested
238. Bove, supra note 77, at 140. The public had a better appreciation of the cause
of the epidemic than some experts. A national news magazine reported in July 1983 of
"the growing realization that this mysterious killer ... is transmitted through blood,"
and that "[s]cientists suspect that AIDS is caused by a new virus or virus particle or an
old agent that has changed and become virulent." The infectious-agent hypothesis was
the only causation hypothesis that the article reported. As AIDS Scare Hits Nation's
Blood Supply-, supra note 89, at 71.
239. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1048, 1063 (1985); Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on
Rubinfeld, id. at 1098, 1101.
240. See, e.g., Ward et al., supra note 10, at 477; Stephen L. Sivak & Gary P.
Wormser, Predictive Value of a Screening Test for Antibodies to HTLV-III, 85 AM. J.
CLIN. PATH. 700 (1986).
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by surrogates and asking the public for fresh donations. But the
standard of care from hepatitis cases-custom without a cost-benefit
test-did not encourage them to incur these extra costs.
The standards and facts of the Kozup decision became precedent
for subsequent litigation over care levels for donor screening and
blood testing. In an Arkansas diversity case the United States dis-
trict court was sustained on an appeal for adopting Kozup's require-
ment that the effectiveness of stronger donor screening measures or
surrogate testing had to be established as a certainty rather than by
a preponderance of the evidence. 241 In a San Francisco jury trial the
plaintiff may have lost because, according to the defendant's trial
brief, one of her donors tested negative on the surrogate test on a
subsequent occasion, and therefore the earlier donation may have
tested negative.242 Reportedly, the same blood bank settled one case
where the donor was positive on the surrogate test.243 In a Michigan
241. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768, 774-79 (W.D. Ark. 1988)
(applying Arkansas law) (transfusion Mar. 1985), aftd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989);
Federal Judge Finds Blood Center Not Negligent in Transfusion AIDS Case, CCBC
NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Nov. 4, 1988, at 3-5; Blood Center Found Not Negligent in
Transfusion AIDS Case, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Nov. 11, 1988, at 1-
2.
242. Dale v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 884160, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP.
2760 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Apr. 27, 1989) (judgment May 1, 1989);
Defendant's Trial Brief, Dale, id. at 2761; Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, Dale, id. at 2769; CA
Jury Denies Damages in AIDS Suit Against Irwin Blood Bank, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP.
2648-49. In a Seattle case, the surrogate testing count against the blood bank was
dropped after a remaining specimen proved negative on that test. Doe v. Puget Sound
Blood Center, No. 88-2-10861-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County Oct. 22, 1990); In-
fected Woman Awarded $1.8 Million by Washington State Jury, 1990 AIDS LITG.
REP. 5328-29; Conformance with National AIDS Guidelines Insufficient, Washington
Jury Finds in Lawsuit Against Blood Center, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Oct.
26, 1990, at 1-2; WA Blood Bank Denied Retrial After $1.8 Million Plaintiff Award,
1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5619.
243. Porter v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 867372, Attorney's Estate
Reaches Private Settlement over His AIDS Death, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 2029 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco County 1988). The transfusion occurred in March 1983 and
the unit was collected in February 1983. Apparently it was tested for a surrogate test as
part of a "blinded" experiment in which the donor was not supposed to be identified.
(Irwin did not begin routine testing with the surrogate until May 1984.) The blood bank
failed to dispose of certain records that allowed the donor to be identified five years later
in the lawsuit. Irwin Settles Case Out-of-Court, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note
5, Feb. 3, 1989, at 6; Irwin Settles Case Out-of-Court (Revisited), AABB BLOOD BANK
WEEK, supra note 5, Feb. 17, 1989, at 2; Cary Groner, Surrogate Blood Tests Take
Center Stage in AIDS News, HEALTHWEEK, May 30, 1989, at 1, 65. In Borchelt v.
Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 8193 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County filed
Aug. 15, 1985), the blood bank director, according to a newspaper report, testified that
the implicated donor was positive on the surrogate test. Robin Evans, Blood Bank Chief
Admits Reluctance to Screen Donors, SAN FRANCISCO PROGRESS, Aug. 1, 1986. But in
the settlement plaintiffs "acknowledged that the screening procedures used by the blood
case the blood bank and hospital defendants won on summary judg-
ment because the plaintiff could not show that using additional blood
tests would have screened out her donor.244
Other courts adopted the Kozup standard of industry custom
without a cost-benefit test. The South Carolina Supreme Court certi-
fied that the standard of care was industry custom nationwide. 2I"
Blood banks in the San Francisco area had introduced routine surro-
gate testing six months before that transfusion, but that was not suf-
ficient to establish a standard of care in South Carolina.240 The
concept of "medical consensus" identified by the Kozup court proved
to be highly elastic when applied to other cases. Courts rejected the
Holmes-Hand rule whether the blood was donated the month of the
consensus,247 five months after,24s one year after,249 or more than a
bank were appropriate." Transfusion-Associated AIDS Lawsuit Resolved in San Fran-
cisco, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Aug. 15, 1986, at 1-3.
244. Anonymous Blood Recipient v. William Beaumont Hosp., No. 89-363705-
NH, 1991 AIDS LITM. REP. 5942 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Oakland County Feb. 7, 1991)
(transfusion Nov. 1983); Red Cross Dismissed from Suit over '83 Michigan Transfu-
sion, id. at 5920-21.
245. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 297 S.C. 430, 432,
377 S.E.2d 323, 325-26 (S.C. 1989) (per curiam).
246. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 637, 633,
641 n.4 (D.S.C. 1989). A California appellate court used the South Carolina case as part
of its basis for rejecting the Holmes-Hand rule. A judgment for the San Francisco blood
bank on the issue of negligent screening and testing was affirmed because it met or ex-
ceeded industry custom, which in California, the court held, is the standard of care for
professionals. Expert testimony must be weighed against custom, and if the expert testi-
fies that more should have been required than anyone in the industry was willing to do,
then custom is controlling. The court said, "[p]laintiffs' case for anti-HBc [surrogate]
testing thus boils down to the proposition that the entire blood banking profession was
negligent. We find that proposition to be untenable." Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood
Bank, No. 891642 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Dec. 1, 1988), affd in rele-
vant part, 92 D.A.R. 4890, 4902-05 (Apr. 13, 1992); CA Sup. Court Affirms Vacation of
Verdict Against Irwin Memorial, AIDS LITIG. REP 8536-37 (1992). See supra note 234.
247. Dale v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 884160, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP.
2760 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Apr. 27, 1989) (judgment May 1, 1989);
CA Jury Denies Damages in AIDS Suit Against Irwin Blood Bank, id. at 2648-49
(1989).
248. Memorandum and Order, Shelby v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. H-86-
3780 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Shelby v. Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center, No. H-87-901,
1988 AIDS LITIG. REP. 701-04 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (applying Texas law). The court held
that the defendants followed industry custom and FDA standards. It stated that these
standards "required extensive questioning of donors regarding all known sexual contacts
and other factors that might make the donor susceptible to carrying the AIDS virus."
That was an error; only in December 1990 did the FDA recommend that donors be
questioned about all risk behaviors. The court rejected the Holmes-Hand rule because
"no test for the HIV virus was available at the time the blood in question was trans-
fused." That was another error; the test that blood banks use is for the antibody to HIV,
not for the virus itself which is a more complex and lengthier laboratory procedure. The
antibody test has an error rate, as discussed supra notes 13 and 47-50 and accompanying
text.
249. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 637, 638-
39, 641 (D.S.C. 1989).
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year after.2 50
Plaintiffs won on summary judgment in a District of Columbia
case arising from a transfusion in July 1984, two months after blood
banks in the San Francisco Bay area began surrogate testing.
Whether such tests were reasonable and prudent in the District of
Columbia was held to be a jury question. The court could not say
"as a matter of law, that no reasonable juror could conclude, on the
basis of the evidence . . ., that the Red Cross violated the applicable
standard of care." The bench ruling, which was followed by a settle-
ment, then was vacated as moot.251 Plaintiff won the appeal of a
summary judgment in Florida. A material fact over whether the
blood bank met the standard of care in 1987 was in dispute, and
plaintiff did not have to prove that the defect was detectable or re-
movable by reasonable scientific procedures to recover in
negligence.5 2
Plaintiffs have won where the court instructed the jury to decide
not on the basis of industry custom but on what they believed a rea-
sonably prudent blood bank would have done under similar circum-
stances. In one case the donor testified that he was a monogamous
homosexual who had donated more than twenty times before testing
positive for anti-HIV. The blood bank argued that it followed the
FDA recommendations and industry custom of the period in advising
only men with multiple sex partners to self-exclude. Plaintiffs' ex-
perts testified that it was naive to think that homosexuals in suppos-
edly monogamous relationships were not at risk, and that donors
250. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768, 774-75 (W.D. Ark. 1988),
afid, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989).
251. Okoro v. American Red Cross (D.C. Chapter), No. 5325-87, 1990 AIDS Li-
TIG. REP. 4007, 4011 (D.C. Super. Ct., Civ. Div. Dec. 8, 1989) (transcript of bench
opinion) (transfusion July 1984); Defendant American Red Cross's Motion for an Expe-
dited Order Vacating the December 8, 1989 Bench Ruling, Okoro, id. at 4012; Defend-
ant American Red Cross's Brief in Support of Its Motion for an Expedited Order
Vacating the December 8, 1989, Bench Ruling, Okoro, id. at 4013; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to the American Red Cross's
Motion for an Expedited Order Vacating the December 8, 1989 Bench Ruling and Plain-
tiff's Motion for a Formal Opinion, Okoro, id. at 4017; Reply and Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for a Formal Opinion, Okoro, id. at 4024; Order (Jan. 17, 1990),
Okoro, id. at 4025.
According to an interview of an attorney for the ANRC, no ANRC case has gone to
trial. All have either been disposed of on motions for summary judgment or demurrers or
have been settled. Slind-Flor, supra note 6, at 37.
252. Sicuranza v. Northwest Florida Blood Center, 582 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (transfusion 1987) (material question of fact as to whether blood center met
applicable standard of care precluded summary judgment for defendant).
should have been interrogated directly.2"3 In another case the donor
said that he would have disclosed that he had multiple homosexual
partners had he been asked the question directly. The jury also de-
cided that the blood bank could have screened out two-thirds of
HIV-positive blood by using one surrogate test.2"4
In a Colorado case the trial court's ruling that the standard of
care should be professional rather than ordinary negligence was re-
versed on appeal. The appellate court held that not only is "the pro-
fession essentially allowed to establish its own standard of care, but
also it is, in all practical respects, immunized by that standard of
care." The "blood banking industry itself," the court said, "lacks the
defining characteristics of a profession which serve to police and pro-
mote the standards, customs, and practices which define a profes-
sional standard of care." Government regulations and industry
custom were "merely evidence" of the standard. "Moreover, there
was undisputed evidence that the defendant may have unduly lagged
behind contemporary professional knowledge in the adoption of new
donor and blood screening procedures."2 55 In what may prove to be a
major development, the Colorado Supreme Court held that profes-
sional negligence was the standard of care and that industry custom
was evidence but not conclusive proof of due care. The industry
could not establish its own standard of care. In a new trial the plain-
tiffs would be allowed to present to the jury expert testimony to chal-
lenge whether industry custom met the Holmes-Hand Rule.2""
253. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, No. 88-2-10861-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., King
County Oct. 22, 1990); Infected Woman Awarded $1.8 Million by Washington State
Jury, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5328-29; Conformance with National AIDS Guidelines
Insufficient, Washington Jury Finds in Lawsuit Against Blood Center, CCBC NEWSLET-
TER, supra note 14, Oct. 26, 1990, at 1-2; WA Blood Bank Denied Retrial After $1.8
Million Plaintiff Award, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5619.
254. Plaintiff's Trial Brief Regarding Applicable Standard of Care, Beeson v. J.K.
and Susie L. Wadley Research Insts. and Blood Bank, No. 89-04827-E, 1991 AIDS
LITIG. REP. 6541 (Tex. 101st Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas County June 12, 1991) (transfusion
1983); Plaintiffs' Supplemental Trial Brief Regarding Applicable Standard of Care,
Beeson, id. at 6544; Defendant Wadley's Brief on the Standard of Care, Beeson, id. at
6547; Texas Jury Awards Infected Widow $800,000 in Negligence Suit, 1991 AIDS
LITIG. REP. 6460-61.
255. Quintana v. United Blood Servs., 811 P.2d 424, 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(transfusion May 27, 1983), affid and remanded, 827 P.2d 509 (en banc) (Colo. 1992).
256. 827 P.2d 509 (en banc) (Colo. 1992); Colorado Sup. Ct. Orders New Trial
on Standard of Care Issue, 1992 AIDS LITIG. REP. 7909-11.
In the retrial, the plaintiffs were allowed to present experts who were sufficiently famil-
iar with the standard of care in blood banking even though they were outside the blood-
banking industry. One expert was Dr. Donald P. Francis, a retired CDC official, who had
not been allowed to testify while employed by the government (see supra note 230).
According to newspaper reports, he testified that the blood bankers rejected his warning
in December 1982 that five AIDS cases had been linked to transfusion and that the
number of cases was doubling every six months. Blood bankers also rejected his warning
in January 1983 to take additional precautions (see supra note 77). New Quitana Trial
to Start Next Week; Jury to Decide If Entire Blood Services Industry Had Negligent
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Plaintiffs have also won where blood banks violated industry cus-
tom or FDA rules. One allowed a drug addict to donate.2 57 At an-
other blood bank, a donor apparently was deferred once because he
tested positive for antibody to syphilis and then twice owing to a
hepatitis vaccination. Both conditions indicated higher risk. Subse-
quently he was allowed to donate three HIV-infected units out of six
attempts between 1982 and 1985.258
4. The Osborn Case: Directed Donation
In early 1983 hospitals and blood banks generally did not offer
directed donations for patients who feared AIDS. Because of indus-
try custom the Kozup court granted Georgetown Hospital summary
judgment on that count.25 9
In Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank 6 ' a California child
developed AIDS as a result of a transfusion of twelve units during
heart surgery at one month of age in Feburary 1983. His parents
claimed that they had read articles in newspapers about AIDS and
were concerned about the possibility of contaminated blood. They
claimed that family and friends were willing to donate for the child
directly, and that the blood bank rejected their request on policy
grounds. They claimed to have learned later that the blood bank al-
lowed directed donations under some circumstances, even though it
AIDS-Screening Practices in 1983, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, July 10, 1992,
at 3-4; Quintana Trial Begins, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, July 24, 1992, at 2-
4. The transfusion recipient died hours before the jury began its deliberations that
awarded plaintiffs a judgment. The jury had been sequestered and did not know of her
death. Defendants claimed a mistrial and would appeal. Quintana v. United Blood Ser-
vices, No. 86-CV- 11750 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County Aug. 1, 1992) (transfusion May
1983); Colorado Woman Awarded $6.6 Million Hours After Her AIDS Death, 1992
AIDS LITIG. REP. 8533-34.
257. Jackson v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., No. 48-95022-86, 1990 AIDS LIrIG.
REP. 4923 (Tex. 48th Jud. Dist. Ct. July 9, 1990) (opinion letter) (transfusion Feb.
1983); TX Victim's Mother Receives $121,000 for Hospitals Negligence, id. at 4900.
258. Clark v. United Blood Servs., No. CV-88-6981 (Nev. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr.
27, 1990) (donation May 1984); CA Man Awarded $970,000 by NV Jury in Blood Neg-
ligence Suit, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 4542; Nevada Judge Reduces HIV Recipient's
Award and Fee by $577,000, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5098-99. See also Note, AIDS:
Blood Bank Liability, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 363 (1991).
259. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1055. A Colorado jury rejected the claim of negli-
gence against a physician for failure to secure informed consent and for negligent failure
to allow or to investigate the possiblity of a directed donation. First Amended Complaint
and Jury Demand, Quintana v. United Blood Servs., No. 86CVl 1750, 1988 AIDS LITIG.
REP. 723 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County June 3, 1988); Colorado Jury Relieves Blood
Bank of Liability in Quintana AIDS Case, 1988 AIDS LITIG. REP. 965.
260. Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 891642 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County Dec. 1 1988).
discouraged them generally, which the blood bank denied. The blood
bank would have claimed that too much time was required to collect
the necessary quantity of the child's unusual blood group, but the
court did not allow it to explain that to the jury, which found for
plaintiff. Subsequently, the court narrowed the grounds for the judg-
ment to negligent misrepresentation and reduced the award. 26 1 On
appeal the decision was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
appellate court held that evidence associated with the child's blood
group was relevant to proximate cause and that the blood bank's
misrepresentation would not have affected the outcome if it was not
feasible to obtain a sufficient number of directed donations of that
blood group in time.262 In another California case with similar facts
the jury rejected a claim against the same blood bank for negligent
misrepresentation of its directed donation policy, which was affirmed
on appeal.2 63
261. Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 891642 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County Dec. 1, 1988), rev'd in relevant part, 92 D.A.R. 4890 (Apr. 13, 1992);
Plaintiff's Opening Statement, Reporter's Transcript (partial), Proceedings of Tuesday,
Nov. 1, 1988, Osborn, 1988 AIDS LITIG. REP. 1924; Trial Brief of Irwin Memorial
Blood Bank, Osborn, id. at 1932; Jury Finds Blood Center Negligent in Transfusion-
Associated AIDS Case, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Dec. 9, 1988, at 2-3; 5-
Year-Old Boy Awarded $750,000 by CA Jury in AIDS Blood Suit, 1988 AIDS LITIO.
REP. 1863-65.
During the trial, the court ruled that the blood bank was not a provider of health
services under California law. Therefore, since the case was tried as one of negligence
rather than medical malpractice, defendant could not introduce evidence on the standard
of care or take advantage of California's statutory cap on medical malpractice awards.
After the verdict the judge reduced the jury's award because it apparently had not fol-
lowed instructions, and the judge reversed his ruling that the blood bank was not a health
care provider subject to the award caps. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Enter a Different Judgment, Osborn v. Irwin
Memorial Blood Bank, No. 891642, 1989 AIDS LITIG. RE'. 2242 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County Dec. 1, 1988); Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Enter a Different Judgment, Osborn, id. at
2249; Further Brief in Opposition to Application of MICRA Limits, Osborn, id. at 2255;
Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities Explaining How MICRA Applies
to This Case, Osborn, id. at 2259; Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Judgment and to
Correct Judgment to Conform with Law (Feb. 7, 1989), Osborn, id. at 2306; Verdict
Against Irwin Modified but Upheld, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Feb. 3,
1989, at 6; P. Robert Rigney, Jr., Legal Update: Blood Banks Achieve Mixed Results in
AIDS Cases as Some Win, Some Lose, Both Sides Appeal, AABB NEWS BRIEFs, Feb,
1989, at 2-3.
262. 92 D.A.R. 4890 (Apr. 13, 1992); CA Sup. Court Affirms Vacation of Verdict
Against Irwin Memorial, 1992 AIDS LITiG. REP. 8536-37.
263. O'Rourke v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 887431 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County July 24, 1989) (transfusions Oct. 1982-Jan. 1983), afird, No.
A047081, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); CA Jury Returns Verdict
in Favor of Blood Bank in AIDS Case, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 3036; CA Appeals Ct.
Affirms Verdict Absolving Blood Bank of Negligence, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6387-88;
California Sup. Ct. Refuses to Review Brendan O'Rourke Case, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP.
6829.
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5. The Kirkendall Case: Testing Inventory
The FDA licensed the anti-HIV test on March 2, 1985 and rec-
ommended that blood banks "begin performing the test as soon as
supplies are commercially available."2"4 The AABB did not require
it until July 1, 1985. The FDA acknowledged that testing was volun-
tary until a regulation became effective and that an "appropriate
phase-in period" was necessary for laboratory staff to become profi-
cient.265 Shipments of test kits began at once, but blood banks re-
ceived them at different times. While staff were being trained, blood
banks continued under standard procedures to collect and ship to
hospitals units that were not tested for anti-HIV. Three plaintiffs
who received AIDS-contaminated blood claimed that blood banks
were negligent in failing to test all units in their inventories that
were donated before routine testing began and in failing to recall
units in hospital inventories that were shipped before routine testing
began. The FDA requires banks to keep the necessary records for
recalls.266
In Kirkendall v. Harbor Insurance Co. 211 the contaminated unit
was donated and shipped about a week before the blood bank re-
ceived its first test kits. It was returned to the blood bank after
twelve days, shipped out again the next day26S-three days before
routine testing began-and transfused a week later. The United
States district court held that the blood bank "could not have pre-
dicted that any of the 1,753 units of blood products in its inventory
on March 23, 1985, would have tested positive for AIDS antibodies.
The overwhelming statistical probability was that not one unit . . .
would test positive."26 9 But that is wrong. The probability that one
of a group of units was positive was small, but it was not zero as the
264. Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, Director, Office of Biologics Research
and Review, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Implementation of Public Health Ser-
vice Provisional Recommendations Concerning Testing Blood and Plasma for Antibodies
to HTLV-III, to all registered blood establishments (Feb. 19, 1985).
265. Id. See also supra note 88 and accompanying text; General Biological Prod-
ucts Standards: Proposed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 6362 (1986); General Biological Products
Standard: Final Rule, 53 .Fed. Reg. 111 (1988). The FDA regulation requiring the test
did not become effective until Jan. 5, 1988, owing to a two-year delay in the review by
the Office of Management and Budget. FDA Issues Final Regs on HIV Antibody Test-
ing, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Jan. 8, 1988, at 1-2.
266. 21 C.F.R. § 606.165 (1991).
267. 698 F. Supp. 768, 775-77 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law), affd,
887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989).
268. The FDA sets limits on the "shelf life" of each blood component, so many
blood banks ship older units first.
269. Kirkendall, 698 F. Supp. at 777.
district court implied. After testing, the probability that any given
unit would be positive is either zero or one (assuming a fully accu-
rate test). The court confused the ex ante expectation of finding a
positive unit before testing was available with the ex post informa-
tion that testing would provide. It is also important to keep in mind
the difference between a small probability of an event and small
damages. The small probability of a disaster may yield large ex-
pected damages.
The court held that industry custom was the standard for negli-
gence. The blood bank "theoretically" could have tested all inventory
units that were about to 'each their expiration dates during a key
five-day period. But that would have delayed testing new units, dis-
rupted supply, and "caused a greater risk to blood recipients than
was present in the supplying of untested blood." The blood bank
could have avoided shipping untested units if, "as plaintiff urge[d],
[it had] advised all sixteen of its serviced hospitals to delay all elec-
tive and non-emergency surgery until all blood could be tested. 2 °70
But the defendant was not negligent because no blood bank tested
inventory and the FDA did not recommend it explicitly. Relying on
Kozup the court expressly rejected the reasoning of The T.J.
Hooper. "Only if the entire blood banking industry was negligent in
the manner in which HIV testing was implemented and carried out
.. . could the court conclude that [this defendant] acted
negligently." 27'
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, but held
that it was "inapposite" for the district court to rely on Kozup,
which did not concern antibody testing. 2  Quoting Justice Holmes
and applying the Holmes-Hand rule, the court of appeals held that
the FDA's recommendation to begin testing as soon as supplies be-
came commercially available imposed a duty on blood banks to do
just that.2 73 Thus "industry practice at the time ... does not govern
270. Id. at 776. The court may not have realized that elective surgeries are occa-
sionally postponed during holiday and vacation periods when donations decline. Blood
banks do not pay donors, so "shortages" are predictable and essentially are "planned"
during these times. Some surgeries had to be postponed in January 1987. John W. An-
derson, Blood Supplies for Area Called Critically Low, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 3,
1987, at A3, col. 3; Red Cross Short of Type 0 Blood, DAILY BREEZE (Torrance, Cal.),
Jan. 6, 1987; Red Cross Appeals for Donors; Blood Supplies at Critical Levels, BosT.
SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan. 11, 1987, at 37; Red Alert: Red Cross is Short of Blood and
Schedules Several Drives, TiMEs LEADER (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.), Jan. 8, 1987; Charles
Seabrook, Blood Shortage Worst in 10 Years After Forced Discarding of Supplies, AT-
LANTA JOURNAL, Jan. 16, 1987.
271. Kirkendall, 698 F. Supp. at 779.
272. Kirkendall, 887 F.2d at 860-61.
273. Id. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
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[defendant's] conduct with respect to blood that it had in inven-
tory.127 4 The court of appeals held that the blood bank did not vio-
late its duty because it had the unit for only one day after kits
arrived. But plaintiffs won jury verdicts in two other inventory
cases.
275
V. FACTUAL TERRAIN OF THE HOLMES-HAND RULE
Generally, blood banks have prevailed in negligence actions when
industry custom was the standard of due care. That standard as-
sumes that the groups setting care levels have expert status and su-
perior information about risk. The criterion for joint liability in Hall
was whether blasting-cap suppliers controlled risk jointly. The court
believed it was "unlikely" that individual suppliers would collect in-
formation about nationwide accident rates and that it was "entirely
reasonable that [they] ... should delegate this function to a jointly-
sponsored and jointly-financed association. ' 27  Joint liability of the
three blood-collecting organizations for setting the wrong industry
standards has yet to be litigated. My purpose here is to set out the
various issues involved, and if possible to identify which facts would
be dispositive.
A factual inquiry probably would focus on two questions. First,
did the three blood-collecting organizations either claim superior
274. Kirkendall, 887 F.2d at 860-61.
275. Third Amended Complaint, J.A.C. v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. 753-411, 1988
AIDS LITIG. REP. 1962 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 1988) (transfusion Apr. 23, 1985); An-
swer to Third Amended Complaint, J.A.C., id. at 1966; WI Man Awarded $3.9 Million
in Damages for Blood Contamination, id. at 1945; $3.9 Million Verdict Against Blood
Center, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Dec. 16, 1988, at 1; Wisconsin AIDS
Case Settled Out of Court, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Mar. 31, 1989, at
5; Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court of Denver County, 763 P.2d
1003, 1004, 1006 (Colo. 1988); C.W. v. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center, No. 87-
CV-4127 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989) (transfusion Mar. 1985); Denver Blood Bank
Ordered to Pay HIV-Infected Woman $5.5 Million, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP. 2493; Jury
Awards Transfusion Recipient $5.5 Million in AIDS Case, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra
note 14, Apr. 7, 1989, at 1-2; Jury Decides Against Blood Bank in Transfusion Suit,
AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Apr. 7, 1989, at 1-2. In another inventory
testing case the defendant ANRC settled before trial, after which the jury found against
the defendant hospital. Jeanne v. Hawkes Hosp. of Mt. Carmel, No. 87-CV-03-1669
(Ohio Common Pleas Ct. Mar. 8, 1990) (transfusion Mar. 26, 1985), affd, Crystal v.
Hawkes Hosp. of Mt. Carmel, No. 90AP-599, AIDS LITIG. REP. 6476 (1991) (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991) (1991 WL 96356); Ohio Jury Awards $12 Million Verdict to Recipient of
Tainted Blood, 1990 AIDS LITiG. REP. 4205; OH App. Ct. Affirms $8.1 Million Award
in Transfusion Suit, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 6459-60. In two other inventory cases, the
ANRC settled before trial. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 232-34.
276. Hall v. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
knowledge or jointly control risk for patients? Second, did they com-
pare costs and benefits before setting care levels jointly? They have
issued at least nine joint statements since early 1983.17 I will as-
sume each is dispositive evidence of the Hall criteria for joint control
of risk-sharing information, concert of action, or express or tacit
agreement. The joint statement of January 13, 1983, for example,
came about through concert of action. The AABB's representative
described the "time and energy" that went into "reach[ing] a con-
sensus" through "several iterations." He expressed the "hope to keep
it up" and the "belie[f] that the three of us can, together, work out
whatever new problems may arise. We plan frequent conference calls
to keep each other informed."27 8 The key elements of each joint
statement are its date and the risk it controlled-directed donation,
inventory testing, surrogate testing, or warning.
A. Directed Donations
Requests for directed donations signal that patients expect rela-
tively high damages and seek to reduce them. Their willingness to
pay the extra costs, assuming that the costs may be billed to them,27 9
indicates that they think the procedure is cost-effective. On June 22,
1983 the AABB, ANRC, and CCBC issued a joint statement oppos-
ing directed donations.280 Risk for transfusions to patients who were
refused a directed donation was controlled by the individual blood
277. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFI-
CIENCY SYNDROME RELATED TO TRANSFUSION (Jan. 13, 1983); AABB, ANRC, &
CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON PREVENTION OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYN-
DROME RELATED TO TRANSFUSION (Mar. 7, 1983); AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT
STATEMENT ON DIRECTED DONATIONS AND AIDS (June 22, 1983); AABB, ANRC, &
CCBC, LOOK-BACK: NOTIFICATION OF PREVIOUS RECIPIENTS OF BLOOD AND COMPO-
NENTS FROM DONORS WHO Now HAVE A CONFIRMED POSITIVE TEST FOR ANTI-HTLV-
III (June 16, 1986); AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR TESTING
DONATED BLOOD FOR HTLV-I ANTIBODIES (Nov. 4, 1988); AABB, ANRC, & CCBC,
JOINT STATEMENT ON HIV ANTIGEN TESTING (Apr. 5, 1989); AABB, ANRC, &
CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF TESTING VOLUNTEER BLOOD Do-
NORS FOR HEPATITIS C VIRUS INFECTION (Apr. 30, 1990); AABB, ANRC, & CCBC,
JOINT STATEMENT ON SCREENING BLOOD FOR EVIDENCE OF HIV-2 INFECTION (Apr. 30,
1990); AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON DONOR STATUS OF MILITARY
PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AREA (Apr. 3, 1991).
278. Joseph R. Bove, Report to the Board of the American Association of Blood
Banks (Jan. 24, 1983), in Blood Supply Safety, supra note 16, Exhibit C, at 73-74.
279. See supra note 142. In California the extra charges for a directed donation
must be based on costs and may not exceed the charges for an autologous donation. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1628(e) (West 1989). Screening the additional candidates
for directed donors that the family sends to the blood bank may increase operating costs.
However, units that are either not suitable for, or used by, the directed recipient and that
are released to the general donor pool may lower costs.
280. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON DIRECTED DONATIONS AND
AIDS (June 22, 1983). But see Eckert, supra note 22, at 66-69.
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bank before June 1983 and by the blood bank and the three associa-
tions jointly after June 1983. That is consistent with the action
against the San Francisco blood bank concerning its policy on di-
rected donations in January 1983.281 A year later it allowed directed
donations.2 82 Within five years six states forced blood banks to allow
them.283
One would think that directed donations would benefit blood
banks as well as patients. Patients who provided donors, or who de-
clined the chance to provide them, presumably would assume the
risk.284 But the industry's policy was defended by experts in each of
the three organizations.285 On political grounds they thought that it
was unfair to let some patients choose donors when others might not
have enough information or friends to get them. On economic
grounds they feared that directed donations would cause a drop in
regular donations, "seriously disrupt" the blood supply, and perhaps
cause blood banks to be "destroyed."28 These arguments had noth-
ing to do with the costs and benefits of a standard of care, and meet-
ing a standard is not relieved simply because the old way of doing
business is no longer profitable. But the standard that emerged from
the hepatitis cases-industry custom-gave blood banks relatively
weak incentives to let patients assume the risk if operating costs rose
as a result.
On medical grounds the experts argued that patients could not se-
lect donors any better than blood banks because donors might not be
281. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text. Presumably an additional
element of proof would be that the intended donor was not in a high-risk group for HIV
at the time of transfusion. Patti J. Miller et al., Potential Liability for Transfusion-
Associated AIDS: In Reply, 255 J. A.M.A. 196 (1986).
282. Irwin Initiates Directed Donation Program, AABB NEWS BRIEFS, July 1984,
at 1, 4. Some hospitals had allowed directed donations for dialysis and immunosup-
pressed patients for years. They emerged as precaution against AIDS in mid-1983.
Samir K. Ballas et al., Designated Blood Donations, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 124-25
(1984).
283. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1628(a) (West Supp. 1989); 1989 Cal. Stat.
1365; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.6015 (West 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 214.456
(Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2153, 2167 (West 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-24B-1 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-32-103 (1989).
284. Patti J. Miller et al., Potential Liability for Transfusion-Associated AIDS,
253 J. A.M.A. 3419, 3422 (1985).
285. Robert Westphal, Potential Liability for Transfusion-Associated AIDS: To
the Editor, 255 J. A.M.A. 195 (1986); Jay E. Menitove & Joseph R. Bove, Potential
Liability for Transfusion-Associated AIDS: To the Editor, id. at 195-96.
286. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON DIRECTED DONATIONS AND
AIDS (June 22, 1983); Westphal, supra note 285; Joseph R. Bove, Directed Donations,
in LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE, supra note 52, at 70-74; Eckert, supra note
22, at 68.
truthful about risk factors among family and friends.287 They be-
lieved that the extra logistical problems involved would increase the
risk of a patient getting the wrong blood. They also claimed that no
body of evidence showed that directed donors were safer than regu-
lar donors. These arguments were relevant to their claims to superior
knowledge about care levels and amounted to assertions that the ex-
pected costs of the procedure exceeded its unknown benefits.
Blood banks began studies to test the "directed-donor-is-riskier"
hypothesis in 1984-1985. These studies were published in 1986-
1989.288 One of the three blood-collecting organizations published a
study in 1989 based on data collected at twenty banks between Sep-
tember 1987 and March 1988.289 Another study found statistically
the same rate of rejection of regular versus directed donors for mark-
ers for hepatitis viruses and HIV.290 The others found a significantly
higher rate of markers for hepatitis viruses among the directed do-
nors but no difference in the incidence of anti-HIV.29' These results
indicated that, on average, patients were no worse than blood banks
in choosing donors after 1984. That result was contrary to what the
industry expected, but did not lead it to change its policy. Moreover,
patients may have been more effective than blood banks in choosing
donors before 1984-1985, when the AIDS risk was greatest. One
study also showed that directed donations increased donations on
net-another result contrary to the industry's expectation. 29 2
B. Testing Inventories
Neither the industry nor the FDA declared that, once routine
anti-HIV testing began, blood banks had to test inventories and re-
call untested units from hospitals.2 93 Absent such a declaration, the
287. In San Francisco a survey by the blood bank revealed that 4% of donors felt
pressured to give. Vincent A. Yalon & Herbert A. Perkins, Tile Arguments for Directed
Donations, 10 TRANSFUSION SCI. 131 (1989).
288. Id. at. 136; Ruth R. Cordell et al., Experience with 11,916 Designated Do-
nors, 26 TRANSFUSION 484 (1986); Pearl T. Toy et al., Higher Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis
Surrogate Marker Rates in Designated Donor Units, 28 TRANSFUSION 17s (1988 Ab-
stract Supp.).
289. Jane M. Starkey et al., Markers for Transfusion-Transmitted Disease in Dif-
ferent Groups of Blood Donors, 262 J. A.M.A. 3452 (1989).
290. DENNIS GOLDFINGER, THE CASE FOR DIRECTED DONATIONS AND THE CON-
CEPT OF INDIVIDUALIZED CARE IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE (Taft B. Schreiber Blood
Bank, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles), cited in Comment, An Economic
Analysis of Liability for AIDS-Contaminated Blood Products, 12 U. PUOET SOUND L.
REV. 81-82 n.41 (1988), and in Dennis Goldfinger, Directed, Paid and Self Donors, Part
IV, in COMPETITION IN BLOOD SERVICES 149, 151 (AABB ed. 1987).
291. Blood bankers attributed the higher rates of hepatitis markers among directed
donors to the higher fraction of first-time donors among them. Yalon & Perkins, supra
note 287, at 131-32.
292. Id. at 134.
293. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
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AABB, ANRC, and CCBC may have concluded that members were
shielded from negligence by the standard of due care in the hepatitis
cases-industry custom without a cost-benefit comparison. But blood
banks lost two of the three inventory cases.2 94 In affirming the case
that the blood bank won, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the FDA recommendation to test as soon as test kits
were commercially available applied to inventory. 95
Industry custom for inventory testing subsequently changed.
When tests for other viruses were adopted in 1988 and 1990, joint
statements recommended testing inventory or replacing it with tested
material.2 96 In 1990 some blood banks suggested that physicians and
hospitals consider postponing elective surgeries until blood was
tested.297 One bank recalled the units shipped over a seven-week pe-
riod because of a possible error in testing. 2
98
C. Donor Screening and Surrogate Testing
Since at least 1982 the working hypothesis in government and in-
dustry was that transfusion AIDS was caused by an infectious blood-
borne agent.299 The crucial question is whether the industry, in light
of the dominant hypothesis, took screening and testing precautions
that struck a favorable balance between benefits and costs. The
Kozup court held that the failure to take extra precautions in early
1983 was not negligent because the medical community did not
reach a consensus on the hypothesis until January 1984. If consensus
was not reached earlier, however, it was because of objections by the
blood bankers.
294. See supra note 275.
295. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768, 777 (W.D. Ark. 1988),
aff'd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text
and infra Appendix.
296. The standard for antibody to HTLV-I was to test inventory within thirty days
of beginning routine testing. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR TEST-
ING DONATED BLOOD FOR HTLV-1 ANTIBODIES (Nov. 4, 1988); AABB, 1989 ANNUAL
REPORT 11 (1990). The standard for antibody to hepatitis C was to test the most re-
cently collected units first, which is in reverse of the common practice of shipping the
older units to hospitals first. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE IN-
TRODUCTION OF TESTING VOLUNTEER BLOOD DONORS FOR HEPATITIS C VIRUS INFEC-
TION (Apr. 30, 1990); Joint Statement Advises on Planning for HCV Testing, AABB
NEWS BRIEFS, Feb. 1990, at 1; AABB, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1991).
297. AHA Advises Hospitals to Plan Now for Licensure of New Hepatitis Test,
CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Mar. 2, 1990, at 2.
298. Denver Blood Center Issues Voluntary Recall of Blood Units, CCBC NEWS-
LETTER, supra note 14, May 4, 1990, at 4.
299. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
On January 4, 1983, the CDC recommended either more careful
donor screening or surrogate testing.300 On January 13, 1983, the
AABB, ANRC, and CCBC opposed both in a joint statement.
Claiming superior knowledge, they believed that "[d]irect or indirect
questions about a donor's sexual preference are inappropriate" or in-
effective. 30' They were concerned that direct questioning could pro-
voke some persons to donate regardless of their health.302 Until more
data were available, they and the FDA believed-and it was nothing
more than a belief-that it was necessary for only highly promiscu-
ous homosexual or bisexual men to exclude themselves. 3
The blood bankers were concerned over the amount of safe blood
surrogate tests would reject and that they would need new donors to
replace. They assumed that the benefits of surrogates would be less
than the increase in their operating costs. Groups of male homosexu-
als opposed stronger donor screening with sexual-orientation ques-
tions, but they favored surrogate testing.0 4 Nevertheless the blood
bankers rejected the CDC's recommendation until surrogates had
been evaluated around the country. One surrogate, however, had
been used routinely as a screen for hepatitis by four blood banks
*since 1981-1983. Apparently these decisions were based on a com-
parison of the costs and benefits of reducing risk.200
300. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
301. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, JOINT STATEMENT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFI-
CIENCY SYNDROME RELATED TO TRANSFUSION (Jan. 13, 1983). Apparently the state-
ment was prepared at a meeting of the AABB's Committee on Transfusion Transmitted
Diseases on Jan. 6, 1983. Present were representatives of the three blood-collecting orga-
nizations, the CDC, the FDA, and certain groups who were included in the July 1982
meeting and the Atlanta meeting (see infra Appendix). Memorandum from Edward 0.
Carr, AABB, President, Joint Statement on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) Related to Transfusion, to AABB Institutional and Associate Institutional Mem-
bers (Jan. 13, 1983).
302. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The director of the New York
Blood Center said in 1986 that "[w]e never encouraged-as a matter of fact for many
years have discouraged-donations in the gay community. This was done not as a public
policy, but by not seeking donations in any orgainized groups." Statement of Johanna
Pindyck, Vice President, New York Blood Center, in LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION
MEDICINE, supra note 52, at 51.
303. It was not until September 1985 that FDA expressly excluded any male who
has had sex with another male even once since 1977. See supra note 83 and accompany-
ing text.
304. SHILTS, supra note 37, at 222, 238; Paul Jacobs, U.S. Seeks to Halt Spread
of New Disease, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1983, pt. 1, at 3. A group of physicians in San
Francisco devoted to promoting the health of homosexuals took the same position. Os-
born v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 92 D.A.R. 4890, 4898 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
305. Two major studies published in 1981 estimated that testing for elevated levels
of alanine aminotransferase (ALT) would eliminate between 29% and 40% of post-
transfusion hepatitis cases and half the worst cases, at a loss of between 1.6% and 3.0%
of donors. Richard D. Aach et al., Serum Alanine Aminotransferase of Donors in Rela-
tion to the Risk of Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis in Recipients: The Transfusion-Transmitted
Viruses Study, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED. 989 (1981); Harvey J. Alter et al., Donor Tran-
saminase and Recipient Hepatitis: Impact on Blood Transfusion Services, 246 J. A.M A,
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On July 1, 1983, the Stanford University Blood Bank imple-
mented a surrogate test for AIDS based on an abnormality in cer-
tain white blood cells (called T-cells) that is characteristic of many
healthy persons and almost all AIDS patients. The test was not per-
fect and cost six dollars per unit, but it identified some infective do-
nors who were allowed to donate at other blood banks.3"6 The head
of the ANRC's blood service opposed the T-cell test because of its
cost and the amount of blood it would reject. Another blood banker
criticized Stanford's action as a "marketing tool for a medical
center" that was "distasteful."3 07 In September 1984 the blood bank
at Tulane University Medical Center adopted the T-cell test.30 8
In May 1984 the blood bank in San Francisco adopted as a surro-
gate for AIDS the hepatitis test that the CDC recommended in
1983, and a month later the ANRC's regional center in San Jose
followed suit.30 9 Later the San Francisco bank discovered that the
CDC's prediction in 1983 that the test would reject blood that was
infected with HIV had been correct.3 10 Two more blood banks began
to use the test in early 1986. A study showing that the test also
630 (1981). In July 1981 the Central Indiana Regional Blood Center began routine ALT
testing. Letter from Byron B. Buhner, President, Central Indiana Regional Blood Center,
to Ross D. Eckert (Jan. 3, 1991). In July 1982 the New York Blood Center implemented
the test and expected that it would prevent 10,000 cases of transfusion hepatitis per year
at the cost of $200 per case. Remarks of Johanna Pindyck, Vice President, New York
Blood Center, in LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE, supra note 52, at 46-47. In
January 1981 it was implemented at the blood banks of the National Institutes of Health
(Bethesda, Md.), and in April 1983 it was implemented at the Oklahoma Blood Institute
(Oklahoma City). Hernandez v. Nueces County Medical Soc'y Community Blood Bank,
779 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). The ALT test produced benefits in excess
of costs that included replacing rejected donors but not the lost wages of patients. Marc
D. Silverstein et al., Should Donor Blood Be Screened for Elevated Alanin Amino-
transferase Levels? A Cost-Effective Analysis, 252 J. A.M.A. 2839 (1984).
306. Jeffrey Lifson & Edgar Engleman, Second Opinion. Special Report on AIDS,
STANFORD MEDICINE, Spring 1985, at 24-25.
307. Marilyn Chase, 'Gift of Life' May Be Also an Agent of Death in Some AIDS
Cases, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1984, at A24.
308. Dylan Landis, Tulane Ignores Critics in Planning AIDS Test, TIMES-PICA-
YUNE, Sept. 14, 1984, at A-1. Tulane used the test until June 1, 1987 even though the
anti-HIV test was implemented on April 1, 1985. Letter from Charlee Verrett, Manager
of Blood Services, Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic, to Ross D. Eckert (Jan.
3, 1991).
309. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 637, 641
n.4 (D.S.C. 1989); Engleman, testimony in Blood Supply Safety, supra note 16, at 98-
99.
310. Blood Bank Will Use Second Test in Drive to Reduce AIDS Risk, WALL ST.
J., March 30, 1984, at 19, at col. 5. About 40% of donors who te'sted positive for anti-
HIV also were positive on the surrogate test. Pekkanen, supra note 19, at 40; Busch et
al., supra note 92, at 7; Thomas F. Zuck, Silent Sequences and the Safety of Blood
Transfusions, 108 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 895, 896 (1988).
detected donors exposed to viral hepatitis led an FDA advisory panel
in 1986 to recommend that blood banks use two surrogates for hepa-
titis.311 In 1987 the AABB finally agreed. 312 In 1991 the FDA rec-
ommended that blood banks use one test.313
The surrogate testing controversy offers more evidence about how
the AABB, ANRC, and CCBC set care levels jointly. They dis-
counted the advice of experts who were outside the industry's coun-
cils, whether at the CDC or at blood banks, and who recommended
new precautions. An abstract of a study on the T-cell surrogate for
AIDS at the Stanford University Blood Bank was submitted for
presentation at the 1983 AABB annual meeting, but it was re-
jected.1 4 An abstract of a study showing the effectiveness of T-cell
testing was submitted for presentation at the 1989 AABB annual
meeting, but it was also rejected." 5
The industry's 1983 joint statement on directed donations was typ-
ical in that it put the burden of proof on those advocating extra pre-
cautions.3 16 That bias was apparent in the earlier controversy over a
test for cytomegalovirus.317 The test was inexpensive and prevented
311. Hernandez v. Nueces County Medical Soc'y Community Blood Bank, 779
S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). In 1986 it was estimated that testing for an-
tibody to the hepatitis B core antigen would cut hepatitis cases by 43% with a loss of
4% of donors. Deloris E. Koziol et al., Antibody to Hepatitis B Core Antigen as a Para-
doxical Marker for Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis Agents in Donated Blood, 104 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 488 (1986).
312. AABB Issues Guidelines on Surrogate Testing for NANB Hepatitis, AABB
BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Aug. 15, 1986, at 1, 3; FDA Advisory Committee
Supports AABB Policies on Surrogate Testing, Confidential Unit Exclusion System,
AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Sept. 12, 1986, at 1-2; Board Delays Enforce-
ment of Requirement for Core Testing, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Nov.
21, 1986, at 1; Workshop Affirms Efficacy of Anti-Core Test for NANB Hepatitis,
AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Jan. 23, 1987, at 1; AABB Reaffirms Decision
to Require ALT and Anti-HBc Testing, AABB BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Feb.
20, 1987, at 1. See also AABB Tells Members They May Delay Implementation of
Anti-HBc Testing, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Nov. 21, 1986, at 1; Bove, supra
note 77, at 143; and infra Appendix.
313. Memorandum from Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr., Acting Director, Center for Bio-
logics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Recommen-
dations Concerning Testing for Antibody to Hepatitis B Core Antigen (Anti-HBc), to all
registered blood establishments (Sept. 10, 1991).
314. EDGAR G. ENGLEMAN, AIDS AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY: A REPORT TO THE
PRES COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 4, appendix
(May 9, 1988); Testimony in PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC. HEARING ON: THE SAFETY OF THE BLOOD SUPPLY.
AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE. HEALTH CARE WORKER SAFETY 47-48 (1988).
315. The technique used at Stanford was estimated to capture 11 of 17 HIV-1
positive units. See M. Gonzalez et al., Retrospective Analysis of CD4:CD8 in Preventing
HIV-1 Transmission, submission form for abstracts, AABB Annual Meetings, 1989; Let-
ters and Enclosures from F. Carl Grumet, Professor of Pathology, Stanford University
School of Medicine to Ross D. Eckert (Nov. 15, 1989 & Dec. 29, 1989).
316. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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devastating illness in premature infants."i But the AABB approved
it only after several years of debate, limited its use to regions
"[w]here transfusion-associated [CMV] disease is a problem,"3 19
and did not recommend it for transplant patients. In 1988 the medi-
cal director of the Stanford University Blood Bank said that "until
very recently the industry has steadfastly resisted the addition of
new tests, requiring that the utility of any candidate test must be
proven over and over and over again before it can even be considered
for mandatory use. '"320
D. Warnings
According to Hall, whether an industry must warn under either
strict liability or negligence depends upon whether benefits outweigh
costs. An activity involving a small likelihood of death may require
more careful warnings than an activity involving a higher probability
of a lesser harm.321 In Canifax suppliers were required to warn if the
risk was not common knowledge.322 The Restatement does not re-
lieve suppliers of the duty to warn, whether or not products are "un-
reasonably dangerous" under comment k.323 Even if the comment k
defense logically fit blood, which it does not, blood banks would not
318. Anne S. Yeager et al., Prevention of Transfusion-Acquired Cytomegalovirus
Infections in Newborn Infants, 98 J. PEDIATRICS 281 (1981).
319. AABB STANDARDS § G6.600. See also Paul J. Schmidt, Revisions to Stan-
dards for Blood Banks and Transfusion Services Announced, AABB NEWS BRIEFS, June
1982, at 4-5; Cytomegalovirus Infection and Blood Transfusion, AABB NEWS BRIEFS,
June 1984, at 1; Letter and Enclosures from F. Carl Grumet, Professor of Pathology,
Stanford University School of Medicine, to Ross D. Eckert (Dec. 29, 1989).
320. ENGLEMAN, supra note 314, at 6-7. In 1986 Bove stated that "[a]lthough the
data [supporting the CMV test] ... seemed unamibiguous and decisive enough to man-
date an immediate change in blood bank practice, neither the [FDA, AABB, or ANRC]
... took decisive action. Blood banks always have been conservative about the addition of
new tests or restrictions without adequate documentation of their need." Apparently the
dominant view was that CMV-related infection was confined to certain local areas. A
study showing causation was published in-1983, and "mounting pressure from neonatolo-
gists, forced most blood banks to adopt some program to reduce the risk ... in selected
newborn infants." Bove, supra note 77, at 126. By 1983 "[s]everal relatively simple and
inexpensive tests [had] been developed." Cytomegalovirus Infection and Blood Transfu-
sion, supra note 319, at 2.
321. Hall v. DuPont, 345 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
322. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
323. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-91 (5th Cir.
1973) (applying Texas law) (expert manufacturers had duty to warn employees of possi-
ble hazards of asbestos); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-76 (5th Cir. 1974)
(applying Texas law) (manufacturers of prescription drugs have duty to warn prescribing
physicians, and drugs with proper warnings are not unreasonably dangerous).
be relieved of a duty to warn.
In 1986 the three blood-collecting organizations issued a joint
statement agreeing to notify hospitals of possible transfusion-trans-
mitted HIV infections.324 When a donor is found to be positive for
anti-HIV, the blood bank "looks back" through its records for previ-
ous donations by that person and notifies the hospital(s) to which the
unit(s) were shipped. The hospital or treating physician then notifies
the patient(s). That puts the blood bank in the unenviable position of
providing information that may identify future plaintiffs in actions
against it. Blood banks adopted the policy out of a concern that an
unaware transfusion recipient could transmit HIV infection to
spouses or others. But they probably have a duty to warn learned
intermediaries of subsequently discovered dangers. 20 Warnings are
low-cost ways to enable consumers to attempt to reduce damages.
Patients cannot make informed decisions about whether to postpone
or forgo treatment unless physicians inform them of hazards and
benefits. Physicians are more likely to inform patients properly if
blood banks inform physicians properly. Blood bankers are special-
ists; they presumably are held to the knowledge and skill of experts,
who are supposed to keep up with scientific developments.3 26 Their
committees set industry standards. In 1988 in another context a
blood banker and former FDA official appeared to claim expert sta-
tus for blood bankers:
Who should educate physicians? The risks of blood transfusions ... are
small parts of the enormous volume of literature on modern technology
thrust upon physicians. Blood bankers are suited to assume the tasks of
education because of their special interests in these areas.327
The risk of transfusion AIDS was foreseeable by blood bankers as
early as July 1982 at least, and on January 4, 1983, the CDC
warned them publicly.328 The ANRC's assistant legal counsel argued
324. AABB, ANRC, & CCBC, LOoK-BACK: NOTIHCATION OF PREVIous RECIPI-
ENTS OF BLOOD AND COMPONENTS FROM DONORS WHO Now HAVE A CONFIRMED POSI-
TIVE TEST FOR ANTI-HTLV-III (June 16, 1986). The AABB supplied members with
model letters to heads of hospitals and transfusion services and forms on which to record
information about the patients who received the units in question. Memorandum from
Eugene M. Berkman, President, AABB, "Look-back" Program to Trace Recipients of
Blood from Donors Now Found to Be HTLV-III Antibody Positive, to AABB Institu-
tional and Associate Institutional Members (June 16, 1986) (with attachments).
325. Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1978) (physi-
cian's failure to warn a patient that an intrauterine device had been withdrawn from the
market, and the risk was foreseeable, was malpractice). In 1985 the AABB's legal coun-
sel noted the implications of that case for blood banks. Willett, supra note 54, at 65-67,
199.
326. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d. 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying Texas law) (expert manufacturers had duty to warn employees of possible
hazards of asbestos).
327. Zuck, supra note 310, at 896.
328. See supra note 77 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
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that the joint statement of January 13, 1983 was a warning to physi-
cians . 29 The statement declared that "the cause of AIDS is un-
known," that "evidence for its transmission by blood is
inconclusive," "still unproven," and only a "possibility," but was of
"sufficient concern" to warrant "[a]dditional caution in the use of
blood." It made recommendations to blood banks and explained why
the AABB, ANRC, and CCBC believed that strong screening and
surrogate testing were unnecessary. It urged blood bankers to "ex-
tend education campaigns to physicians to balance the decision to
use each blood component against the risks of transfusion" and rec-
ommended that autologous blood (predeposited units of a patient's
own blood) "should be considered more frequently, especially in elec-
tive surgery." The statement shows that blood bankers believed they
had superior information and that they controlled risk to patients. It
also contained a gross underestimate of the risk of transfusion AIDS
relative to what later studies showed.330 Whether it was a warning to
physicians is debatable, although one court took it as a warning. 33'
For some time the three blood banking organizations have jointly
prepared the Circular of Information, which is distributed to hospi-
tals and physicians.332 In 1986 the ANRC's assistant legal counsel
stated that the Circular was revised in July 1985 to disclose HIV
risks.333 The document she cites was not on file at the FDA in
1990.11" In any event the key issue is whether the AABB, ANRC,
and CCBC issued a clear warning to physicians before 1985. For my
part, I could not find one, and I note that in 1985 AABB's legal
counsel said:
I think that the difference [before 1985] was that physicians may well not
have appreciated the degree of the risk of AIDS that attended blood trans-
fusion. That's conjecture on my part and is something that's better an-
swered by experts. I hope they won't have to take the stand and do it, but
that's my impression now.335
329. Karen S. Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131, 139 (1986).
330. See supra note 79, 89-92 and accompanying text.
331. Anonymous Blood Recipient v. William Beaumont Hosp., No. 89-363705-
NH, 1991 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5942, 5949-50 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Oakland County Feb. 7,
1991) (transfusion Nov. 1983).
332. See supra note 63.
333. Lipton, supra note 329, at 139 n.40.
334. In December 1989 I requested copies of the CIRCULAR OF INFORMATION since
1980 from the FDA's Freedom of Information Branch. On Feb. 12, 1990 I received three
undated copies. One published by the AABB and the ANRC circa 1982 does not men-
tion AIDS. Two copies of another edition published by the AABB, ANRC, and CCBC
circa 1985 warn physicians that donor "screening may not eliminate the risk of AIDS."
335. Willett, supra note 54, at 65.
VI. RETHINKING THE BLOOD SHIELD LAWS
Attorneys for blood banks anticipated that the negligence rule
from the hepatitis cases-industry custom without a cost-benefit
test-would be the standard of due care for AIDS.3 36 Apart from
the inventory-testing cases (for which no express standard was set)
and a few other exceptions, they were mainly correct. But the indus-
try custom cases raise problems if interests other than the well-being
of blood banks are at stake.
First, some witnesses may have complex incentives. As a rule, only
blood bankers may testify as experts on the prevailing professional
standard of care at blood banks, 337 even though the outcome of the
trial could indirectly affect the future liability of the expert's blood
bank. Also, plaintiffs who join blood banks and hospitals as defend-
ants may encourage cooperation among parties whose interests might
otherwise diverge-on warnings, for example.33 8
Second, courts misunderstand facts. In Kozup, the key case, the
court misunderstood the risk of an infectious disease, constructed an
erroneous chronology of the industry's response to AIDS, and did
not realize that blood tests have error rates.
Third, the industry custom standard renders the key issue of
whether the industry adopted a cost-beneficial standard of care
moot. Industry custom means that courts review only gross negli-
gence or those blood bank practices for which standards do not exist.
Standard-setting is relegated to the FDA and to an influential indus-
try that acts jointly and usually puts the burden of proof on those
who advocate new precautions.
I conclude that the problems of using a negligence rule to induce
blood bankers to make cost-benefit calculations before jointly setting
care levels are so great that a rule of strict liability is worth recon-
sidering. Though blood bankers, like the veterinary assistant in Nel-
son, are the party in the best position to take the cost-effective
precaution, they are protected against strict liability by a chain of
336. Lipton, supra note 329, at 144; Willett, supra note 54, at 95. See also Rabkin
& Rabkin, supra note 177, at 2243.
337. This is California law. Jury Upholds Voluntary Blood Service AIDS Screen-
ing Procedures in 1983, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, June 10, 1988; General
Order No. 8: Standard of Care, In re: Complex Blood Bank Litigation, No. 908-843,
1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 4761-62 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County June 27, 1990)
(more than twenty consolidated cases); CA CT: Blood Banks to Be Judged by Profes-
sional Care Standard, id. at 4744-45; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 864-
989 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County, June 7, 1991) (transfusion 1983); CA Jury
Relieves Irwin of Liability for Tainted Transfusion, 1991 AIDS LiTir. REP. 6466-67.
338. In 1986, an attorney for a blood products manufacturer said that "[t]hus far
we've been able to avoid the blood organizations fighting among themselves and with the
prescribing physicians. That sort of fighting will make the case for plaintiffs." ABC
Board Reviews New Donor Group, Confidential Unit Exclusion, AABB BLOOD BANK
WEEK, supra note 5, Dec. 19, 1986, at 3.
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fictions that most state legislatures and jurisdictions accept: (1) that
blood bankers have no better information about transfusion risks
than physicians or patients; (2) that donor screening cannot substi-
tute for laboratory testing; and (3) that the Restatement's comment
k applies because blood is like a vaccine. None of these assumptions
has any support by logic or by empirical evidence.
Perhaps the most influential argument that led courts and legisla-
tures to adopt shields is the fear that strict liability would curtail
blood supplies .33  I interpret this theory to mean that the litigation
damages that blood banks would sustain without an exemption from
strict liability would be so great that they would cease to operate. In
other words, blood banks-after adopting the better screening, test-
ing, or warnings that strict liability required-could not raise the
price of their products sufficiently to continue making a profit. It is
not clear to me, however, why this argument applies to blood bank-
ing uniquely. Other industries continue to operate in spite of the
higher costs that strict liability causes-whether they are competi-
tive or monopolistic, for-profit or not-for-profit.3 40 At any rate, the
purpose of a strict liability rule is not to minimize industry operating
costs. Its purpose is to strengthen the incentives of producers to com-
pare the costs and benefits of precautions whenever they have supe-
rior information about risk and to remove impediments to disclosing
useful information to consumers.341 The argument that blood banks
cannot survive with strict liability is tantamount to arguing that they
cannot survive if consumers are fully informed about transfusion
339. For hepatitis cases that invoke the blood-supply issue to exempt blood banks
from strict liability judicially, see Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1133
(D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 333 So. 2d 354, 359 (La.
Ct. App. 1976). For hepatitis cases that invoke the blood-supply issue as they uphold
statutory shields, see Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 613, 109
Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1973); Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood Bank,
Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 417, 419-20, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92, 93 (1976); McDonald v. Sacra-
mento Med. Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 872-73, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447-
48 (1976); Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hosp., 528 A.2d 805, 810 (Conn. 1987). For
AIDS cases that apply statutory shields, see supra note 207.
340. The failure of blood banks to provide the correct level of safety-that is, the
standard of care that consumers value in excess of its extra cost--does not appear to be
related to their typical positions as regional monopolies. Monopolists charge monopoly
prices, but the theory of monopoly does not imply that profit-seeking monopolists will fail
to provide increments in product quality that consumers are willing to pay for. Moreover,
it is not clear that the not-for-profit status of blood banks is relevant. As the AABB's
executive director said, "Think of us as tax-exempt rather than not-for-profit. We have to
make a profit." Quoted in Andrea Rock, Inside the Billion-Dollar Business of Blood,
MONEY, Mar. 1986, at 153, 158.
341. ECKERT & SMITH, supra note 126.
risk.
Under the industry custom rule at the present, blood bankers
screen donors relatively lightly342 and rely on laboratory tests for an-
tibody reactions, which have error rates. They use a pool of about 9
million donors, who give an average of 1.5 times per year. About
one-fifth of this group are first-time donors, who are more likely to
transmit disease.34 3 In 1987 repeat women donors were nine times
less risky than first-time males, but women constituted only 42% of
the pool.344
Since under the strict liability rule the legal risk of using such a
huge donor pool would increase, blood bankers would find it re-
warding to screen donors more carefully. Either they can test inside
the laboratory for antibody reactions or they can "test" more exten-
sively outside the laboratory for donor characteristics associated with
lower risk. What I and others have proposed are donor regis-
tries-limited panels of low-risk repeat donors who are in good
health to begin with, who maintain their health, who have not been
transfused since 1977, who agree to a confidential and more detailed
medical history (including questions about promiscuity), who have
not had a venereal disease, and who agree to more extensive testing
of their blood, if necessary, than was routine at blood banks in 1991.
Registry donors would give as often as good health allowed and
would be replaced only when necessary with new, equally well
screened and tested persons from the same low-risk groups. 3 "5
One difference between registries and the donor screening recom-
mendations that the FDA issued in 1990 is that the FDA excludes
persons who have exchanged money or drugs for sex, have had
syphilis or gonorrhea (but not other venereal diseases), or who have
received a transfusion of blood or blood products within the past
twelve months. In registries these events or behaviors (and others)
would establish lifetime exclusions. 346 The FDA's decision to recom-
mend that blood banks ask donors directly about all risk behaviors,
342. See supra note 39 and accompanying text describing the FDA donor screen-
ing recommendations of December 1990.
343. Yearly attrition of donors in the ANRC system is about 15%. S. Gerald
Sandier, The Case for Enrolling and Testing, but Not Collecting, During a Donor's First
Visit, Presentation at the 28th Annual Meeting of the Council of Community Blood Cen-
ters, Clearwater, Fla. (Feb. 18-22, 1990), at 3. First-time donors are riskier because
repeated medical history screening sometimes reveals information justifying exclusion
that the donor forgot to mention previously. Yalon & Perkins, supra note 287, at 132;
Leitman et al., supra note 42.
344. Cumming et al., supra note 32, at 944-45.
345. Eckert, supra note 22, at 14-26; Kessel, supra note 139, at 272-76, 287 n.71.
346. A survey by CDC in early 1990 revealed that between 1977 and 1985, 5% of
adults (about 9 million) had received a blood transfusion and 1% (1.8 million) did not
know whether they had been transfused. CDC Reports New Information on AIDS and
Blood Donation, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Oct. 26, 1990, at 4-7.
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however, is a step in the right direction.
Available evidence shows that stronger donor screening culls infec-
tious blood when dangerous viruses cannot be detected by specific
laboratory tests. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s the Mayo
Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota-in a rural area of about
120,000 residents and employees-utilized a "small, selected,
targeted and tested donor pool." 4" It rejected random or walk-in
volunteers that regular blood banks accepted. Registered donors,
many of whom received cash or other awards, gave three to four
times per year. In 1976 donors who were hepatitis B carriers at the
Mayo clinic were about one-eighth as common as at the nearby
ANRC regional center, which was the safest Red Cross blood in the
United States at the time.348 In a 1976 report to the Congress the
Comptroller General found similar results at other hospitals that
used registries. 349 These arrangements once were common and are of
the kind that strict liability would encourage. That makes it difficult
for me to believe that strict liability would cause blood banks to
close.
Even such a simple factor as geography can reduce HIV risk. In
the fifty states in the year ending February 1992, 44,474 AIDS cases
for all risks were reported to the CDC. Figure 2 shows that 28,726
or about 65% were concentrated in six states: New York (7,910),
California (8,317), Florida (5,585), Texas (3,061), New Jersey
(2,212), and Illinois (1,641). Six other states had 86 cases or about
0.19%: Montana (26), Alaska (23), Vermont (14), Wyoming (14),
South Dakota (5), and North Dakota (4).350 The distribution of
blood donors with anti-HIV in 1986-1987 by state on a per capita
basis in Figure 3 shows a similar pattern. In California in 1987-
1988, for example, blood donors with anti-HIV were about twice as
likely to be found among men than women and about twice as likely
347. Howard F. Taswell, Directed, Paid and Self Donors, in COMPETITION IN
BLOOD SERVICES 147 (AABB ed. 1987). Noncash volunteer donors required more blood
bank personnel, higher solicitation costs, longer hours of operations, and resulted in less
blood harvester per donor. Unit costs were about half as much with cash donors, com-
pared to noncash volunteers. Id. at 144-46.
348. Kessel, supra note 139, at 287; Taswell, Director, Mayo Clinic Blood Bank,
Statement in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DEFINITIONS OF VOLUNTARY
AND PAID BLOOD DONORS 91a, 93a (1976).
349. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEPATITIS FROM BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS:
EVALUATION OF METHODS TO REDUCE THE PROBLEM, Report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General 7-23 (Feb. 13, 1976).
350. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., supra
note 3, at 5.
to be found in Los Angeles and San Francisco as in the rest of the
state.351 In 1987-1989 the rate of HIV infection among San Fran-
cisco blood donors was 1.5 times the national average.5 2 Metropoli-
tan areas under 500,000 population reported 10% of all AIDS cases
before 1985 but 19% in 1988.153 In summary, although geography
has become a less effective marker for risk as the HIV epidemic has
advanced, it remains reasonably accurate. It is not, however, a pan-
acea. In some rural areas viral hepatitis and diseases spread by bites
from ticks and fleas are relatively common, so careful donor screen-
ing remains essential.
FIGURE 2
Adult-adolescent and pediatric AIDS cases, reported March








Source: CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEIL-
LANCE REP., March 1992, at 4.
351. Michael J. Hughes et al., Prevalence of HIV Antibody Among Blood Donors
in California, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 974 (1989).
352. Herbert A. Perkins, More on Transmission of HIV by Blood Transfusion,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 463 (1989).
353. Centers for Disease Control, First 100,000 Cases of AIDS, supra note 3, at
561.
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FIGURE 3
HIV antibody prevalence (percent positive) in blood donors, combined data
from adjacent centers, by state, July 1986-June 1987
M.025 - .040
M .020 - .024
63.015 - .019
0.010- .014
S0.000 - .009 P'A
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Source: Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Public Health Service,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A
Review of Current Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. No. S-6 at 44 (1987).
A blood bank's "critical decisions," Marc Franklin argued, "are
where to conduct its business and which donors it will seek out and
use. 354 Locating blood banks in cities where the incidence of viral
hepatitis was high-when direct tests for viruses were poor, and
without using registries-was a fateful decision. 55 The effect of in-
troducing strict liability would be to lead blood banks in higher-risk
areas to become centers for distributing to hospitals blood that is
354. Franklin, supra note 139, at 466.
355. The high rates of transfusion hepatitis in the 1960s and 1970s are usually
attributed to paying donors cash, but were in fact caused by the location of blood banks
and by inadequate donor screening. See Eckert, supra note 22, at ch. 2.
imported from lower-risk areas. In the era before preservatives ex-
tended shelf life it was probably necessary to collect blood near hos-
pitals. Blood is now regularly shipped within the AABB, ANRC,
and CCBC "exchanges." Los Angeles imports blood from
Oklahoma, and New York imports it from Florida and Europe. In
1991 about one blood donation in ten crossed state lines. 356 Hence,
strict liability would cause changes that are only a matter of degree.
Experience indicates that blood bankers respond to changes in lia-
bility rules. For example, blood banks lost two inventory-testing
cases and were reversed in principle on the appeal of the case that
they won. Later, when new tests were introduced, the industry
adopted stronger rules for testing inventory.3 7 By the same token, I
expect that donor screening practices would improve if strict liability
became the rule.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Blood safety in the United States is determined by blood bankers
and by politicians in state legislatures and in the FDA. Their strat-
egy has been to displace the ex post private damage action with ex
ante incentive controls through a combination of industry self-regu-
lation and direct FDA regulation. State laws shield blood banks
from strict liability. In negligence cases the standard of due care is
usually industry custom. Under this relatively weak rule blood banks
have won most of the AIDS cases, including the most important
ones. The FDA relies heavily on the industry for advice in setting
key risk-management standards. The probability of requiring a
transfusion in a given year is so low that it does not pay the average
consumer to learn more about blood safety or to try to influence reg-
ulation. The gains of lobbying exceed costs for the blood banks, so
they have influence over the politicians in state legislatures and at
356. Gaul, supra note 31; Gaul, supra note 68; Robert Baker, Red Cross is Laying
Off 80; Will Collect Less Blood, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at B3; Blood and Plasma
Organizations Urge FDA to Preempt State and Local Laws, CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra
note 14, May 10, 1991, at 4-5. Some blood banks that ship blood extensively tell donors
that it lowers operating costs. Resource Sharing Beneficial to Central Iowans, in LIFE
CYCLES: A PUBLICATION OF THE BLOOD CENTER OF CENTRAL IOWA, Fall/Winter 1989,
reprinted in CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Jan. 5, 1990, at app.; Saving Lives
Elsewhere, QUAD CITY TIMES, July 31, 1991; Statement of the Mississippi Valley Re-
gional Blood Center, reprinted in CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Aug. 2, 1991, at
app.; Blood Supply Safety (1991), supra note 39, at 225-29, 241-47, 260-67, 281-84,
passim. Even platelets, which are often given to chemotherapy patients and have a rela-
tively short shelf life, are routinely shipped around the country within 24 hours of
donation.
357. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued
that the availability of an effective laboratory test for anti-HIV undermines the premise
of blood shield statutes and justifies strict liability. Note, AIDS; Blood Bank Liability,
supra note 258, at 372-73.
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the FDA.358
The precautions that the industry and the FDA have taken since
AIDS emerged have been viewed by a presidential commission as
too little and too late.3 59 But neither the industry nor the FDA con-
cedes any errors, and the mechanism by which each makes decisions
has not changed materially. The industry continues to be conserva-
tive in adding new precautions. It believes that its response to AIDS
was appropriate and that the public has an unrealistic expectation of
blood safety.360
I argue that industry self-regulation and direct FDA controls have
been a poor substitute for liability. Since blood bankers have supe-
rior information on how to reduce transfusion risks by screening do-
nors, testing blood, and warning physicians, it would be appropriate
for them to be subject to strict liability. Since their three trade as-
sociations claim expert status, set key care levels, and jointly control
risks, joint liability for negligence should be considered. The result-
ing factual inquiry would help to determine whether they chose cost-
beneficial care levels.
The future course of litigation against individual blood banks is
unclear. Among potential plaintiffs, about seven percent of those
with transfusion AIDS are children. Their economic damages, ac-
cording to theories based on lost earnings, are speculative. That may
weaken the incentives of attorneys to take their cases. Some states
extend statutes of limitations and statutory caps for malpractice
awards to blood banks, which further weakens such incentives. 361 At-
torneys of defendants may specialize in blood cases more than those
358. This outcome is common in regulated industries. See George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211
(1976).
359. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRus EPIDEMIC 78 (1988).
360. That was the theme of industry and regulatory participants in a 1989 confer-
ence that they organized. See The Nation's Blood Supply: Is Absolute Safety Achieva-
ble? A Special Report on a Symposium Co-Sponsored by the Food and Drug
Administration and the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute, November 1, 1989,
CCBC NEWSLETTER, supra note 14, Oct. 27, 1989, at 10-15.
361. Owing to HIV's long latency, plaintiffs may not have claims if blood banks
are considered providers of medical services and if statutes of limitations for medical
malpractice toll from the date treatment for the primary illness was terminated rather
than from when the HIV infection was discovered. Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center, 721
F. Supp. 1073 (D.Minn. 1989). In New York, HIV in blood is considered a toxic sub-
stance, and the statute of limitations tolls from the date that the injury was discovered.
DiMarco v. Hudson Valley Blood Servs., 542 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
Twenty-five states cap malpractice damage awards, usually for noneconomic damages
of plaintiffs. But two courts broke with the precedent of granting
defendant blood banks an order to protect the confidentiality of their
internal documents.362 That may lower the cost of bringing new
lawsuits.
Even if the debate over liability for transfusion AIDS is nearly
over, our society is at a crossroads. The supply of viruses and para-
sites is not likely to decline. Strict liability for blood banks would
encourage them to solicit donors in low-risk areas and to screen them
more carefully. Most major cities do not produce the wheat or let-
tuce that they consume. Why should they collect blood locally if it
can be obtained more safely through inter-regional transactions?
Perhaps their experience with AIDS will lead blood bankers to
choose different care levels before the next deadly virus arrives. But
in 1983 they preferred the risks of controversy and litigation to the
extra costs of precautions or clear warnings. Plaintiffs and defend-
ants bear their own costs, so litigation is expensive for defendants
even when they triumph. In 1989 apparently some blood bankers
were concerned about the adequacy of their malpractice insurance 363
and were sour about lawsuits and public criticism. An FDA blood-
banking official said, before he became the executive director of the
AABB, that "one hears recurrently about how the fun has gone out
of blood banking, of the lack of appreciation of the public and the
media. 36 4 Will the gratitude that blood bankers seem to crave for
only. Indiana's cap is $750,000. Isabel Wilkerson, Indiana Law at Center of Malpractice
Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1990, at A13. California caps noneconomic awards for
malpractice at $250,000 and exempts providers of medical services from the collateral
source rule for insurance benefits. When California courts applied that statute to blood
banks, an attorney for blood banks stated that the rule "should have a dramatic effect on
the future of litigation." CA Appeals Court Affirms Blood Bank's Coverage by MICRA,
1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 4543, 4571; CA Supreme Court Rejects Review of MICRA
Application Rulings, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 4899-900. See also Blood Bank Granted
Partial Summary Judgment in CA HIV Trial, 1989 AIDS LiTiG. REP. 3123-24; CA
Judge Applies MICRA Cap to Blood Banks in All AIDS Cases, 1989 AIDS LITIG. REP.
3630.
362. Vansant v. American Red Cross, No. 4881 (Pa. Court of Common Pleas,
Sept. Term, 1989); PA Court Rejects Protective Order for Red Cross Documents, 1990
AIDS LITIG. REP. 4602-03; Motion of the American Red Cross for Protective Order, id.
at 4630; Memorandum of the American Red Cross in Support of Its Motion for a
Protective Order, id. at 4632; Plaintiffs' Response to American Red Cross' Motion for
Protective Order, id. at 4615; Order, Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, No. 1:89-
CV-1073-MHS, 1990 AIDS LITIG. REP. 5124 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 1990); GA CT Red
Cross Must Reveal Documents but not Donor Names, id. at 5097-98.
363. Lawyers Accuse Blood Banks of Monopolizing "Expert Witnesses", AABB
BLOOD BANK WEEK, supra note 5, Mar. 3, 1989, at 1; AABB, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT
20 (1990); AABB, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1991); AABB, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 3,
14, 32 (1992). Premiums for blood bank liability insurance were rising and coverage
falling. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 239.
364. Joel Solomon, FDA Viewpoint: A Call for Supervisory Reform, Presentation
to the 35th Annual Meeting of the Michigan Association of Blood Banks, Troy, Mich.
(Sept. 21, 1989), reprinted in PLASMAPHERESIS, Spring 1990, at 18.
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supplying what once was viewed as the "gift of life," plus concern
over malpractice insurance, be enough to get them to take cost-bene-
ficial precautions against the next blood-borne virus or parasite? We
may find out only after it arrives.
APPENDIX. AUTHOR'S CHRONOLOGY OF THE
RESPONSE TO AIDS THREAT.
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE CDC's WARNING
1977
This is the earliest date that AIDS is believed to be transmissible.
June and July 1981
The first cases among homosexual men of what was later called
AIDS are reported in a CDC publication.
July 1982
Three cases among hemophiliacs are reported in a CDC
publication.
July 1982
The New York Blood Center implements a surrogate blood test
for hepatitis.
July 27, 1982
An open meeting of the Public Health Service for blood bankers
and others is held to discuss the hemophilia cases. Various theories
of AIDS are discussed, including its characteristics that suggested
the possibility of a blood-borne infectious agent. The meeting results
in neither recommendation nor action.
December 1982
The death of a San Francisco infant after transfusion from a do-
nor who later died, after being diagnosed with AIDS is reported in a
CDC publication.
January 4, 1983
The CDC convenes a meeting in Atlanta of blood bankers and
others to warn of likelihood that AIDS is caused by a blood-borne
agent. Blood bankers reject the CDC's recommendation either to ask
donors directly about risk behavior or to adopt for AIDS another
surrogate test for hepatitis. No conclusion is reached about how to
exclude high-risk donors.
RESPONSE OF THE FDA AND BLOOD BANKS TO THE CDC's
WARNING
January 13, 1983
The AABB, ANRC, and CCBC issue a joint statement on high-
risk donors. They conclude that evidence for a blood-borne cause of
AIDS is incomplete and that donors should not be asked directly
about risk behavior.
March 4, 1983
A Public Health Service (PHS) interagency group states in a
CDC publication that available evidence suggests that AIDS is
caused by an agent 'that is probably transmitted by blood.
March 7, 1983
The AABB, ANRC, and CCBC issue a new joint statement that
acknowledges the differences between their first joint statement and
the report of the PHS interagency group.
March 24, 1983
The FDA issues donor screening recommendations that identify
risk groups conservatively and are consistent with first joint state-
ment of the blood banks.
April 1, 1983
The blood bank in Oklahoma City implements the surrogate test
for hepatitis adopted in 1982 by the New York Blood Center. By the
end of 1983 about four banks are using this test routinely.
June 22, 1983
The AABB, ANRC, and CCBC issue a joint statement opposing
directed donations.
July 1, 1983
The Stanford University Blood Bank implements its T-cell surro-
gate test for AIDS.
January 1984
A published study links seven AIDS patients to transfusions from
high-risk donors with pre-AIDS blood abnormalities. Later a United
States district court takes this as dispositive evidence as to when the
scientific and medical communities reached a consensus that AIDS
could be blood-borne.
April 1984
Scientific papers identify the AIDS-causing agent (then called
HTLV-III, now called HIV).
May 1, 1984
The San Francisco blood bank implements as a screen for AIDS
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the surrogate hepatitis test that the CDC recommended on January
4, 1983. The ANRC's regional blood center in San Jose followed
suit in June 1984.
September 13, 1984
The Tulane University Medical Center blood bank adopts the T-
cell surrogate test for AIDS that Stanford University Blood Bank
adopted in 1983.
March 2, 1985
The FDA licenses the first test kits to screen blood for the an-
tibody to HIV (anti-HIV).
RESPONSE SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE BLOOD TEST FOR ANTI-
HIV
July 1, 1985
The AABB requires members to test for anti-HIV.
August 1985
The ANRC publishes its initial experience with the anti-HIV test
for over 1,000,000 donors in all ANRC regional centers. The preva-
lence of HIV turns out to be two to three orders of magnitude
greater than the earlier estimates of blood bankers.
December 15, 1986
The FDA recommends that blood banks adopt the confidential
unit exclusion procedure.
July 1, 1987
The AABB requires that members implement the surrogate hepa-
titis test adopted in 1982 by the New York Blood Center as well as
the surrogate hepatitis test recommended for AIDS by the CDC on
January 4, 1983.
January 5, 1988
The FDA requires all blood banks to test for anti-HIV.
June 24, 1988
The Presidential Commission on the HIV epidemic concludes that
the blood banking industry's response to the AIDS threat was "un-
necessarily slow," that the industry was hesitant on economic
grounds to promote strategies to minimize the use of transfusion
therapies, and that the FDA "relies heavily" on the industry for ad-
vice on which standards to set.
December 5, 1990
The FDA removes Haitian immigrants from its list of high-risk
297.
donor groups and recommends that blood banks interrogate donors
directly about risk behaviors.
